wi' 


This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


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^OS  Ai^GtLEs,  CALiF, 


^>» 


PREVIOUS    WRITINGS  OF 
PAUL  S.   REINSCH 

The   Conimon   Law   in  the  Early  American 

Colonies,    1899. 
World  Politics  at  the  End  of  the  Nineteenth 

Century    as   Influenced    by    the    Oriental 

Situation,    1900. 
Colonial  Government,  1902. 
Colonial  Administration,  1905. 
American       Legislatures      and     Legislative 

Methods,  1907. 
Intellectual  Currents  in  the  Far  East,  1911. 
International  Unions,  1911. 
An  American  Diplomat  in  China,  1913-1918, 

1923. 


SECRET    DIPLOMACY 


HOW  FAR  CAN  IT  BE  ELIMINATED? 


BY 

PAUL  S.  REINSCH 


m 


"51)Q>^S 


NEW  YORK 
HARCOURT,  BRACE  AND  COMPANY 


COPYRIGHT,    1922,    BY 
HARCOURT,   BRACE  AND  COMPANY,   INC. 


PHINTE3    IN   THE    U    S    A.  BY 

THE   QUINN    a    rODEN    COMPANY 
RAHiWAY.    N      J. 


3 


The  principal  conclusions  based  on  the  material 
contained  in  this  book  were  presented  by  the  Au- 
thor at  a  joint  meeting  of  the  American  Historical 
Association  and  the  American  Political  Science 
Association,  in  his  address  as  President  of  the 
latter,  on  December  28th,  1920. 


CONTENTS 

Inteoduction 

rAGR 

3 

CHAPTER 
I. 

Eighteenth  Century  Diplomacy 

22 

II. 

Old  Diplomatic  Correspondence 

36 

in. 

After  the  Congress  of  Vienna  . 

45 

IV. 

Napoleon  III,  Disraeli,  Bismarck     . 

58 

V. 

Triple  Alliance  Diplomacy  and  Mo- 

« 

rocco     

70 

VI. 

Entente  Diplomacy 

84 

VII. 

The  Crisis  of  1914 

102 

vin. 

The  Secret  Treaties  op  the  War  /  . 

116 

IX. 

Hopes  for  Improvement  Deferred  |  . 

129 

X. 

The  Destruction  of  Public  Confi- 

dence  / 

136 

XI. 

Parliament  and  Foreign  Affairs     . 

149 

XII. 

The  Public  and  Diplomacy    . 

166 

XIII. 

A  Survival  of  Absolutism 

181 

XIV. 

Recent  American  Experience 

194 

Conclusion 

211 

Index 

225 

SECRET  DIPLOMACY 


INTRODUCTION 

Is  secret  diplomacy  the  evil  spirit  of  modem 
politics?  Is  it  the  force  that  keeps  nations  in  a 
state  of  potential  hostility  and  does  not  allow  a 
feeling  of  confidence  and  of  wholehearted  co- 
operation to  grow  up?  Or  is  it  only  a  trade  de- 
vice, a  clever  method  of  surrounding  with  an  aura 
of  importance  the  doings  of  the  diplomats,  a  race 
of  men  of  average  wisdom  and  intelligence  who 
traditionally  have  valued  the  prestige  of  dealing 
with  ''secret  affairs  of  state"?  Or  is  it  some- 
thing less  romantic  than  either  of  these — merely 
the  survival  from  a  more  barbarous  age  of  in- 
stincts of  secretiveness  and  chicane  acquired  at 
a  time  when  self-defense  was  the  necessity  of 
every  hour? 

It  is  quite  patent  that  the  practice  of  secret 
diplomacy  is  incompatible  with  the  democratic 
theory  of  state.  Even  in  the  Liberal  theory  of 
state  it  finds  little  favor,  although  that  is  dis- 
posed to  grant  a  great  deal  of  discretion  to  the 
representatives  who  are  given  the  trusteeship  of 
public  affairs.  Yet  the  essential  idea  of  Liberal- 
ism, government  by  discussion,  includes  foreign 


4  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

affairs  within  its  scope  fully  as  much  as  those  of 
purely  domestic  concern.  In  applying  to  public 
affairs  the  experience  of  private  business  it  is 
often  argued  that  as  the  directorate  of  a  corpora- 
tion could  not  be  expected  to  transact  its  busi- 
ness in  public,  even  so  diplomatic  conversations 
are  not  to  be  heralded  from  the  house  tops.  How 
far  this  particular  analogy  between  private  busi- 
ness and  public  affairs  will  hold,  is  a  point  we 
shall  have  to  examine  later.  At  first  sight  the 
planning  of  private  enterprises  and  the  considera- 
tion of  benefits  and  losses,  can  hardly  furnish 
completely  satisfactory  rules  for  the  conduct  of 
public  affairs,  particularly  those  involving  the 
life  and  death  of  the  persons  concerned.  Stock- 
holders would  be  reluctant  to  allow  such  matters 
to  be  determined  by  a  board  of  trustees  in  secret 
conclave. 

Divesting  ourselves  of  all  prejudices,  even  of 
righteous  indignation  against  plainly  unconscion- 
able practices,  we  shall  try  to  examine  and  analyze 
the  action  of  great  diplomats  and  to  see  to  what 
extent  really  important  results  achieved  by  them 
have  depended  upon  the  use  of  secret  methods. 
In  the  18th  Century,  diplomacy  was  still  looked 
upon  as  a  sharp  game  in  which  wits  were  matched, 
with  a  complete  license  as  to  the  means  pursued; 


INTRODUCTION  6 

provided,  however,  tbat  embarrassing  discovery- 
must  be  avoided,  in  other  words,  that  the  exact 
method  of  deception  must  be  so  closely  guarded 
that  only  the  results  will  show.  The  great  diplo- 
mats of  the  beginning  of  the  19th  century — Met- 
ternich,  Talleyrand,  Pozzo  di  Borgo — while  they 
talked  much  about  humanitarian  principles,  con- 
tinued to  play  a  barren  game  of  intrigue.  Napo- 
leon III,  that  master  of  devious  statecraft,  will 
always  be  cited  by  excoriators  of  secret  diplomacy 
as  an  abhorrent  example — a  man  undone  by  the 
results  of  his  owti  plotting.  Bismarck  indeed 
prided  himself  on  looking  down  upon  pettj^  se- 
cret mana^uvering  and  cast  a  certain  amount  of 
contempt  on  the  whole  diplomatic  business;  he 
often  disconcerted  his  opponents  by  an  unaccus- 
tomed frankness.  Yet  the  orientation  of  his 
statesmanship  was  based  upon  the  idea  of  helping 
history  to  find  a  short-cut  to  her  aims  through 
masterful  plotting.  He  took  the  reins  out  of  the 
hands  of  Providence. 

But  let  us  return  to  our  first  question:  "Is 
secret  diplomacy  the  evil  spirit  of  modern  poli- 
ties'?" It  is  indeed  worth  inquiring  how  far  our 
secretive  methods  in  foreign  affairs  are  to  blame 
for  the  pitiful  condition  in  which  the  world  finds 
itself  to-day.    No  doubt  there  is  a  general  belief 


6  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

that  socret  diplomacy  and  ever-increasing  arma- 
ments led  Europe  into  the  terrible  destruction  of 
the  Great  War  and  that  the  continuance  of  such 
methods  is  chiefly  to  blame  for  the  deplorable 
condition  since  the  Armistice.  There  may  be 
deeper  causes,  but  these  evidences  are  so  obtru- 
sive that  they  naturally  attract  most  attention  and 
are  given  most  blame  for  the  evils  we  endure.  It 
is  plain  that  secret  diplomacy  is  a  potent  cause 
for  continued  distrust,  fear  and  hate.  There  are 
few  statesmen  that  would  not  shrink  from  deliber- 
ately planning  and  staging  a  war.  Yet  they 
nearly  all  participate  in  methods  of  handling  pub- 
lic business  from  which  it  is  hardly  possible  that 
anything  but  suspicion,  fear  and  hatred  should 
arise.  Distrust  is  planted  everywhere.  There  is 
no  assurance  of  what  is  the  truth;  true  reports 
are  questioned;  false  reports,  believed.  All  mo- 
tives are  under  suspicion.  The  public  conscience 
and  will  are  beclouded ;  nothing  stands  out  as  re- 
liable but  stark  military  force. 

It  would  seem  that  we  have  learned  very  little 
from  the  war.  The  same  dangerous  and  un- 
healthy methods  continue  to  be  used  with  in- 
veterate zeal.  The  result  is  that  suspicion  has 
now  grown  up  among  those  who  fought  side  by 
side  and  who  shed  their  blood  together.     Realiz- 


INTRODUCTION  7 

ing  the  fundamental  importance  of  basing  inter- 
national life  on  sound  opinion  and  fair  dealing, 
the  framers  of  the  League  of  Nations  tried  to  se- 
cure the  publicity  of  all  international  agreements. 
Yet  this  moderate  provision  of  the  covenant  has 
not  been  obeyed  by  some  of  the  strongest  contract- 
ing powers.  Some  outsiders,  indeed,  such  as  Rus- 
sia, have  quite  willingly  published  their  treaties 
and  furnished  them  to  the  bureau  of  the  league. 
That  the  first  act  of  peace-making  was  to  shut 
the  door  of  the  council  chamber  in  the  face  of  the 
multitudes  who  had  offered  their  lives  and  shed 
their  blood  for  the  rights  of  humanity  was  a  tragic 
mistake.  In  the  defense  of  secret  procedure,  pub- 
lished on  January  17,  1919,  it  was  said  ''To  dis- 
cuss differences  in  the  press  would  inflame  public 
opinion  and  render  impossible  a  compromise." 
So  all  connection  between  the  great  public  that 
was  paying  the  price  of  the  game  and  the  benevo- 
lent elder  statesmen  who  thought  they  would 
shoulder  the  burden  of  responsibility  alone,  was 
cut  off.  The  men  in  the  council  chamber  were  not 
strengthened  in  this  great  crisis  by  a  feeling  of 
intimate  touch  with  a  strong  and  enlightened  pub- 
lic opinion.  The  public  itself  was  disillusioned; 
suspicion  and  contempt  were  the  natural  result. 
The  bald  statements  given  to  the  press  concern- 


8  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ing  the  negotiations  did  not  satisfy  any  one. 
Most  of  what  was  going  on  became  known  to  out- 
siders. But  its  authenticity  was  so  uncertain  and 
it  was  so  commingled  with  mere  rumor  that  the 
public  soon  gave  up  in  despair.  It  will  be  impor- 
tant to  inquire  as  to  what  is  the  proper  perspec- 
tive between  confidential  deliberation  and  public- 
ity of  results,  in  conferences,  which  are  becoming 
the  usual  agency  for  discussing  and  settling  inter- 
national affairs. 

When  secrecy  is  confined  merely  to  the  methods 
of  carrjjing  on  negotiations,  its  importance  for 
good  and  evil  is  certainly  not  so  great  as  when 
the  secrecy^  of  methods  includes  concealment  of 
aims  and  of  the  agreements  arrived  at.  We 
could  imagine  that  even  a  statesman  who  seeks 
the  closest  relationship  with  public  opinion,  even 
a  Lincoln,  could  not  at  all  times  eliminate  all 
use  of  confidential  communications.  But  the 
temper  of  the  whole  system  of  foreign  affairs  is 
a  different  matter;  and  any  broad  effort  to  con- 
ceal the  tendency  of  action  or  its  results  is  cer- 
tainly productive  of  evil,  no  matter  how  salutary 
or  beneficial  it  may  seem  to  the  men  employing  it 
at  the  time. 

But,  it  is  said,  we  must  trust  to  experts.  In- 
ternational relations  are  so  intricate  and  have  so 


INTRODUCTION  9 

many  delicate  shadings  that  they  elude  the  grasp 
of  the  ordinary  man,  and  can  be  held  together  and 
seen  in  their  proper  relations  only  by  the  com- 
prehensive and  experienced  mind  of  the  seasoned 
statesman.  There  is,  however,  a  distinction 
which  ought  to  be  noted.  The  public  relies  in 
most  cases  unreservedly  upon  expertship  in  mat- 
ters of  engineering,  science,  accounting,  business 
management,  and  even  in  medicine,  though  in  the 
latter  with  a  feeling  of  less  complete  security.  In 
all  these  cases  we  know  that  the  processes  applied 
and  the  methods  pursued  are  demonstrable,  and 
mathematically  certain  to  produce  the  results  an- 
ticipated. But  in  the  affairs  of  international  poli- 
tics into  w^hich  the  human  equation  and  other  in- 
exactly calculable  factors  enter,  there  is  no  such 
mathematical  certainty  which  can  be  tested  and 
ascertained  by  any  group  of  experts.  It  is  all  a 
matter  of  wisdom  in  choosing  alternatives,  and 
we  may  well  doubt  whether  any  man  or  small 
group  of  men,  under  modern  conditions  of  life 
and  public  state  action,  can  be  wiser  in  such  mat- 
ters by  themselves  than  they  would  be  if  they  con- 
stantly kept  in  direct  touch  with  public  opinion. 
Society,  when  properly  organized,  will  have  at  its 
disposal  on  every  question  of  importance,  groups 
of  men  who  have  expert  knowledge.    Expertship 


10  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

in  foreign  affairs  is  not  confined  to  the  foreign 
offices  or  the  chanceries;  many  thoughtful  men 
observing  and  thinking  intensely,  traveling  widely, 
seeing  foreign  affairs  from  an  independent  angle, 
have  opinions  and  judgments  to  contribute  that 
the  officials  cannot  safely  ignore.  In  an  inquiry 
of  this  kind  we  shall  have  to  consider  the  broader 
setting  of  diplomacy  as  a  part  of  public  life  within 
the  nation  and  throughout  the  world.  The  ele- 
ment of  secrecy  is  appropriate  only  when  we  con- 
sider diplomacy  as  a  clever  game  played  by  a 
small  inner  privileged  circle;  it  appears  out  of 
place  in  a  society  organized  on  a  broader  basis. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  the  defense  of  secrecy,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  inner  politics  of  the  state, 
resolves  itself  almost  entirely  into  an  opinion  that 
the  ignorance  and  inexperience  of  the  people  does 
not  fit  them  to  judge  of  foreign  relations.  That, 
it  must  be  confessed,  does  not  seem  to  be  a  very 
sound  or  convincing  basis  for  the  choice  of  meth- 
ods of  public  action  in  a  modern  state. 

But  the  real  strength  of  the  arg-ument  for  se- 
crecy comes  when  the  external  aspects  of  state 
action  are  considered.  Then  there  is,  on  the  sur- 
face at  least,  an  apparent  justification  for  se- 
cretiveness,  in  the  interest  of  a  closely  knit  society 
engaged  in  competitive  struggle  with  similar  so- 


INTRODUCTION  11 

cieties  and  obliged  to  defend  itself  and  to  safe- 
guard its  interest  by  all  available  means. 

Regarded  in  its  broader  aspects  there  are  two 
conceptions  of  diplomacy  which  are  quite  antag- 
onistic and  which  have  divided  thinkers  since  the 
time  of  Machiavelli  and  Grotius.  These  two 
great  minds  may  indeed  be  considered  as  typify- 
ing the  two  tendencies  and  expressing  them  in 
themselves  and  through  the  sentiments  which 
their  thought  and  writings  have  engendered  in 
their  successors. 

We  have  the  conception  of  diplomacy  as  work- 
ing out  a  complex  system  of  state  action,  balanc- 
ing and  counterbalancing  forces  and  material  re- 
sources and  giving  direction  to  the  innermost 
purposes  of  the  state.  It  is  probable  that  all 
professional  diplomats  are  more  or  less  enchanted 
by  this  ideal.  Up  to  the  great  war,  Bismarck  was 
generally  considered  the  ablest  master  of  diplo- 
macy, and  his  action  seemed  to  supply  short-cuts 
for  historical  forces  to  work  out  their  natural 
aims.  Nationalism  was  the  word  of  the  day  and 
the  creation  of  the  German  national  state,  fore- 
ordained as  it  seemed  by  the  laws  of  history,  was 
accelerated  by  the  masterful  action  of  the  great 
diplomat.  But  we  are  now  able  to  see  wherein 
lay  the  limitations  of  this  method  as  applied  by 


12  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

Bismarck.  Notwithstanding  his  grasp  of  historic 
principles  of  development,  he  did  not,  after  all, 
work  in  unison  with  broad  natural  forces,  but  re- 
lied on  his  power  to  dominate  other  men  through 
forceful  mastery,  with  dynastic  associations.  He 
was  a  superman  rather  than  a  great  representa- 
tive of  a  people's  aspirations.  So  while  he  pro- 
claimed the  truthfulness  of  his  diplomacy,  it  was 
nevertheless  kept  essentially  as  his  own  and  his 
master's  affair  and  business,  rather  than  the  peo- 
ple's. The  base  of  his  policy  was  narrow.  He 
understood  nationalism  from  a  Prussian  point  of 
view.  He  severed  Austria  from  Germany,  and 
then  antagonized  France  by  taking  Lorraine ;  far 
more  important  still,  he  failed  to  strengthen  Ger- 
man relations  with  Central  Europe  and  thus  made 
it  later  seem  necessary  for  Germany  to  go  on  to 
the  sea  and  thus  to  arouse  the  apprehensions  and 
enmity  of  England.  Thus  while  he  himself  would 
probably  have  in  the  end  avoided  confronting  the 
entire  world  as  enemies,  the  foundations  he  had 
laid  did  not  provide  a  safe  footing  for  the  more 
ordinary  men  who  followed  him.  His  diplomacy, 
once  considered  so  great,  had  contained  no  ade- 
quate and  sound  foundation  for  permanent  na- 
tional life.  Such  have  been  the  results  of  the 
most  distinguished  and  successful  work  of  manip- 


INTRODUCTION  13 

ulative  diplomacy  during  the  Nineteenth  Century. 
What  then  shall  we  say  of  the  justification  of 
wars  brought  about  as  a  part  of  such  a  system; 
under  which  statesmen  consider  it  quite  natural 
to  contemplate  ''preventive  war"  and  to  assume 
responsibility  for  wholesale  slaughter  because 
their  plan  of  action  seems  to  reveal  a  necessity 
for  it.  The  idea  of  conscious  planning,  or  striv- 
ing to  subject  national  and  economic  facts  and 
all  historic  development  to  the  conscious  political 
will, — that  conception  of  diplomacy  is  synony- 
mous with  the  essence  of  politics  and  will  stand 
and  fall  with  the  continuance  of  the  purely  polit- 
ical state.  Manipulative,  and  hence  secret,  di- 
plomacy is  in  fact  the  most  complete  expression 
of  the  purely  political  factor  in  human  affairs. 
To  many,  it  will  seem  only  a  survival  of  a  hyper- 
political  era,  as  human  society  now  tends  to  out- 
grow and  transcend  politics  for  more  comprehen- 
sive, pervasive  and  essential  principles  of  action. 
We  need  not  here  rehearse  the  fundamental  char- 
acter of  politics  as  a  struggle  for  recognized  au- 
thority to  determine  the  action  of  individuals, 
with  the  use  of  external  compulsion.  Politics  is 
a  part  of  tlie  idea  of  the  national  state  seen  from 
the  point  of  view  of  a  struggle  for  existence 
among  different  political  organizations,  in  which 


14  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

one  class  originally  superimposed  its  authority 
upon  a  subject  population  and  in  which,  after  au- 
thority is  firmly  established  within,  political  power 
is  then  used  to  gain  advantages  from,  or  over, 
outside  societies.  It  is  Machiavelli  as  opposed 
to  Grotius  who  gives  us  the  philosophy  of  this 
struggle.  The  narrowness  of  this  basis  for  hu- 
man action  and  the  direful  etfect  of  conscious  and 
forceful  interference  with  social  and  economic 
laws,  is  now  beginning  to  be  recognized. 

But  there  is  also  a  broader  conception  of  diplo- 
macy which  is  influencing  the  minds  of  men  al- 
though it  is  not  yet  fully  embodied  in  our  daily 
practice.  This  conception  looks  upon  humanity, 
not  as  a  mosaic  of  little  mutually  exclusive  areas, 
but  as  a  complex  body  of  interlocking  interests 
and  cultural  groups.  As  this  conception  gains  in 
strength,  the  center  of  effort  in  diplomacy  will 
not  be  to  conceal  separatist  aims  and  special  plots, 
but  to  bring  out  into  the  clear  light  of  day  the 
common  interests  of  men.  The  common  work  for 
them  to  do  in  making  the  world  habitable,  in  dig- 
nifying the  life  of  men  and  protecting  them 
against  mutual  terror  and  massacre, — that  ideal 
of  cooperation  and  forbearance,  is  as  yet  only 
partially  embodied  in  our  international  practices, 
although   it   arouses    the   fervid   hopes    of   men 


INTRODUCTION  15 

throughout  the  world.  Whether  a  system  of  local 
autonomy  combined  with  full  cooperation  and  free 
interchange  of  influences  can  be  brought  about 
without  the  exercise  of  an  overpowering  influence 
on  the  part  of  a  group  of  allied  nations,  is  still 
doubtful.  But  if  it  should  be  achieved,  then 
plainly  the  old  special  functions  of  diplomacy  will 
fall  away  and  administrative  conferences  will  take 
the  place  of  diplomatic  conversations.  When 
Portugal  became  a  republic,  the  proposal  was 
made  to  abolish  all  diplomatic  posts  and  have  the 
international  business  of  Portugal  administered 
by  consuls.  That  would  eliminate  politics  from 
foreign  relations. 

Diplomacy  in  the  spirit  of  Grotius  has  always 
had  its  votaries  even  in  periods  of  the  darkest 
intrigue,  but  there  has  only  recently  come  into 
general  use  a  method  of  transacting  international 
business  which  favors  open  and  full  discussion  of 
diplomatic  affairs.  Such  business  will  be  dealt 
with  less  and  less  in  separate  negotiation  between 
two  powers ;  there  will  generally  be  more  nations 
involved,  and  conferences  and  standing  commit- 
tees or  commissions  will  be  at  work,  rather  than 
isolated  diplomats.  Indeed,  international  con- 
ferences are  still  largely  influenced  by  the  old 
spirit  of  secretive  diplomacy.    Yet  the  practice 


16  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

of  meeting  together  in  larger  groups  is  itself 
inimical  to  the  strict  maintenance  of  the  older 
methods  and  we  may  expect  a  natural  growth  of 
more  simple  and  direct  dealings.  It  will  be  in- 
teresting to  watch  the  use  of  the  older  methods 
of  diplomacy  under  these  new  conditions  and  to 
see  how  far  and  how  fast  they  will  have  to  be 
modified  in  order  to  bear  out  the  underlying  prin- 
ciple in  human  development  to  which  action  by 
conference  responds. 

The  Washington  Conference  of  1921  atforded 
the  first  notable  occasion  for  bringing  into  use 
open  methods  in  diplomatic  discussion.  Secre- 
tary Hughes  in  his  introductory  speech  struck  a 
keynote  hitherto  not  heard  in  negotiations  on  in- 
ternational matters.  A  new  era  seemed  to  have 
dawned  in  which  great  issues  and  all-important 
interests  could  be  discussed  openly  and  decided 
on  their  merits.  A  great  wave  of  enthusiasm 
passed  over  the  public.  But  it  cannot  be  said  that 
the  temper  of  this  auspicious  opening  was  sus- 
tained throughout.  As  the  conference  descended 
from  general  declarations  to  important  questions 
of  detail  there  was  an  unmistakable  reversion  to 
old  methods,  which  obstructed  the  straightforward 
aims  of  Secretary  Hughes.  Even  the  generous 
initial  proposal  of  the  American  government  was 


INTRODUCTION  17 

made  by  one  of  the  powers  a  trading  subject.  The 
result  was  that  some  of  the  attendant  evils  of  se- 
cret diplomacy  invaded  even  this  conference,  and 
that  the  public  soon  became  somewhat  confused  as 
to  its  object  and  purposes,  through  an  abundance 
of  guesses  which  put  a  premium  on  the  sensational 
imagination.  It  must  be  said  that  the  temper  of 
the  press,  encouraged  by  the  manner  in  which  the 
Conference  had  been  inaugurated,  was  one  of  re- 
straint and  responsibility.  Viewing  the  questions 
which  were  before  this  Conference,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  very  problems  about  which 
there  was  hesitation  and  exaggerated  secretive- 
ness,  were  exactly  those  which  could  have  been 
best  judged  of  by  the  well-informed  public  opin- 
ion. One  could  not  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  j 
fear  of  publicity  is  in  all  cases  inspired  by  mo-  j 
tives  which  cannot  stand  the  test  of  a  world-wide ' 
public  opinion. 

At  the  present  day,  as  yet,  the  fatal  circle  has 
not  been  broken:  secret  diplomacy,  suspicion, 
armaments,  war.  We  had  thought  that  we  should 
escape  from  it  quite  easily,  after  the  terrible  sac- 
rifices laid  on  mankind  and  the  light  w^hich  had 
been  flashed  on  us  in  that  darkness.  But  the  pas- 
sions which  had  been  stirred  up  and  the  fear  and 
terror  which  had  been  aroused  in  that  dire  ex- 


18  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

perience  may  for  some  time  yet  serve  to 
strengthen  the  reactionary  forces  in  human  af- 
fairs, and  retard  those  which  tend  to  liberate  hu- 
manity from  terror  and  suffering.  But  it  is  lack 
of  leadership  toward  better  things,  that  is  most 
to  blame. 

To  America,  to  the  government  and  the  people, 
the  elimination  of  secret  dealings  in  international 
affairs  is  nothing  short  of  a  primary  interest. 
The  entire  character  of  our  foreign  policy  is  in- 
spired with,  and  based  upon,  the  belief  in  open 
dealings  and  fair  play.  We  have  a  broad  conti- 
nental position  which  makes  secret  plotting  and 
devious  transactions  unnatural,  inappropriate 
and  unnecessary.  Our  national  experience  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years  has  expressed  itself  quite 
spontaneously  in  proposals  for  the  peaceful  set- 
tlement of  interaational  disputes  by  discussion, 
for  the  improvement  of  international  relations 
through  conferences,  and  in  the  great  policies  of 
the  Open  Door,  which  means  commercial  fair  play, 
and  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  means  political 
fair  play  to  the  American  sister  republics.  A 
policy  such  as  this  has  nothing  to  seek  with  secret 
methods  and  concealed  aims. 

To  tolerate  secrecy  in  international  atfairs 
would  mean  to  acquiesce  in  a  great  national  dan- 


INTRODUCTION  19 

ger.  For  good  or  ill  we  can  no  longer  conceive 
ourselves  as  isolated.  Our  every-day  happiness 
and  permanent  welfare  are  directly  affected  by 
what  other  nations  do  and  plan.  Continued  se- 
crecy would  mean  that  we  should  feel  ourselves 
surrounded  by  unknoAvm  dangers.  We  should  have 
to  live  in  an  atmosphere  of  dread  and  suspicion. 
We  could  find  peace  of  mind  only  in  the  security 
of  vast  armaments.  In  international  affairs  we 
would  be  walking  by  the  edge  of  precipices  and 
over  volcanoes ;  our  best  intentioned  proposals  for 
the  betterment  of  human  atfairs  would  be  secretly 
burked,  as  in  the  case  of  Secretary  Knox'  plan 
of  railway  neutralization  in  Manchuria.  Our 
rights  would  be  secretly  invaded  and  our  security 
threatened,  as  at  the  time  when  England  and 
France  agreed  with  Japan  that  she  should  have 
the  North  Pacific  islands,  behind  our  backs, 
though  our  vital  interests  were  involved.  In  all 
such  matters  secrecy  will  work  to  the  disadvan- 
tage of  that  power  which  has  the  most  straight- 
forward aims  and  policies.  America  cannot  will- 
ingly submit  to  such  a  condition.  It  is  unthink- 
able that  with  our  traditions  of  public  life  and 
with  our  Constitutional  arrangements,  we  should 
ourselves  play  the  old  game  of  secret  intrigue; 
it  is  for  us  to  see,  and  to  the  best  of  our  power 


20  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

and  ability  to  assure,  that  it  will  not  be  played  in 
the  future  by  others. 

Nations  will  respond  to  the  call  for  absolutely 
open  dealings  in  international  affairs,  with  a 
varying  degree  of  readiness  and  enthusiasm.  "We 
are  perhaps  justified  in  saying  that  wherever  the 
people  can  make  their  desires  felt  they  will  be 
unanimously  for  a  policy  of  openness.  The  Eng- 
lish tradition  of  public  life  would  also  be  favor- 
able to  such  a  principle  of  action,  were  it  not  that 
such  special  imperial  interests  as  the  British  raj 
in  India  frequently  inspires  British  diplomacy 
with  narrower  motives  and  with  a  readiness  to 
depart  from  open  dealings  from  a  conviction  that 
imperial  interests  so  require.  The  Russian  So- 
viet government  in  giving  to  the  public  a  full 
knowledge  of  international  affairs,  was  at  first 
inspired  primarily  by  a  desire  to  discredit  the 
old  regime.  But  it  is  also  undoubtedly  true  that 
the  hold  which  this  government  has  on  the  party 
which  supports  it,  is  in  a  measure  due  to  the  fact 
that  all  foreign  policies  and  relationships  are 
freely  reported  to,  and  discussed  in,  the  party 
meetings  and  the  Soviets.  No  matter  what  the 
aims  of  this  government  may  be,  it  cannot  be  de- 
nied that  it  has  strengthened  itself  by  the  open- 
ness of  its  foreign  policy.    The  Chinese  people 


INTRODUCTION  21 

have  manifested  a  deep  faith  in  public  opinion  and 
their  chief  desire  in  international  affairs  is  that 
there  shall  be  open,  straightforward  dealings  so 
that  all  the  world  may  know  and  judge.  Through 
all  their  difficulties  of  the  last  decade  they  have 
been  sustained  by  this  faith  in  the  strength  of  a 
good  cause  in  the  forum  of  world-wide  public 
opinion. 

The  peoples  of  the  Continent  of  Europe  un- 
doubtedly would  welcome  a  reign  of  openness 
and  truth,  for  they  have  suffered  most  from  se- 
cret dealings  in  diplomacy.  But  those  who  gov- 
ern them  find  it  difficult  to  extricate  themselves 
from  the  tangle  of  intrigue.  As  President  Wil- 
son expressed  it: 

''European  diplomacy  works  always  in  the  dense 
thicket  of  ancient  feuds,  rooted,  entangled  and  en- 
twined. It  is  difficult  to  see  the  path;  it  is  not  always 
possible  to  see  the  light  of  day.  I  did  not  realize  it  all 
until  the  peace  conference;  I  did  not  realize  how  deep 
the  roots  are." 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  DIPLOMACY 

DuEiNG  the  eighteenth  century,  diplomatic  ac- 
tion was  dominated  entirely  by  the  tactics  and 
stratagems  of  war.  Diplomacy  was  a  continuous 
struggle  for  political  advantage  and  power,  seek- 
ing to  accomplish  the  purposes  of  war  through 
keen  intriguing;  it  was  war  pursued  in  the  coun- 
cil chamber.  The  temper  of  diplomacy  was  not 
that  of  a  commercial  transaction,  or  of  coopera- 
tion in  the  works  of  peace  and  betterment ;  but  it 
was  intent  upon  selfish  advantage — power,  pres- 
tige, preferment,  and  all  the  outward  evidences 
of  political  success.  It  did  not  have  the  con- 
science of  peaceful  enterprise  and  cooperation, 
but  on  the  contrary  emulated  the  keen,  restless, 
alert,  and  all-suspecting  spirit  of  the  military 
commander  in  action.  All  the  ruses,  deceptions, 
subterfuges,  briberies  and  strategies  which  the 
struggle  for  existence  in  war  appears  to  render 
justifiable,  diplomacy  made  use  of.  It  was  es- 
sentially a  political  secret  service  informed  with 
the    spirit    of    life-and-death   competition.      As, 

22 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  DirLOMACY       23 

among  individuals  in  that  society,  all  action  was 
dominated  by  the  constantly  overhanging  haz- 
ard of  private  duel,  bringing  into  life  something 
of  the  keenness  and  cruelty  of  the  tempered 
blade ;  so  among  nations  warlike  rivalry  inspired 
all  political  action.  War  was  either  going  on  or 
impending  and  being  prepared  for ;  humanity  was 
living  true  to  the  old  adage:  ''Man  a  wolf  to 
man." 

Diplomacy  was  personal  in  that  the  ambassa- 
dor was  held  to  be  an  alter  ego  of  the  monarch. 
It  was  surrounded  with  the  glamor  of  high  state 
and  important  enterprise,  and  inspired  with  a 
great  pride  of  office.  The  fact  that  he  repre- 
sented absolute  power  in  its  contact  with  the  ab- 
solute power  of  others,  gave  the  diplomat  a  sense 
of  high  importance.  The  monarchs,  themselves, 
were  generally  governed  by  personal  motives  and 
considerations.  They  looked  upon  politics  as  a 
keen  game  for  personal  or  family  power  in  which 
populations  of  subjects,  territory,  and  war  in- 
demnities were  the  stakes,  and  human  lives  the 
pawns;  the  highest  happiness  and  good  fortune 
of  the  subject  was  supposed  to  be  the  right  to 
die  for  his  king.  The  diplomatic  representatives 
quite  naturally  fell  into  the  same  way  of  regard- 
ing affairs  of  state  from  the  viewpoint  of  political 


24  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

power  to  be  gained,  maintained  and  constantly  in- 
creased. It  was  a  rather  narrow  game  as  seen 
by  the  rank  and  file  of  the  diplomatic  world; 
only  a  few  far-seeing  and  statesmanlike  minds 
could  at  that  time  appreciate  the  broad  under- 
lying human  foundation  of  all  political  action. 

Such  broader  insight  would  often  have  been  a 
real  obstacle  to  the  success  of  the  keen  and  clever 
player  of  the  game.  The  mastery  of  underlying 
principles  which  made  Grotius  famous  for  all  ages 
did  not  contribute  to  his  success  as  a  diplomat. 
The  wheel  of  fortune  turned  fast,  and  fleeting  ad- 
vantage had  to  be  caught  by  quick,  clever  though 
often  superficial,  machinations.  Even  as  late  as 
1830,  John  Quincy  Adams  observed  that  deep  in- 
sight and  unusual  ability  was  something  of  a 
hindrance  to  a  diplomat.  Yet  the  keen  edge  of 
the  successful  diplomats  of  the  powdered  wig  pe- 
riod is  in  itself  one  of  the  noteworthy  qualities 
of  that  sociable  though  unsocial  age. 

Throughout  this  period  Machiavelli's  Prince 
may  be  taken  as  the  fitting  commentary  on  po- 
litical action.  The  men  of  this  age  had  not  yet 
grown  up  to  the  realization  which  Machiavelli  al- 
ready had  of  the  nature  and  importance  of  the 
national  principle;  but  Machiavelli 's  thought  con- 
cerning the  means  by  which,  in  a  period  of  unrest 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  DIPLOMACY       25 

and  sharp  rivalry,  political  power  may  be  estab- 
lished, built  up  and  preserved,  with  total  disre- 
gard of  every  feeling  and  ideal  and  the  single- 
minded  pursuit  of  political  success, — that  thor- 
oughly explains  the  spring  of  action  of  this  period. 

In  reading  the  memoirs  and  letters  of  this  time, 
one  will  encounter  a  great  many  protestations  of 
conventional  morality,  as  well  as  an  understand- 
ing of  human  nature  and  a  comprehensive  grasp 
of  the  details  of  international  rivalry.  But  far- 
seeing  ideals  of  wisdom,  moderation,  and  justice, 
and  of  human  cooperation  will  not  frequently  be 
met  with ;  there  is  no  searching  vision  of  realities. 
Nor  will  one  gain  from  these  memoirs  very  spe- 
cific information  about  the  actual  methods  of 
doing  diplomatic  business.  These  methods,  even 
the  particularly  unscrupulous  ones,  were  prob- 
ably considered  almost  as  natural  processes,  to 
be  passed  by  without  mention.  But  incidentally, 
one  may  receive  hints,  even  in  the  correspondence 
of  the  most  correct  and  guarded  diplomat,  suf- 
ficient to  reconstitute  their  current  manner  of 
thought  and  action. 

We  encounter  there  all  the  artifices  of  a  secret 
service  versed  in  the  stratagems  and  tricks 
through  which  information  can  be  obtained, — the 
stealing  of  documents,  bribery  of  public  officials, 


26  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

general  misrepresentation  and  deceit.  Matters 
are  often  so  inextricably  complicated  that  it  must 
have  required  the  greatest  effort  to  remember 
what  each  participant  in  that  particular  intrigue 
knew  or  was  supposed  not  to  know,  what  he  could 
be  told  and  what  must  be  kept  from  him.  These 
are  still  the  more  venial  methods;  but  when  the 
welfare  of  the  state  required,  it  might  even  be 
necessary,  as  in  the  case  of  war,  to  dispose  of  in- 
convenient and  obstructive  individuals  by  wreck- 
ing their  reputation  or  even  by  putting  them  out 
of  the  way  altogether. 

Even  the  learned  and  dignified  authorities  on 
international  law  could  not  entirely  ignore  the 
methods  employed  in  actual  diplomatic  inter- 
course. Grotius  held  that  "amphibologies" — a 
term  apparently  coined  by  him  to  designate  state- 
ments which  could  be  understood  in  several  ways 
— ^were  admissible,  except  in  certain  cases  where 
there  existed  a  duty  to  unmask,  as  in  matters 
involving  the  "honor  of  God,"  or  charity  towards 
a  neighbor,  or  the  making  of  contracts,  or  others 
of  like  nature.  His  successor,  Vattel,  draws  a 
disdnction  between  a  downright  lie,  "words  of 
him  who  speaks  contrary  to  his  thoughts  on  an 
occasion  when  he  is  under  obligation  to  speak  the 
truth";  and  a  "falsiloquy,"  which  he  considers 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  DIPLOMACY       27 

venial,  and  which  is  "an  untrue  discourse  to  per- 
sons who  have  no  right  to  insist  on  knowing  the 
truth  in  a  particular  case."  This  distinction 
gives  a  rather  ample  latitude  to  the  discretion 
of  a  diplomat  in  the  matter  of  truthfulness.  Ac- 
cording to  the  good  and  learned  Vattcl,  the  duty 
of  any  one  to  tell  the  truth  was  binding  only 
towards  another  who  had  the  right  to  demand 
that  the  truth  be  spoken.  In  his  day,  very  few 
people  indeed  could  claim  the  right  of  demanding 
an  insight  into  diplomatic  affairs,  so  that  his  rule 
did  not  put  the  diplomat  under  a  very  severe 
moral  constraint.  Even  to  the  present  day  there 
have  been  known  individual  envoys  whose  utter- 
ances plainly  are  made  in  the  spirit  of  Vattel's 
distinction. 

Callieres,  who  wrote  on  the  Practice  of  Diplo- 
macy, in  the  year  1716,  is  full  of  admiration  of 
all  that  a  shrewd,  clever  diplomat  may  accomplish 
in  stirring  up  trouble  and  confounding  things  gen- 
erally in  the  state  to  which  he  is  accredited.  To 
the  question,  "What  can  be  achieved  by  a  negotia- 
tor?" Callieres  answers,  "We  see  daily  around 
us  its  definite  effects — sudden  revolutions  favor- 
able to  a  great  design  of  state,  use  of  sedition  and 
fermenting  hatreds,  causing  jealous  rivals  to  arm, 
so  that  the  third  party  may  rejoice   {ut  tertiits 


28  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

gaudeat),  dissolution  by  crafty  means  of  the  clos- 
est unions.  A  single  word  or  act  may  do  more 
than  the  invasion  of  whole  armies,  because  the 
crafty  negotiator  will  know  how  to  set  in  motion 
various  forces  native  to  the  country  in  which  he 
is  negotiating  and  thus  may  spare  his  master  the 
vast  expense  of  a  campaign.  ...  It  frequently 
happens  that  well  chosen  spies  contribute  more 
than  any  other  agency  to  the  success  of  great 
plans.  They  are  not  to  be  neglected.  An  am- 
bassador is  an  honorable  spy  because  it  is  his 
function  to  discover  great  secrets.  He  should 
have  a  liberal  hand."  That  admiration  of  suc- 
cessful deceit  and  mental  cleverness  in  obtaining 
results  that  could  only  be  gained  by  force  through 
great  sacrifice  of  life,  inspired  also  the  Italian 
admiration  for  clever  deceit,  such  as  shown  by 
Machiavelli  in  his  eulogy  of  Pope  Alexander  VI 
for  his  unrivaled  eminence  in  prevarication. 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  famous  witticism  of 
Sir  Henry  Wotton  that  "an  ambassador  is  a  per- 
son sent  abroad  to  lie  for  the  good  of  his  coun- 
try," did  not  occur  to  some  one  much  earlier;  but 
though  the  hon  mot  had  not  been  coined,  the  idea 
itself  was  quite  familiar.  Louis  XI  quite  bluntly 
instructed  his  embassies,  "If  they  lie  to  you,  lie 
still  more  to  them."    But  through  all  this  period 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  DIPLOMACY       29 

the  virtue  of  sincerity  and  of  truthfulness  also 
had  their  admirers :  Callieres,  speaking  of  the  suc- 
cessful diplomat,  says,  "Deceit  is  but  the  measure 
of  smallness  of  mind  and  intelligence.  A  diplo- 
mat should  have  a  reputation  for  plain  and  fair 
dealing  and  should  observe  the  promises  he  has 
made."  It  may,  however,  be  suspected  that  the 
good  writer  here  contemplates  the  dangers  of  un- 
successful deceit  and  of  too  transparent  ruses, 
rather  than  the  positive  value  of  truth  itself. 

James  Harris,  Lord  Malmesbury,  who  was  cer- 
tainly conversant  with  all  the  ins  and  outs  of 
eighteenth  century  diplomacy,  wrote  in  a  letter 
of  advice  (April  11, 1813)  addressed  to  Lord  Cam- 
den: "It  is  scarce  necessary  to  say  that  no  oc- 
casion, no  provocation,  no  anxiety  to  rebut  an 
unjust  accusation,  no  idea,  however  tempting,  of 
promoting  the  object  you  have  in  view,  can  need, 
much  less  justify,  a  falsehood.  Success  obtained 
by  one  is  a  precarious  and  baseless  success.  De- 
tection would  ruin,  not  only  your  own  reputation 
for  ever,  but  deeply  wound  the  honor  of  your 
Court."  In  this  sage  advice,  too,  the  dominant 
idea  seems  to  be  that  detection  is  i-uinous.  The 
homage  which  is  thus  paid  to  the  ideal  of  truth 
and  sincerity  is  compatible  with  the  use  of  quite 
opposite  methods  provided  they   are   successful 


30  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

and  so  cleverly  guarded  that  they  are  not  dis- 
covered. 

However,  at  all  times  there  must  have  existed, 
among  the  people  at  large  and  even  among  those 
playing  the  game  of  politics,  men  who  had  a  nat- 
ural inborn  desire  for  truth  and  a  simplicity  of 
nature  which  brought  them  closer  to  the  true  un- 
derlying forces  than  were  the  common  run  of 
courtiers  and  politicians.  The  ever  recurring  ad- 
miration expressed  for  the  diplomacy  of  Cardinal 
d'Orsat,  the  envoy  of  Henry  IV  to  the  Pope,  in- 
dicates a  real  appreciation,  even  among  the  pro- 
fession, of  high  standards  of  straightforwardness 
in  diplomatic  negotiations.  Cardinal  d'Orsat 
seems  to  have  disdained  all  shallow  devices  of 
deceptive  cleverness.  He  relied  upon  simple  rea- 
sonableness and  honesty  in  proposing  an  arrange- 
ment mutually  beneficial,  to  win  after  others  had 
exhausted  all  possible  tricks  and  stratagems.  In 
discussing  diplomacy,  Mably  says  that  such  meth- 
ods alone  are  calculated  to  secure  positive  and 
permanent  results  while  the  devices  of  clever  de- 
ceit can  only  serve  to  delay  and  confuse. 

Several  statesmen  have  discovered  that  the 
telling  of  the  actual  truth  often  exerts  a  some- 
what befuddling  effect  on  diplomats,  so  that  they 
may  easily  be  misled  by  telling  them  real  facts 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  DIPLOMACY      31 

which  they  will  interi^ret  in  a  contrary  sense. 
This  method  has  usually  been  associated  with  the 
name  of  Bismarck  who  on  one  occasion  said,  ''It 
makes  me  smile  to  see  how  puzzled  all  these  diplo- 
mats arc  when  I  tell  them  the  truth  pure  and  sim- 
ple. They  always  seem  to  suspect  me  of  telling 
them  fibs."  The  discovery  had,  however,  been 
made  by  many  statesmen  before  Bismarck.  As 
early  as  1700,  de  Torcy  had  arrived  at  the  con- 
clusion that  the  best  way  of  deceiving  foreign 
courts  is  to  speak  the  truth.  Lord  Stanhope  said 
quite  complacently  that  he  could  always  impose 
upon  the  foreign  diplomats  by  telling  tliem  the 
naked  truth,  and  that  he  knew  that  in  such  cases 
they  had  often  reported  to  their  courts  the  oppo- 
site to  what  he  had  truthfully  told  them  to  be 
the  facts.  At  a  later  date,  Palmerston  also 
prided  himself  on  being  able  to  mislead  by  the 
open  and  apparently  unguarded  manner  in  which 
he  told  the  truth.  It  would,  however,  manifestly 
be  difficult  to  use  this  method  successfully  more 
than  in  spots;  it  would  have  to  be  interspersed 
from  time  to  time  with  a  judicious  amount  of  pre- 
varication, in  order  to  throw  the  other  party  off 
the  scent. 

To  appear  simple  and  true  has  always  been 
greatly    desired   of   diplomats.     Count   Du    Luc, 


32  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

French  Ambassador  to  Vienna,  said  in  a  letter, 
*<My  great  desire,  if  I  may  be  permitted  to  speak 
about  myself,  is  to  appear  simple  and  true.  I 
flatter  myself  that  I  possess  the  latter  qualifica- 
tion; but  you  know  my  method  of  manoeuvering. " 
The  appearance  of  frankness  has  indeed  been 
most  valuable  to  diplomats  in  all  ages ;  though  one 
naturally  suspects  the  man  who  in  and  out  of 
season  explicitly  declares  and  protests  that  vir- 
tue. Diplomatic  frankness  is  a  part  of  that  elab- 
orate and  complicated  system  of  self-control  and 
coolness  together  with  a  mastery  of  all  the  out- 
ward expressions  of  different  affections  and  pas- 
sions, which  notable  diplomats  have  sought  to 
achieve.  It  would  not  take  an  expert  to  advise 
against  pomposity.  Callieres  counsels,  "Be 
genial.  Avoid  the  sober,  cold  air.  An  air  of  mys- 
tery is  not  useful." 

In  that  century  in  which  keenness  and  clever- 
ness were  so  intensively  cultivated  with  the  high 
pitch  of  the  personal  duel  transferred  to  affairs 
of  state,  the  complete  self-control  of  diplomats, 
their  quickness  and  their  gift  of  taking  advantage 
of  any  favorable  turn  in  the  situation,  are  cer- 
tainly worthy  of  admiration,  as  we  reanimate  in 
our  minds  the  life  portrayed  in  these  old  memoirs 
and  letters.    Occasionally  a  mishap  occurs  like 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  DIPLOMACY       33 

that  of  the  British  Minister,  Mr.  Drake,  who 
boasted  to  Mehee  de  la  Touche  of  the  very  care- 
ful precautions  he  had  taken  to  guard  his  secret 
correspondence;  which  vainglory  resulted  quite 
disastrously  to  liis  collection  of  secrets.  In- 
stances of  delightful  cleverness  and  cool-headed- 
ness  are  frequent.  Cardinal  Mazarin,  who  in  his 
methods  and  principles  was  quite  the  opposite  to 
Cardinal  d 'Or sat  and  who  was  particularly  free 
from  any  scruples  whatsoever  concerning  the 
truth,  won  his  first  striking  diplomatic  success 
through  a  ruse.  Wliat  a  quick  mind  and  daring 
spirit  his,  when  on  his  first  mission  to  the  court 
of  the  Duke  of  Feria,  as  a  very  young  man,  he 
attained  his  object  so  completely.  How  other- 
wise could  he  have  ascertained  the  true  opinion 
of  His  Highness  on  the  matter  of  great  impor- 
tance to  the  Court  of  France  which  Mazarin  was 
especially  sent  to  ascertain,  as  there  were  great 
doubts  about  it  and  the  duke  entirely  unwilling 
to  express  himself?  A  keen  observer,  Mazarin 
had  soon  learned  that  the  duke  was  irascible  and 
unguarded  when  in  anger;  but  few  would  have 
followed  him  in  suddenly,  out  of  the  clear  sky, 
deliberately,  so  stirring  the  duke  to  anger  that  he, 
entirely  off  his  guard,  blurted  out  things  which 
unmistakably  gave  a  clue  to  his  real  opinions  an 


34  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

the  important  matter  of  state  in  question.  "What 
a  vivid  satisfaction  the  young  man  must  have  had, 
which,  however,  he  needs  must  carefully  conceal 
to  feign  grief  and  despair  because  lie  had  been 
hapless  enough  to  arouse  the  ill  will  of  His  High- 
ness. Mazarin  was  throughout  his  life  noted  for 
a  perfect  command  of  the  expressions  of  all  the 
moods,  sentiments  and  passions,  used  by  him  at 
will  so  that  it  was  impossible  for  any  one  to  pene- 
trate his  mask.  The  same  achievement  was  at- 
tained in  a  notable  manner  by  the  great  diplomats 
of  the  old  school,  Talleyrand  and  Metternich,  who 
held  the  stage  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century;  and  it  has  been  emulated  in  greater  or 
less  perfection  by  successive  generations  of  Min- 
isters, Counselors,  and  Secretaries. 

When  Cromwell  had  allowed  himself  to  be 
tangled  up  in  double-faced  negotiations  with  the 
Spanish  and  the  French  courts  of  which  the  lat- 
ter had  obtained  complete  knowledge,  the  French 
envoy,  DeBass,  very  cleverly  rebuked  him  for  the 
inconstancy  and  disingenuousness  of  his  action. 
The  envoy  related  to  Cromwell  in  complete  detail, 
but  as  an  "unauthenticated  report,"  all  the  facts 
of  the  dubious  negotiation,  and  then  asked  the 
Protector  kindly  to  extricate  him  from  this  laby- 
rinth.    Cromwell  was  entirely  taken  aback  and 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  DIPLOMACY       35 

took  his  departure  abruptly  on  urgent  business, 
leaving  his  secretary  to  make  excuses.  The  star 
performance  of  Metternich  was  when  Napoleon, 
returning  from  a  hunt  in  a  fit  of  heated  excite- 
ment, in  the  presence  of  the  other  foreign  repre- 
sentatives, rushed  up  to  him  shouting,  "What  the 
deuce  does  your  Emperor  expect  of  me?"  Met- 
ternich replied  with  the  greatest  composure,  "He 
expects  his  ambassador  to  be  treated  with  re- 
spect." 


II 

OLD  DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE 

The  correspondence  of  diplomats  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  is  full  of  interest  because  of  the 
particular  intimacy  which  characterized  social  life 
at  that  time.  But  we  receive  from  it  also  direct 
and  invaluable  information  on  the  spirit  and 
methods  of  diplomacy.  The  correspondence  from 
St.  Petersburg  at  the  time  of  Catherine  the  Great 
gives  a  complete  picture  of  the  less  noble  features 
of  diplomatic  life  and  action.  At  that  Court,  pre- 
sided over  by  a  woman  of  great  ambition  whose 
every  movement  and  mood  the  diplomats  felt  nec- 
essary to  take  into  account  and  carefully  to  cal- 
culate, at  a  time  when  England  and  France  as 
well  as  other  nations  were  involved  in  almost  con- 
stant hostilities,  the  sharpest  characteristics  of 
eighteenth  century  diplomacy  came  to  the  surface. 
Politics  is  seen  as  a  game  of  forfeits  and  favors 
in  which  wars  were  made  for  personal  and  dynas- 
tic reasons  and  territories  traded  off  in  the  spirit 
of  the  gamester  without  regard  to  natural  or 
ethnic  facts,  or  the  welfare  of  the  population. 

36 


OLD  DIPLOMATIC  COllIlESrONDExNCE       37 

A  letter  written  near  the  beginning  of  Cather- 
ine's reign,  addressed  by  Sir  George  Macartney 
to  the  Earl  of  Sandwich,  most  strikingly  illus- 
trates the  character  of  the  period.  The  British 
Minister  first  reports  that  M.  Fanin,  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  signed  a  treaty 
of  alliance  with  Denmark,  contemplating  war  with 
Turkey.  By  a  most  secret  article,  Denmark 
promises  "to  disengage  herself  from  all  French 
connections,  demanding  only  a  limited  time  to  en- 
deavor to  obtain  the  arrears  due  to  her  by  the 
Court  of  France.  At  all  events,  she  is  immedi- 
ately to  enter  into  all  the  views  of  Russia  in 
Sweden,  and  to  act  entirely,  though  not  openly, 
with  her  in  that  kingdom."  The  writer  then  re- 
ports that  it  is  the  ardent  wish  of  the  Empress 
"to  make  a  common  cause  with  England  and 
Denmark,  for  the  total  annihilation  of  the  French 
interest  there  (in  Sweden).  This  certainly  can- 
not be  done  without  a  considerable  expense;  but 
Russia,  at  present,  does  not  seem  unreasonable 
enough  to  expect  that  we  should  pay  the  w^hole." 
The  amount  necessary  absolutely  to  prevent  the 
French  from  ever  getting  at  Stockholm  again  is 
suggested.  As  the  Swedes  are  highly  sensitive 
because  of  their  dependent  situation  in  recent 
years,  the  Russian  Court  desires  "that  we  and 


38  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

they  should  act  upon  separate  bottoms,  still  pre- 
serving between  our  respective  Ministers  a  con- 
fidence without  reserve.  That  our  first  care 
should  be,  not  to  establish  a  faction  under  the 
name  of  a  Russian  or  of  an  English  faction;  but, 
as  even  the  wisest  men  are  imposed  upon  by  a 
mere  name,  to  endeavor  to  have  our  friends  dis- 
tinguished as  the  friends  of  liberty  and  inde- 
pendence." The  Minister  then  reports  that  an 
alliance  with  Russia  is  not  to  be  thought  of  un- 
less by  some  secret  article  England  would  agree 
to  pay  a  subsidy  to  Russia  in  case  of  a  Turkish 
war  (Turkey  happened  at  the  time  to  be  in  al- 
liance with  England).  The  Minister  relates  that 
a  similar  proposal  which  was  put  up  to  the  King 
of  Prussia  by  a  Russian  official  who  w^as  his  mor- 
tal enemy  and  who  hoped  greatly  to  embarrass 
him  thereby,  was  unexpectedly  and  quite  blandly 
accepted  by  Frederick  II.  The  letter  closes  with 
the  earnest  entreaty  on  no  account  to  mention  to 
M.  Gross,  the  Russian  Minister  in  London,  the 
secret  article  of  the  treaty  which  his  own  Gov- 
ernment had  just  concluded  with  Denmark. 

The  correspondence  of  James  Harris,  Lord 
Mahnesbury,  is  a  particularly  full  and  continuous 
account  of  court  and  diplomatic  life  in  the  eight- 
eenth   century.     In    describing    his    diplomatic 


OLD  DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE       39 

struggles  in  a  Court  in  which  everything  turned 
round  the  whims  and  ambitions  of  an  unscrupu- 
lous woman  who  had  come  to  the  throne  through 
putting  out  of  the  way  its  rightful  occupant,  the 
vicious  practices  of  the  day  are  presented  in  all 
their  corruption  and  deceitfulness.    Before  going 
to  Russia,  Sir  James  Harris  was  Minister  at  Ber- 
lin.    He  paints  the  character  of  Frederick  the 
Great  in  the  following  words:  "Thus  never  los- 
ing sight  of  his  object,  he  lays  aside  all  feelings 
the  moment  that  is  concerned;  and,  although  as 
an  individual  he  often  appears,  and  really  is,  hu- 
mane, benevolent,  and  friendly,  yet  the  instant  he 
acts  in  his  Royal  capacity,  these  attributes  for- 
sake him,  and  he  carries  with  him  desolation,  mis- 
ery^  and  persecution,  wherever  he  goes."    A  Ger- 
man scholar  of  the  period,  an  admirer  of  the 
great    monarch,    used    the    following    language: 
''The  art,  till  then  unknown  in  Europe,  of  con- 
cluding alliances  without  committing  one's  self, 
of  remaining  unfettered  while  apparently  bound, 
of  seceding  when  the  proper  moment  is  arrived, 
can  be  learnt  from  him  and   only  from  him." 
These  descriptions  of  the  political  character  of 
Frederick  II  set  forth  the  essential  political  fac- 
tor as  it  was  understood  at  the  time  and  as  it  has 
been  understood  by  a  continuous  li^ie  of  states- 


40  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

men  from  Machiavelli  to  the  present.  As  in 
physical  science,  every  factor  has  to  be  disre- 
garded except  those  essential  to  the  experiment 
which  is  being  conducted,  so  in  the  intensive  poli- 
tics of  the  modern  state,  in  the  mind  of  such  men, 
abstraction  is  made  from  all  sentiment,  virtue  and 
quality,  to  the  sole  pursuit  of  a  closely  calculated 
political  effect.  The  same  German  scholar  cred- 
its Frederick  the  Great  with  a  superior  straight- 
forwardness. That  quality,  however,  is  mani- 
fested by  such  a  man  mostly  on  occasions  where 
he  is  so  sure  of  himself  and  of  his  plans  that  he 
can  challenge  the  worst  attempts  of  his  enemies 
to  upset  them  and  can  confound  them  utterly  by 
flinging  his  plans  in  their  faces,  as  did  Bismarck 
at  a  later  time.  A  startling  and  fearless  frank- 
ness is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  political 
genius. 

But  to  return  to  the  correspondence  of  Lord 
Malmesbury.  All  the  devices  and  foibles  of  the 
profession  at  that  period  are  there  mirrored. 
When  he  (still  as  Sir  James  Harris)  reports  the 
coming  of  a  new  French  Minister  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, he  expresses  the  hope  that  the  new  envoy 
will  not  be  so  difficult  to  deal  with  as  the  present 
charge  d 'affairs,  ''who,  though  he  has  a  very 
moderate  capacity,  got  access  to  all  the  valets  do 


OLD  DIPLOMATIC  CORRESPONDENCE       41 

chambre  and  inferior  agents  in  the  Russian 
houses,,  who  very  often  conjured  up  evil  spirits 
where  I  least  of  all  expected  them."  A  little  later 
he  reports  to  the  British  Foreign  Minister,  Lord 
Stormont,  as  follows:  "If,  on  further  inquiry, 
I  should  find,  as  I  almost  suspect,  that  my  friend's 
(Prince  Potemkin)  fidelity  has  been  shaken,  or 
his  political  faith  corrupted,  in  the  late  confer- 
ences, by  any  direct  offers  or  indirect  promises 
of  reward,  I  shall  think  myself,  in  such  a  case, 
not  only  authorized  but  obliged  to  lure  him  with 
a  similar  bait."  He  reminds  His  Lordship  of 
the  fact  that  Prince  Potemkin  is  immensely  rich 
and  that,  therefore,  perhaps  as  much  may  be  re- 
quired as  de  Torcy  offered  to  the  Duke  of  Marl- 
borough (two  million  francs). 

In  a  letter  of  June  25,  1781,  Sir  James  Harris, 
writing  to  the  same  Minister,  speaks  of  having 
obtained  information  of  the  conclusion  of  a  secret 
treaty  between  Russia  and  Austria  from  the  con- 
fidential secretary  of  a  Russian  minister.  He 
adds:  "I  trust  I  shall  keep  him  to  myself,  since 
I  have  lost  almost  all  my  other  informers  by 
being  outbid  for  them  by  the  French  and  Prus- 
sians." He  adds  that  it  is  painful  to  him  that 
the  secret  service  expenses  come  so  veiy  high  but 
he  explains  that  the  avid  corruption  of  the  court 


42  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

is  ever  increasing  and  that  his  enemies  are  fa- 
vored by  the  fact  that  they  can  join  in  the  ex- 
pense against  him,  their  courts  moreover  supply- 
ing them  most  lavishly.  He  adds:  "They  are 
also  much  more  adroit  at  this  dirty  business  than 
I  am,  who  cannot  help  despising  the  person  I  cor- 
rupt." 

The  Foreign  Minister  of  Russia  at  this  time, 
and  for  many  years  before  and  after,  was  Count 
Panin.  It  was  then  suspected  and  is  now  known 
that  he  was  firmly  bought  by  Frederick  II.  But 
there  has  been  some  doubt  as  to  whether  he  en- 
tered upon  this  corrupt  relation  behind  the  back 
of  Empress  Catherine  or  at  her  bidding.  It  is 
known  that  she  often  encouraged  her  ministers 
at  foreign  courts  to  accept  bribes  and  apparently 
to  sell  themselves  to  foreign  governments,  be- 
cause through  the  relationship  of  confidence  thus 
established  they  might  gather  information  use- 
ful to  their  own  government.  This  is  one  of  the 
many  ways  in  which  the  game  of  corruption 
tended  to  defeat  itself. 

As  far  as  the  letters  of  this  period  deal  with 
diplomatic  policies  they  are  no  more  reassuring 
than  when  they  relate  the  details  of  diplomatic 
practice.  On  August  16,  1782,  Sir  James  Harris 
made  a  long  confidential  report  to  Lord  Grantham. 


OLD  DIPLOMATIC  COURESrONDENCE       43 

He  observes  that  Count  Pauiii  is  powerfully  as- 
sisting the  King  of  Prussia,  the  BVencli  Minister 
is  artful  and  intriguing,  working  through  Prince 
Potemkin  and  the  whole  tribe  of  satellites  which 
surrounded  the  Empress,  whom  he  calls  "barber 
apprentices  of  Paris."  He  then  unfolds  his  own 
policy  of  winning  the  favor  of  the  Empress  for 
England  by  giving  her  the  island  of  Minorca  as 
a  present.  His  idea  had  been  adopted  by  the 
British  Foreign  Office  and  he  writes,  "Nothing 
could  be  more  perfectly  calculated  to  the  meridian 
of  this  Court  than  the  judicious  instructions  I  re- 
ceived on  this  occasion."  He  decided, — hand  in 
hand  with  the  proposed  cession  of  Minorca, — to 
designate  the  Empress  as  a  friendly  mediatrix  be- 
tween England  and  Holland;  he  says:  "I  knew, 
indeed,  she  was  unequal  to  the  task  but  I  knew 
too  how  greatly  her  vanity  would  be  flattered  by 
this  distinction."  Farther  on  he  reports  how, 
gradually,  after  several  British  Ministers  had  in- 
curred the  ill  humor  of  Catherine,  Fox  and  the 
present  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  have  finally 
found  favor  and  smoothed  the  road  for  Sir  James. 
He  hopes  that  all  these  great  efforts  and  sacri- 
fices may  result  in  "lighting  the  strong  glow  of 
friendship  in  Her  Imperial  Majesty  in  favor  of 
England."    At  this  distance  a  slim  result  of  so 


44  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

much  effort.  The  characterization  of  Catherine 
with  which  he  closes,  few  historians  would  now  ac- 
cept.* 

American  diplomats  had  their  first  taste  of  Eu- 
ropean diplomatic  methods  in  1797,  when  Pinck- 
ney,  Gerry  and  Marshall  were  sent  to  France  on 
their  special  mission.  Every  attempt  at  delay 
and  mystification  was  practised  on  them.  After 
various  secret  agents  had  tried  the  patience  of  the 
Americans  and  had  finally  come  out  with  the  plain 
demand  of  Talleyrand  for  a  million  francs  as  the 
price  for  peace  and  good  relations,  they  resolutely 
turned  their  back  on  Paris.  Meanwhile  Pitt  was 
seriously  considering  buying  peace  on  similar 
terms. 

*  "With  very  bright  parts,  an  elevated  mind,  an  uncommon 
sagacity,  she  wants  judgment,  precision  of  ideas,  reflection,  and 
I'esprit  de  combinaison." 


in 

AFTER  THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA 

The  convulsions  of  the  French  revolution  and 
the  Napoleonic  conquests  did  not  seem  materially 
to  affect  the  principles  and  practices  of  diplo- 
macy. When  the  Congress  of  Vienna  met  to  re- 
arrange the  state  of  Europe,  it  was  guided  by 
men  who  still  looked  upon  diplomacy  entirely  in 
the  manner  of  the  18th  century,  when,  in  the 
words  of  Horace  "VValpole,  *'it  was  the  mode  of 
the  times  to  pay  by  one  favor  for  receiving  an- 
other." The  idea  of  restoring  the  balance  of 
Europe  or  patching  up  the  rents  and  cracks  in  the 
old  system  which  had  been  so  severely  shaken  was 
the  purpose  which  animated  these  men.  They 
viewed  everything  from  the  dynastic  interests  of 
their  respective  rulers  and  traded  off  lesser  king- 
doms and  slices  of  territory  with  the  same  spirit 
of  the  gamester  that  has  always  characterized 
the  absolutist  diplomacy. 

Of  the  three  master  minds  of  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,    Talleyrand,    Metternich    and    Pozzo    di 

45 


46  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

Borgo,  it  may  indeed  be  said  that  they  illustrated 
both  the  qualities  and  the  vices  of  the  old  diplo- 
macy in  a  superlative  degree.  The  last  named 
has  characterized  Talleyrand  as  "a  man  who  is 
unlike  any  other.  He  wheedles,  he  arranges,  he 
intrigues,  he  governs  in  a  hundred  different  man- 
ners every  day.  His  interest  in  others  is  pro- 
portioned to  the  need  which  he  has  of  them  at 
the  moment.  Even  his  civilities  are  luxurious 
loans  which  it  is  necessary  to  repay  before  the 
end  of  the  day.*'  Talleyrand,  himself,  has  said: 
*'Two  things  I  forbid — too  much  zeal  and  too 
absolute  devotion — they  compromise  both  persons 
and  affairs."  He  did  not,  indeed,  betray  his 
great  master  Napoleon,  he  only  quitted  him  in 
time. 

Metternich,  who  resembled  Talleyrand  in  the 
complete  self-control  of  a  passionless  diplomat, 
had  a  long  and  brilliant,  but  essentially  sterile, 
career.  His  correspondence  shows  a  keen  and 
luminous  spirit  with  a  great  mastery  of  detail, 
and  capacity  for  manipulating  the  human  pawns ; 
but  there  is  no  deep  insight,  no  real  constructive 
policy.  Indeed,  he  supported  Alexander  I  in  his 
efforts  for  a  Holy  Alliance  or  sacred  league 
among  nations,  but  it  was  conceived  in  such  a 
form  that  it  would  not  have  interfered  with  the 


AFTER  THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA       47 

traditional  game  of   diplomacy.     Metternicli   in- 
deed often  pays  his  compliments  to  the  ideal,  as 
when  he  praises  the  league  as  resting  on  the  same 
basis    as   the   great    Christian    society    of   man, 
namely,  the  precept  of  the  Book  of  Books,  "Do 
unto  others  as  you  would  that  they  should  do 
unto  you."     But  the  details  of  his  policy  were 
governed  entirely  by   the  barren  principles   of 
balance  of  power  and  legitimacy,  and  showed  an 
utter  disregard  for  the  natural  and  ethnic  facts 
underlying  government.    Metternicli  indeed  him- 
self at  times  realized  the  vanity  of  political  in- 
trigue, as  when  he  wrote  to  his  daughter  from 
Paris  in  1815,  ''This  specific  weight  of  the  masses 
will  always  be  the  same,  while  we,  poor  creatures, 
who  think  ourselves  so  important,  live  only  to 
make  a  little  show  by  our  perpetual  motion,  by 
our  dabbling  in  the  mud  or  in  the  shifting  sand." 
^lien  Alexander  himself  left  the  realm  of  vague 
ideals  and  descended  to  details,  his  impulses  often 
took  a  form  somewhat  like  the  proposal  made  to 
Castlereagh  at  Vienna,  "We  are  going  to  do  a 
beautiful  and  grand  thing.    We  are  going  to  raise 
uj)  Poland  by  giving  her  as  king  one  of  my  broth- 
ers or  the  husband  of  my  sister."     The  British 
statesman  does  not  seem  to  have  been  immedi- 
ately carried  away  with  this  generous  design. 


48  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

It  was  consistent  with  the  character  and  tem- 
per of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  that  there  flowed 
in  it  innumerable  currents  and  counter-currents 
of  intrigue.  In  January,  1815,  the  representa- 
tives of  England,  France  and  Austria  agreed  upon 
a  secret  treaty  of  alliance,  directed  against  Rus- 
sia and  Prussia.  When  Napoleon  returned  from 
Elba  he  found  this  document  and  showed  it  to 
the  Russian  Minister  before  tearing  it  up. 

The  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
dominated  by  the  principles  that  had  prevailed  at 
Vienna.  In  the  details  of  diplomatic  intercourse, 
indirection,  bribery  and  deceit  continue  to  prevail 
although  in  a  less  flamboyant  fashion  than  in  the 
eighteenth  century.  As  the  principle  of  nation- 
alism comes  more  clearly  to  emerge,  the  secrecy 
of  diplomatic  methods  is  distinguished  from  the 
secrecy  of  diplomatic  policy  with  increasing  con- 
demnation of  the  latter;  a  greater  sense  of  re- 
sponsibility to  the  nation  as  a  whole  begins  to 
show  itself,  and  the  traditional  resources  of  di- 
plomacy are  no  longer  quite  adequate. 

Nevertheless,  the  diplomatic  literature  of  the 
age  still  looks  upon  diplomacy  as  essentially  a 
tactical  pursuit,  conditioned  by  the  continuous 
enmity  of  states.  The  French  writer.  Garden,  in 
his    Traite   de   diplomatie,   gives   the    following 


AFTER  THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA       49 

elucidation:  "Put  on  this  plane,  diplomacy  be- 
comes like  a  transcendent  manoeuvering  of  which 
the  entire  globe  is  the  theater,  where  states  are 
army  corps,  where  the  lines  of  combat  change  un- 
ceasingly, and  where  one  never  knows  who  is  a 
friend,  and  who  is  an  enemy.  It  is  a  political 
labyrinth  in  the  midst  of  which  ability  alone  is 
capable  of  moving  with  ease  and  without  being 
smothered  by  detail." 

The  memoirs  and  anecdotal  literature  of  the 
period  afford  numerous  instances  of  the  persist- 
ence of  that  desire  for  cleverness  in  dealing  with 
secrets,  w^hich  often  brings  about  amusing  inci- 
dents. 

At  the  time  when  Frankfort  was  the  capital  of 
the  North  German  Confederation,  the  Austrian 
government  provided  its  representative  there 
(Count  Rechberg)  with  duplicate  instructions; 
one  to  the  effect  that  he  must  exhaust  every  en- 
ergy to  maintain  the  most  friendly  and  mutually 
helpful  relations  with  Prussia ;  the  other  of  quite 
the  opposite  tenor.  The  former  was  to  be  shown 
to  the  Prussians.  Unfortunately,  at  the  critical 
moment  the  Austrian  Minister  show^ed  the  wrong 
letter  to  Bismarck,  who  guessed  the  situation; 
suppressing  his  amusement  as  best  he  could,  Bis- 
marck tried  to  console  the  embarrassed  Austrian 


50  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

by  promising  not  to  take  any  advantage  of  the 

slip. 

A  Prussian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
(Manteuffel)  bad  hired  a  police  agent  to  sneak 
into  the  French  Embassy  in  order  to  secure  some 
documents  there.  When  he  delightedly  showed 
one  of  the  letters  secured  to  General  Von  Gerlach, 
the  latter  said:  "I  could  have  written  you  ten 
such  letters  for  what  this  cost  you." 

Disraeli,  in  a  letter  to  his  sister,  spoke  of  the 
Danish  Minister  at  London  as  his  secret  agent  in 
the  diplomatic  corps. 

There  were  also  more  innocent  means  of  gain- 
ing advantages  such  as  are  practised  in  many 
other  branches  of  human  enterprise.  For  in- 
stance, Labouchere  relates  his  discovery,  when 
attache  at  Washington,  that  Secretary  Marcy  was 
put  in  a  terrible  ill-humor  whenever  he  lost  at 
whist.  Upon  a  hint  from  Labouchere,  the  British 
Minister  managed  thereafter  regularly  to  lose  in 
his  games  with  Marcy  who  was  immensely  pleased 
at  ''beating  the  British  at  their  own  game."  La- 
bouchere adds :  "Every  morning  when  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  were  being  discussed  we  had  our 
revenge  and  scored  a  few  points  for  Canada." 

There  was  all  this  time  an  increasing  tendency 
to  discount  the  importance  of  the  traditional  arts 


AFTER  THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA       51 

of  diplomacy  and  to  believe  that  a  great  deal  of 
this  carefully  nurtured  secrecy  was  merely  a  trick 
of  the  trade.  Bismarck  expressed  himself  in  the 
following  language  on  diplomatic  literature: 
''For  the  most  part  it  is  nothing  but  paper  and 
ink.  If  you  wanted  to  utilize  it  for  historical 
purposes,  you  could  not  get  anything  worth  hav- 
ing out  of  it.  I  believe  it  is  the  rule  to  allow  his- 
torians to  consult  the  Foreign  Office  archives  at 
the  expiration  of  thirty  years  (after  the  date  of 
despatches).  They  might  be  permitted  to  exam- 
ine them  much  sooner,  for  the  despatches  and  let- 
ters, when  they  contain  any  information  at  all,  are 
quite  unintelligible  to  those  unacquainted  with  the 
persons  and  relations  treated  of  in  them."  In 
reporting  this  statement,  Labouchere  observes: 
"If  all  foreign  office  telegrams  were  published 
they  would  be  curious  reading. ' '  *     He  also  re- 

*  He  wTites  that  when  "I  was  an  attache  at  Stockholm,  the 
present  Queen,  the  Duchess  of  Ostrogotha,  had  a  baby,  and  a 
telegram  came  from  the  Foreign  OfTice  desiring  that  Her  Majes- 
ty's congratulations  should  bo  offered,  and  tliat  she  should  be 
informed  how  the  mother  and  child  were.  The  Minister  was 
away,  so  off  I  went  to  the  Palace  to  convey  the  message  and  to 
inquire  about  the  health  of  the  pair.  A  solemn  gentleman  re- 
ceived me.  I  informed  him  of  my  orders,  and  requested  him  to 
say  what  I  was  to  reply.  'Her  Royal  Highness,'  he  replied,  'is 
as  well  as  can  be  expected,  but  His  Royal  Highness  is  suffering 
a  little  internally,  and  it  is  believed  that  this  is  due  to  the  fact 
of  the  milk  of  his  nurse  having  been  slightly  sour  last  eve- 
ning.'    I  telegraphed  this  to  the  Foreign  Office." 


52  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

lates  how  his  youthful  efforts  at  secret  diplomacy 
were  received  by  the  Foreign  OfiQce.  He  had  suc- 
ceeded at  St.  Petersburg  in  being  able  quite  regu- 
larly, through  the  assistance  of  a  laundress,  to 
get  from  the  government  printing  office  loose 
sheets  of  confidential  minutes  of  State  Council 
meetings.  When  Lord  John  Russell  discovered 
the  method  in  which  this  interesting  information 
was  obtained,  he  put  a  stop  to  the  simple  intrigue ; 
Labouchere  concludes  his  account  of  this  experi- 
ence thus :  "For  what  reason,  I  wonder,  did  Rus- 
sell imagine  diplomacy  was  invented?" 

The  term  "secret  diplomacy"  is  during  this 
period  used  in  a  special  sense,  referring  to  a  se- 
cret intrigue  on  the  part  of  a  monarch  or  minis- 
ter without  the  knowledge  of  those  who  have  the 
public  responsibility  in  the  matter.  Earlier  mon- 
archs  often  played  their  own  game  without  in- 
forming their  ministers  and  attempted  to  keep  the 
threads  of  foreign  intrigue  in  their  own  hands. 
Louis  XV  did  great  injury  to  his  country  by  pur- 
suing this  method. 

Napoleon  III  w^as  a  great  offender  in  this  re- 
spect. Not  only  w^as  his  international  policy 
prone  to  unscrupulous  attempts  and  proposals, 
but  he  acted  in  these  matters  frequently  without 
informing  those  who  were  responsible  before  the 


AFTER  THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA       53 

country.  Most  of  his  secret  advances  to  Bis- 
marck were  made  entirely  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility; he  did  not  inform  the  Foreign  Minister, 
Ollivier,  of  the  fateful  instructions  to  Benedetti 
to  the  effect  that  he  should  demand  of  Prussia 
assurances  that  no  Gorman  prince  should  ever 
again  be  suggested  for  the  Spanish  throne;  his 
Mexican  policy,  too,  was  worked  out  by  himself, 
in  conjunction  with  the  Due  de  Morny  and  Jecker, 
the  banker,  rather  than  with  his  ministers.  The 
disastrous  consequences  of  the  secret  diplomacy 
of  Napoleon  III  will  be  reverted  to  later  on. 

It  has  also  repeatedly  happened  that  envoys 
have  incurred  a  strong  suspicion  of  playing  a 
political  game  of  their  own  without  the  author- 
ization or  even  the  knowledge  of  their  Foreign 
Minister.  While  a  diplomatic  representative  in 
taking  such  action  risks  disavowal  and  dismissal, 
yet  the  temptation  felt  by  a  strong-willed  man 
who  is  confident  that  he  knows  the  local  situation 
and  the  needs  of  his  country  there  better  than 
any  one  else,  has  often  been  too  powerful  to  be 
resisted.  Wlien  the  unauthorized  action  has  been 
successful  in  gaining  some  advantage,  it  has  gen- 
erally been  condoned.*     But  though  the  home  gov- 

*  Frequently,  indeed,  ministers  have  been  encouraged  to  make 
certain   d^marclies   "on   their  own   account";    if   successful,   they 


6*  SECRET  DirLOMACY 

ernment  is  at  all  times  able  theoretically  to  dis- 
avow unauthorized  actions  of  its  foreign  repre- 
sentatives, yet  the  latter  through  their  self-willed 
acts  may  have  set  in  motion  forces  which  can  no 
longer  be  controlled.  Very  often  also  doubt  and 
confusion  is  cast  on  the  real  causes  of  important 
events  and  a  general  feeling  of  suspicion  is  thus 
generated. 

One  of  the  most  self-willed  of  British  Ministers 
was  Stratford  Canning  (Lord  Stratford  de  Red- 
cliffe).  It  is  generally  accepted  that  his  personal 
diplomacy  at  Constantinople,  where  he  began  his 
diplomatic  career  in  1808  and  where  he  ended  it 
in  1858  after  various  intervening  missions,  was 
one  of  the  causes  which  brought  on  the  Crimean 
war.  After  reciting  that  Lord  Stratford  con- 
stantly held  private  interviews  with  the  Sultan 
and  did  his  utmost  to  alarm  him,  urging  him  to 


could  be  sanctioned  after  the  event.  Such  is  the  procedure  which 
Palmerston  criticized  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Clarendon  (May  22, 
1853) : 

"The  Russian  Government  has  always  had  two  strings  to  its 
bow — moderate  language  and  disinterestetl  professions  at  Peters- 
burg and  at  London;  active  aggression  by  its  agents  on  the 
scene  of  operations.  If  the  aggressions  succeed  locally,  the 
Petersburg  Government  adopts  them  as  a  fait  accompli  which 
it  did  not  intend,  but  cannot,  in  honor,  recede  from.  If  the 
local  agents  fail,  they  are  disavowed  and  recalled,  and  the  lan- 
guage previously  held  is  appealed  to  as  a  proof  that  the  agents 
have  overstepped  their  instructions." 


AFTER  THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA       55 

reject  accommodation  ^viih  Russia,  and  promising 
him  the  armed  assistance  of  England,  John 
Bright  stated  that  all  this  was  done  without  in- 
structions from  the  home  government.  Lord  Clar- 
endon wrote :  ''He  is  bent  on  war  and  on  playing 
the  first  part  in  settling  the  great  Eastern  ques- 
tion." When  the  war  came  on,  Lord  Granville 
wrote:  ''We  have  generals  whom  we  do  not 
trust,  and  whom  we  do  not  know  how  to  replace. 
We  have  an  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  an 
able  man,  a  cat  whom  no  one  cares  to  bell,  whom 
some  think  a  principal  cause  of  the  war,  others 
the  cause  of  some  of  the  calamities  which  have  at- 
tended the  conduct  of  the  war;  and  whom  we 
know  to  have  thwarted  or  neglected  many  of  the 
objects  of  his  Government." 

Labouchere,  who  served  under  Lord  Stratford 
in  1862,  wrote  afterwards  that  the  despatches  of 
Stratford  during  the  Crimean  war  could  not  be 
recognized  as  the  originals  from  which  Mr.  King- 
lake  drew  his  material  for  a  narrative  of  the  am- 
bassador's career.*  He  thought  that  Stratford's 
great  power  at  Constantinople  was  due  to  his  long 

*  T,abouoliere  -wrote:  "Lord  Stratford  was  one  of  the  most 
detestable  of  the  human  race.  He  was  arropant,  resentful  and 
spiteful.  He  hated  the  Emperor  Nicholas  because  he  had  de- 
clined to  accept  him  as  Ambassador  to  Kussia.  and  the  Crimean 
war  was  his  reveno:e.  In  every  way  he  endeavored  to  envenom 
the  quarrel  and  to  make  war  certain." 


56  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

stay  there  which  made  it  necessary  for  the  Turks 
to  remain  on  good  terms  with  him.  Labouchere 
also  claims  that  Lord  Stratford  misled  his  own 
government  by  getting  the  Sultan  to  publish  cer- 
tain reform  decrees  which  he  would  send  home  as 
evidence  of  good  government,  never  explaining 
that  such  decrees  were  entirely  dead  letters. 

The  danger  and  disadvantage  of  having  a  diplo- 
mat or  ruler  inject  his  personal  ambitions  and  dis- 
likes into  his  diplomacy  have,  unfortunately,  been 
frequently  exemplified.  With  respect  to  the 
causes  of  the  Crimean  war,  it  will  be  remembered 
that  Napoleon  III  had  a  personal  grudge  against 
Emperor  Nicholas  who  had  addressed  him  "Sire 
and  Good  Friend"  instead  of  "Brother"  as  is 
customary  among  monarchs.  Though  Napoleon 
answered  him,  acknowledging  the  compliment  im- 
plied from  the  fact  that  one  may  choose  one's 
friends  but  not  one's  brothers,  yet  he  never  for- 
got the  slight. 

Lord  Palmerston  as  Foreign  Minister  quite 
openly  regarded  himself  as  a  power  independent 
not  only  of  Parliament  but  of  the  Cabinet  itself, 
and  not  bound  to  consult  his  colleagues  provided 
he  could  justify  himself  later  before  the  House  of 
Commons.  But  when  in  December,  1851,  he  had 
entirely  on  his  own  responsibility  approved  the 


AFTER  THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA       57 

coup  d'etat  by  which  Napoleon  III  made  himself 
emperor,  Lord  John  Russell  instantly  dismissed 
him  and  thus  vindicated  the  rule  that  the  Foreign 
Minister  must  always  pay  regard  to  the  joint  re- 
sponsibility of  the  Cabinet. 

In  1861  a  select  committee  of  Parliament  on 
the  diplomatic  service  was  appointed.  It  took 
evidence,  among  other  things,  on  the  existence  of 
''secret  diplomacy"  in  the  British  service.  By 
this  term  was  understood  private  correspondence 
or  private  action  affecting  the  conduct  of  pub- 
lic affairs,  which  did  not  become  part  of  the  rec- 
ord in  the  ministry.  Lord  Stratford  de  Red- 
cliffe,  the  Earl  of  Clarendon,  Lord  Cowley,  and 
Lord  John  Russell,  all  gave  evidence  with  re- 
spect to  the  conduct  of  business  by  private  cor- 
respondence. They  all  seemed  to  agree  that  pri- 
vate correspondence  between  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ter and  the  individual  representatives  abroad  was 
useful  and  even  necessary  for  supplementing  the 
formal  instructions  and  reports.  But  they  stated 
their  belief  that  whenever  any  such  private  cor- 
respondence should  begin  to  affect  the  actual  con- 
duct of  public  affairs  it  would  certainly  get  into 
llie  record;  if,  however,  it  should  come  to  noth- 
ing, then  it  might  not  be  referred  to  in  public 
despatches. 


IV 

NAPOLEON  III,  DISRAELI,  BISMARCK 

We  have  so  far  been  dealing  primarily  with  the 
methods  of  diplomacy.  During  the  old  regime 
both  the  methods  and  the  general  policy  of  diplo- 
matic action  were  controlled  by  the  secret  coun- 
cils of  the  monarch  and  of  a  few  ministers.  With 
the  growth  of  representative  government  public 
opinion  began  to  concern  itself  more  directly  with 
foreign  affairs.  There  grew  up  gradually,  al- 
though with  many  relapses  and  with  many  breaks 
of  continuity,  a  consensus  that  while  the  methods 
of  diplomatic  action  might  be  secret,  the  general 
trend  of  policy  should  regularly  be  laid  before 
the  representatives  of  the  people  who  should  also 
be  informed  of  any  individual  action  involving  the 
responsibilities  of  the  nation.  When,  therefore, 
in  contemplating  the  history  of  the  last  one  hun- 
dred years,  secret  diplomacy  is  spoken  of  in  con- 
demnatory terms,  the  attempted  secrecy  of  na- 
tional foreign  'policy,  rather  than  of  methods,  is 
usually  thought  of.  When  important  engage- 
ments are  undertaken  which  involve  the  nation  in 

58 


NAPOLEON  III,  DISRAELI,  BISMARCK       59 

responsibility  to  others,  particularly  for  the  use 
of  armed  forces ;  when  by  a  series  of  specific  acts 
a  tendency  is  given  to  foreign  policy  which  is  not 
avowed  to  the  representatives  of  the  people ;  then 
there  exists  secret  diplomacy  in  a  reprehensible 
sense.  A  further  method  of  concealment  works 
through  a  false  statement  of  motives.  Often  nar- 
rowly selfish  action  has  been  camouflaged  with  the 
avowal  of  noble  aims  and  high  ideals ;  or  there  has 
been  fencing  for  position  in  order  that  at  the  be- 
ginning of  a  war  the  opprobrium  of  being  the 
assailant  could  be  thrown  on  the  other  party. 
Undoubtedly  sometimes  statesmen  may  persuade 
themselves  of  the  presence  of  high  motives  in 
matters  in  which  their  specific  action  or  that  of 
their  successors,  working  with  the  same  materials, 
takes  on  a  contrary  direction. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  Crimean  war,  Lord 
Palmerston  wrote  to  Lord  Clarendon  (March  1, 
1867)  as  follows: 

**.  .  .  the  alliance  of  England  and  France  has  de- 
rived its  strength  not  merely  from  the  military  and 
naval  power  of  the  two  states,  but  from  the  force  of 
the  moral  principle  upon  which  that  union  has  been 
founded.  Our  union  has  for  its  foundation  resistance 
to  unjust  aggression,  the  defence  of  the  weak  against 
the  strong,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  balance 
of  power.     How,  then,  could  we  combine  to  become  un- 


60  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

provoked  aggressors,  to  imitate  in  Africa  the  partition 
of  Poland  by  the  conquest  of  Morocco  for  France,  of 
Tunis  and  some  other  state  for  Sardinia,  and  of  Egypt 
for  England?  And,  more  especially,  how  could  Eng- 
land and  France,  who  have  guaranteed  the  integrity  of 
the  Turkish  Empire,  turn  round  and  wrest  Egypt  from 
the  Sultan?  A  coalition  for  such  a  purpose  would  re- 
volt the  moral  feelings  of  mankind,  and  would  certainly 
be  fatal  to  any  English  Government  that  was  a  party 
to  it.  Then,  as  to  the  balance  of  power  to  be  main- 
tained by  giving  us  Egypt,  but  we  do  not  want  the  bur- 
den of  governing  Egypt,  and  its  possession  would  not, 
as  a  political,  military,  and  naval  question,  be  con- 
sidered, in  this  country,  as  a  set-off  against  the  posses- 
sion of  Morocco  by  France.  Let  us  try  to  improve  all 
these  countries  by  the  general  influence  of  our  com- 
merce, but  let  us  all  abstain  from  a  crusade  of  conquest 
which  would  call  upon  us  the  condemnation  of  all  other 
civilized  nations." 

This  program  of  liberal  principles  applied  to  for- 
eign affairs,  of  liigh-toned  and  high-minded  di- 
plomacy, one  reads  with  mixed  feelings  in  view 
of  the  things  which  have  come  thereafter. 

In  the  period  between  the  Crimean  and  the 
Franco-Prussian  war,  Napoleon  pursued  a  policy, 
or  a  series  of  policies,  which  fitly  illustrate  the 
worst  features  of  secret  diplomacy.  In  1858 
Napoleon  III  obtained  from  Cavour  a  promise 
that  Savoy  and  Nice  should  be  ceded  to  France. 
These  arrangements,  made  without  the  knowledge 


NAPOLEON  III,  DISRAELI,  BISMARCK       61 

or  the  desire  of  the  French  people,  involved  Napo- 
leon in  the  war  of  1859  and  led  to  a  fatal  weak- 
ening of  his  position.  In  1864  Napoleon  se- 
cretly suggested  to  Prussia  that  she  might  take 
Schleswig-Holstein,  thus  greatly  encouraging  her 
to  undertake  the  war  of  1864.  France  at  this 
time  was  under  treaty  obligations  to  Denmark 
which  made  such  action  doubly  dishonest.  "When 
the  war  between  Austria  and  Prussia  broke  out 
in  1866,  Napoleon  concluded  a  secret  treaty  with 
Austria  which  contained  a  bargain  that  he  would 
assist  Austria  to  recover  Silesia  in  return  for  a 
cession  of  Venetia  to  Italy,  to  compensate  the  lat- 
ter for  Savoy  and  thus  to  eradicate  the  evil  ef- 
fects of  the  arrangement  of  1858.  As  this  treaty 
became  known,  it  absolutely  alienated  Prussia 
from  France.  At  the  same  time  Napoleon  had  se- 
cretly demanded  from  Prussia  the  cession  of  the 
Rhenish  Palatinate  which  belonged  to  Bavaria; 
this  would  mean  of  course  that  Prussia  and 
France  together  would  first  have  to  take  it  from 
Bavaria.  Bismarck  secretly  informed  Bavaria  of 
this  demand  and  thus  turned  her  decisively 
against  Napoleon ;  so  that  he  was  enabled  to  make 
secret  treaties  of  alliance  not  only  with  Bavaria 
but  with  Wurtemberg  and  Baden  for  their  mili- 
tary support  in  case  of  war.     Napoleon  had  thus 


62  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

managed  unwittingly  to  bring  about  the  coalition 
of  German  states  which  proved  disastrous  to  him 
in  1870.  Had  the  French  government  known  of 
these  three  German  treaties,  it  would  probably 
have  avoided  war ;  as  it  was,  France  did  not  know 
that  she  would  have  all  Germany  against  her.  In 
1866  Napoleon,  through  Benedetti,  submitted  to 
Bismarck  a  draft  treaty  according  to  which,  in 
case  the  French  Emperor  should  decide  to  send 
his  troops  to  enter  Belgium,  the  King  of  Prussia 
would  grant  armed  aid  to  France  and  support  her 
with  all  his  forces,  military  and  naval,  in  the  face 
of  and  against  every  other  power  which  might  in 
this  eventuality  declare  war.  Though  this  draft 
treaty,  which  became  known  in  Great  Britain  and 
caused  high  excitement  there,  was  not  adopted  in 
this  form,  a  secret  compact  was  made  between 
France  and  Prussia  in  1867,  one  article  of  which 
stated  that  Prussia  would  not  object  to  the  an- 
nexation of  Belgium  by  France.  The  fact  that 
both  of  these  powers  had  signed  the  treaty  of 
1839,  guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  ag- 
gravates the  noxiousness  of  this  conspiracy. 
Early  in  1870  Napoleon  was  secretly  negotiating 
with  Austria  with  a  view  to  a  joint  war  against 
North  Germany.  The  negotiations  were  in  prog- 
ress when  the  war  of  1870  broke  out.    Probably 


NAPOLEON  III,  DISRAELI,  BISMARCK       63 

Bismarck  was  informed  of  what  was  going  on 
and  was  therefore  the  more  anxious  to  face  at 
once  what  he  considered  an  inevitable  war.  As 
already  stated,  Napoleon  did  not  communicate  to 
his  responsible  minister  his  decision  to  require  of 
the  King  of  Prussia  the  absolute  assurance  that 
no  German  prince  should  ever  again  be  nominated 
for  the  throne  of  Spain.  In  doing  so  he  put  him- 
self in  a  position  where  Bismarck  could  manoeuver 
him  into  a  dilemma  from  which  there  seemed  no 
exit  except  war. 

This  was  done  by  the  famous  editing  of  the 
Ems  dispatch  through  which,  taking  advantage 
of  King  William's  permission  to  modify  and 
eliminate,  Bismarck  gave  to  the  report  sent  by 
the  king  the  appearance  that  nothing  further 
could  be  said  between  the  king  and  the  French 
envoy  and  that  therefore  the  only  alternative  to 
the  French  was  retreat  or  war.  This  act  illus- 
trates one  of  the  most  terrible  dangers  of  secret 
diplomacy  in  that  just  at  the  time  when  inflam- 
mable material  is  at  hand  in  abundance,  one  word 
or  phrase  may  give  a  decisive  turn  to  develop- 
ments and  force  an  issue,  in  a  certain  direction, 
without  allowing  a  chance  for  calm  consideration 
of  all  that  is  involved. 

Bismarck  considered  that  the  unification  of  Ger- 


64  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

many  required  a  war  because  only  thus  could  the 
feeling  of  unity  among  the  German  people,  until 
then  divided  into  numerous  small  states,  be 
molded  into  political  oneness.  But  in  bringing 
on  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  no  matter  how  in- 
evitable he  might  consider  such  a  struggle,  he 
was  too  confident  of  his  ability  to  play  the  part 
of  a  Providence  and  to  cut  short  the  slow  proc- 
esses of  historic  development.  Therefore,  though 
he  attempted  to  work  in  the  interest  of  outstand- 
ing national  factors,  his  policy  was  not  of  a  na- 
ture to  develop  that  public  confidence  in  the  aims 
of  his  nation  on  which  alone  a  statesman  can  per- 
manently build.  His  was  the  diplomacy  of  au- 
thority, often  announcing  its  aims  with  great 
frankness,  indeed,  but  always  retaining  the  old 
method  so  that  the  public  mind  remained  often 
in  the  dark.  His  politics  directed  German  devel- 
opment into  a  dangerous  course.  He  abhorred 
German  disunion,  but  tried  to  cure  it  with  means 
too  forceful  and  artificial.  The  solutions  brought 
about  further  problems.  The  taking  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  the  cause  of  future  war.  In  1871, 
Bismarck  offered  Mulhouse  to  Switzerland  se- 
cretly, but  the  gift  was  declined. '  In  the  years 
after  1871,  Bismarck  always  threatened  Parlia- 


NAPOLEON  III,  DISKAELI,  BISMARCK      65 

ment  with  the  danger  of  war  whenever  he  wanted 
to  put  anything  through. 

The  Russo-Turkish  war  of  1878,  being  in  its  na- 
ture a  conflict  about  the  merits  of  which  only- 
vague  ideas  could  be  current  among  the  Western 
nations,  produced  a  whole  nest  of  secret  treaties. 
The  treaty  of  San  Stefano  itself  was  kept  secret 
by  Russia  and  Turkey.  The  British  Foreign  Sec- 
retary in  a  diplomatic  note  which  was  much  ad- 
mired at  the  time,  demanded  that  the  treaty  must 
be  submitted  to  the  European  powers. 

Meanwhile  a  second  secret  treaty  had  been  made 
between  Russia  and  Austria  wherein,  as  is  cus- 
tomary in  such  transactions,  "compensations" 
were  distributed  out  of  property  belonging  to 
neither  of  the  contracting  parties,  at  the  cost  of 
somebody  else ;  it  was  agreed  that  Austria  should 
have  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Meanwhile  the 
British  Foreign  Office,  though  it  had  just  de- 
claimed in  indignant  tones  against  the  secret 
terms  of  San  Stefano,  made  an  agreement,  equally 
secret,  with  Russia  (May  30, 1878),  concerning  the 
points  on  which  Great  Britain  would  insist  in  the 
final  adjustment.  Through  the  wrongful  action 
of  an  employee  of  the  Foreign  Office  this  agree- 
ment leaked  out  and  a  summary  of  it  was  pub- 


66  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

listed  on  May  31st.    When  questioned  in   the 
House  of  Lords,  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury,  who 
at  all  times  had  a  well-deserved  reputation  for 
sincerity,  nevertheless  qualified  the  statement  in 
the  Globe  as  "wholly  unauthenticated  and  not  de- 
serving of  any  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  House 
of  Lords."     The  full  text  of  the  agreement  was 
published  by  the  Globe  on  June  14th,  and  when 
challenged    by    Lord    Rosebery    concerning    his 
dementi,  Lord  Salisbury  calmly  stated:     "I  de- 
scribed it  as  unauthentic  simply  because  it  was  so, 
and  because  no  other  adjective  actually  described 
it,  and  I  shall  be  able  to  state  why  I  so  described 
it."    The  explanation  which  followed  was,  how- 
ever, quite  lame,  and  consisted  mainly  in  stating 
that  the  document  as  published  did  not  give  a  com- 
plete view  of  the  situation.     The  impression  pro- 
duced by  these  tactics  was  far  from  favorable. 
Lord   Granville,   with    a   great   deal   of   justice, 
wanted  to  know  ' '  where  the  House  of  Lords  would 
have  been  had  it  not  been  for  the  immoral  action 
of  the  man  who  gave  the  secret  treaty  to  the  news- 
paper.    They  would  have  had  blue  books  and  cop- 
ies   of   instructions,   protocols    and   other   docu- 
ments, but  they  would  have  been  perfectly  duped 
as  to  the  way  in  which  the  government  had  actu- 
ally proceeded." 


NAPOLEOxN  III,  DISRAELI,  BISMARCK       67 

But   there   followed   another,   a  fourth    secret 
treaty,  growing  out  of  the  Turkish  situation,  an 
agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Turkey  con- 
cluded on  June  4th,  at  Constantinople.     As  a  re- 
sult of  erroneous  information  having  been  tele- 
graphed from  Constantinople  by  Mr.  Layard,  the 
British  envoy,  to  the  effect  that  in  spite  of  the 
armistice  the  Russians  were  moving  on  Constan- 
tinople, a  large  war  credit  was  voted  in  the  Brit- 
ish House,  although  against  the  opposition  of  the 
Liberals   under   Gladstone    and   Bright.     Orders 
were  also  given  to  the  Indian  Government  to  send 
troops  to  Cyprus.    A  secret  treaty  was  then  con- 
cluded in  which  Great  Britain  received  a  protec- 
torate over  Cyprus  in  return  for  the  engagement 
on  her  part  to  protect  the  Asiatic  domains  of 
Turkey.     Never  was  the  blood  of  a  nation  with- 
out its  own  knowledge  and  consent  risked  in  a 
more   doubtful   adventure   than   in   this   famous 
transaction  of  Lord  Beaconsfield.     Gladstone,  on 
July  20th,  analyzed  the  treaty  as  providing  for 
three  things:  the  occupation  and  annexation  of 
Cyprus,  the  defense  of  Turkey  in  Asia  against 
any  attempt  Russia  may  make  (''to  go  two  thou- 
sand miles  from  your  own  country,  alone  and  sin- 
gle handed,  in  order  to  prevent  Russia  making 
war  at  any  time  upon  Turkey  in  Asia"),  and  re- 


68  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

sponsibility  for  the  government  of  Turkish  terri- 
tory in  Asia ;  and  all  that  was  undertaken  without 
the  consent  and  knowledge  of  the  British  people, 
to  be  done  at  their  expense  by  the  blood  of  their 
children.  Mr.  Gladstone  concluded:  "There  is 
but  one  epithet  which  I  think  fully  describes  a 
covenant  of  this  kind.  I  think  it  is  an  insane  cove- 
nant. ' ' 

Disraeli  had  formerly  said  of  Palmerston: 
"With  no  domestic  policy,  he  is  obliged  to  divert 
the  attention  of  the  people  from  the  consideration 
of  their  own  affairs  to  the  distraction  of  foreign 
politics.  His  scheme  of  conduct  is  so  devoid  of 
all  political  principle  that  when  forced  to  appeal 
to  the  people,  his  only  claim  to  their  confidence 
is  his  name."  The  same  language  could  with 
equal  justice  have  been  applied  to  Beaconsfield 
himself.  His  speeches  in  defense  of  his  foreign 
policy  are  usually  a  superficial  appeal  to  imperial- 
ist passion,  and  deal  in  such  phrases  as  "What 
is  our  duty  at  this  critical  moment?"  "To  main- 
tain the  empire  of  England."  (Loud  cheers.) 
"Empire"  is  taken  for  granted  as  covering  every- 
thing desirable,  but  the  actual  relationship  of 
these  adventurous  foreign  policies  to  the  welfare 
and  true  development  of  the  English  people  is 
never  reasoned  out. 


NAPOLEON  III,  DISRAELI,  BISMARCK       C9 

While  Beaconsfield  had  opposed  the  first 
Afghan  war,  he  readily  changed  his  views  when 
he  came  into  power  and  began  the  second  war  in 
1878  on  the  avowed  ground  that  the  Ameer  had 
refused  to  receive  a  British  mission.  But  with  a 
sudden  change  of  tactics,  at  a  dinner  at  the  Man- 
sion Plouse  on  November  9,  Lord  Beaconsfield  sol- 
emnly announced  that  the  war  had  been  made  be- 
cause the  frontier  of  India  was  *'a  haphazard  and 
not  a  scientific  one."  Yet  a  little  before,  when 
condemning  the  first  Afghan  war,  he  had  de- 
scribed the  frontiers  of  India  as  "a  perfect  bar- 
rier." He  did  not  give  to  any  organization  of 
public  opinion  a  chance  to  influence  him  in  this 
matter,  or  even  to  be  heard.  On  December  9, 
Lord  Derby  said  in  the  House  of  Lords:  ''We 
are  discussing,  and  we  know  we  are  discussing,  an 
issue  upon  which  we  have  no  real  or  practical  in- 
fluence. ' ' 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  DIPLOMACY  AND 
MOROCCO 

TowAKD  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
dominating  development  in  the  diplomacy  of  Eu- 
rope was  the  actual  formation  of  the  two  great 
alliances — the  Triple  Alliance  created  by  Bis- 
marck, and  the  Russo-French  Alliance  which  had 
come  into  being  in  1896  as  a  counterpoise  to  the 
former.  The  treaties  upon  which  these  alliances 
rested  were  made  secretly ;  they  were  part  of  an 
authoritative  policy  based  on  the  theory  of  bal- 
ance of  power.  The  texts  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
Treaty  were  not  published  until  after  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Great  War.  The  so-called  Counter- 
Insurance  Treaty  with  Russia  by  which  Bismarck 
attempted  to  stabilize  the  situation  and  isolate 
France  through  a  mutual  neutrality  agreement 
between  Russia,  Austria  and  Germany,  was  one 
of  the  most  characteristic  examples  of  compli- 
cated methods  followed  by  the  old  diplomacy;  it 
was,  of  course,  also  kept  secret.    When  after  Bis- 

70 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  DIPLOMACY  71 

marck's  retirement  the  German  Government  did 
not  renew  this  secret  treaty,  it  made  possible  a 
fundamental  change  in  the  grouping  of  powers 
with  the  result  that  Russia,  after  a  very  short  in- 
terval, identified  herself  with  France  in  the  Dual 
Alliance. 

While  Bismarck  had  been  in  control  of  German 
diplomacy,  the  main  lines  of  German  foreign  pol- 
icy were  kept  quite  clear  and  their  general  direc- 
tion was  definite,  no  matter  how  complicated  and 
indirect  were  the  means  frequently  applied  to 
carry  it  out.  Emperor  William  II  sought  to  free 
himself  from  the  tutelage  of  the  powerful  Chan- 
cellor, but  from  then  on  the  orientation  of  Ger- 
man diplomacy  was  far  from  definite.  No  one 
could  be  clear  where  its  main  objective  lay;  it 
seemed  to  seek  expansion  of  influence  in  Asia 
Minor,  the  Far  East,  Morocco,  South  Africa,  and 
almost  everywhere,  even  with  the  inclusion  of 
South  America.  Germany  appeared  to  have 
many  irons  in  the  fire,  although  meanwhile  she 
did  not  make  much  progress  in  any  specific  direc- 
tion. This  uncertainty  of  her  diplomatic  aims  in 
an  increasing  manner  aroused  the  apprehension 
of  her  neighbors ;  none  of  them  felt  any  assurance 
about  what  Germany  actually  wanted.  That  her 
actual  wants  may  not  have  been  unreasonable. 


72  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

that  she  herself  apparently  did  not  know  exactly 
which  of  her  interests  should  predominate,  did 
not  help  matters ;  all  those  who  had  more  posses- 
sions than  she  felt  themselves  endangered,  and  a 
general  suspicion  and  lack  of  confidence  resulted. 

In  the  years  after  the  Chino-Japanese  war  the 
German  Government  showed  a  great  desire  to 
play  a  prominent  part  in  Far  Eastern  affairs. 
Thus,  it  took  the  lead  in  bringing  about  the  joint 
intervention  of  Russia,  France  and  Germany, 
which  obliged  Japan  to  surrender  Port  Arthur, 
a  part  of  the  spoils  of  war  just  taken  from  China. 
The  three  powers  who  had  thus  come  to  the  res- 
cue, however,  forthwith  proceeded  to  exact  from 
China  an  enormous  commission  for  their  good  of- 
fices, and  forced  her  to  make  to  them  grants  of 
lease-holds  and  other  concessions,  in  which  was  in- 
cluded the  very  territory  that  they  had  rescued 
from  Japan.  In  this  keen  onset,  which  amounted 
to  an  attempt  to  divide  up  the  Chinese  Empire, 
Great  Britain  in  her  turn  also  participated.  The 
Far  Eastern  situation  was  rendered  decidedly  un- 
stable, and  the  frantic  and  unorganized  resistance 
of  the  Boxer  levies  was  the  result. 

After  the  settlement  of  these  troubles,  in  1901, 
the  German  Government,  as  we  now  know,  tenta- 
tively suggested  the  formation  of  an  alliance  in- 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  DIPLOMACY  73 

eluding  Great  Britain  and  Japan.  This  proposal 
shows  how  far  German  diplomacy  at  the  time  had 
departed  from  the  fundamentals  of  policy  under 
Bismarck.  Japan  proceeded  most  assiduously  to 
work  on  this  suggestion,  but  Germany  was  left  out 
when  the  highly  important  Anglo-Japanese  Al- 
liance was  secured  by  the  Japanese  Minister  in 
London.  Negotiations  between  Great  Britain  and 
Japan  were  carried  on  with  the  greatest  secrecy. 
Lord  Lansdowne  himself  seems  at  one  time  to 
have  been  very  anxious  for  prompt  action;  he 
said  to  Count  Hayashi,  as  reported  by  the  latter, 
that  ' 'there  was  great  danger  in  delay,  as  the 
news  of  the  proposed  treaty  might  leak  out  and 
objections  might  then  be  raised." 

It  is  significant  that  while  Lord  Lansdowne 
and  Count  Hayashi  were  in  the  depth  of  their 
negotiations.  Marquis  Ito,  on  his  return  journey 
from  the  United  States,  proceeded  to  Russia  and, 
entirely  in  opposition  to  the  express  judgment 
of  Count  Hayashi,  "}>lunged  into  conversations 
on  the  most  delicate  of  matters"  at  St.  Peters- 
burg. In  fact,  the  Japanese  Government  allowed 
almost  identical  secret  negotiations  to  be  carried 
on  in  London  and  St.  Petersburg  at  the  same  time. 
Count  Hayashi  considered  this  procedure  as  im- 
plying "a  lack  of  faith  and  a  breach  of  honor." 


74  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

When  the  Anglo-Japanese  treaty  had  been  ac- 
tually signed  it  was,  through  the  indiscretion  of 
some  official,  published  in  Japan  three  days  too 
soon.  The  Japanese  Foreign  Office  promptly  de- 
nied its  existence,  and  Baron  Rosen,  the  Russian 
Minister  at  Tokyo,  who  no  doubt  knew  of  the  Ito 
negotiations  at  St.  Petersburg,  very  emphatically 
denied  the  very  possibility  of  such  a  treaty.  The 
effect  on  Russia  of  the  truth  when  it  became 
known  there,  can  be  readily  imagined.  In  the 
Anglo-Japanese  treaty,  England,  which  had  re- 
cently joined  in  the  solemn  guarantee  of  the  in- 
tegrity of  China  and  of  the  independence  of 
Korea,  made  engagements  scarcely  consistent 
with  either. 

Lord  Rosebery,  in  a  public  address,  October, 
1905,  expressed  his  sense  of  the  great  importance 
of  this  treaty.  ''The  treaty,"  he  said,  "is  an  en- 
gine of  tremendous  power  and  tremendous  lia- 
bility. Wliatever  else  is  certain,  this  at  least  is 
sure,  that  it  will  lead  to  countless  animosities, 
many  counter  intrigues,  and  possibly  hostile  com- 
binations. But  I  want  to  point  out  to  you  the 
enormous  importance  of  the  engagements  in 
which  this  treaty  involves  you,  the  reactions 
which  it  will  cause  elsewhere,  and  to  bid  you  to 
be  vigilant  and  prepared,  and  not  negligent,  as 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  DIPLOMACY  75 

sometimes  you  are,  of  the  vast  bearings  of  your 
foreign  policy." 

The  German  Emperor,  having  failed  to  obtain 
a  treaty  with  England,  now  turned  to  his  Rus- 
sian cousin  with  the  design  of  inducing  him  to 
make  an  alliance.     The  Willy-Nicky  correspond- 
ence which  was  published  by  the  Russian  Revo- 
lutionary  Government   in   1917,   as  well   as   the 
memoirs  of  Isvolsky,  give  us  a  complete  insight 
into  the  action  of  William  II  in  this  matter.    The 
correspondence  shows  that  Emperor  William  neg- 
lected no  means  of  arousing  resentment  and  sus- 
picion of  England  in  the  mind  of  Nicholas,  par- 
ticularly in  attempting  to  show  a  complicity  of 
England  with  Japan  in  the  war  against  Russia. 
In  November,  1904,  William  proposed  the  imme- 
diate signature  by  Russia,  without  the  knowledge 
of  France,  of  a  defensive  treaty  of  alliance,  evi- 
dently directed  against  Great  Britain.     France 
was  to  be  invited  to  join  after  the  signature  by 
Germany  and  Russia.     The   Czar,  however,   in- 
sisted that  he  could  not  entertain  this  proposal 
without  first  submitting  it  to  his  ally.    William, 
in  a  long  telegram,  argued  insistently  upon  the 
danger  of  informing  France  before  the  signature. 
He  said:    "Only  the  absolute,  undeniable  knowl- 
edge that  we  are  both  bound  by  the  treaty  to  give 


76  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

mutual  aid  to  each  other,  can  induce  France  to 
exercise  pressure  upon  England  to  remain  tran- 
quil and  in  peace,  for  fear  of  placing  France  in 
a  dangerous  situation.  Should  France  know  that 
a  German-Eussian  agreement  is  simply  in  prep- 
aration and  not  yet  signed,  she  would  immediately 
inform  England.  England  and  Japan  would  then 
forthwith  attack  Germany."  Therefore,  William 
concluded  that  if  the  Czar  should  persist  in  re- 
fusing to  sign  the  treaty  without  the  previous 
consent  of  France,  it  would  be  better  not  to  at- 
tempt making  an  agreement  at  all.  He  stated 
that  he  had  spoken  only  to  Prince  Buelow  about 
it,  and  that  as  undoubtedly  the  Czar  had  spoken 
only  to  Count  Lamsdorff,  the  foreign  minister,  it 
would  be  easy  to  keep  it  an  absolute  secret.  He 
then  congratulated  the  Czar  on  having  concluded 
a  secret  agreement  of  neutrality  with  Austria. 
As  a  matter  of  fact.  Count  Lamsdorff  had  not 
been  informed  by  the  Czar  of  the  Emperor's  pro- 
posal. 

In  the  summer  of  1905,  Emperor  William  re- 
turned to  the  charge,  taking  advantage  of  the  dis- 
couragement of  the  Czar  due  to  many  external 
and  internal  troubles  resulting  from  the  Japanese 
war.  He  visited  the  Czar  at  the  Island  Bjorkoe 
in  July,  and  used  every  resource  of  his  personal 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  DIPLOMACY  77 

influence  to  prevail  on  Nicholas.  This  time  he 
succeeded,  and  the  two  sovereigns  signed  a  secret 
treaty  of  alliance,  which  contained  four  articles 
to  the  following  effect : 

(1)  If  any  European  state  shall  attack  either 
of  the  empires  the  allied  party  engages  itself  to 
aid  with  all  its  forces  on  land  and  sea. 

(2)  The  contracting  parties  will  not  conclude  a 
separate  peace. 

(3)  The  present  agreement  comes  in  force  at 
the  moment  of  conclusion  of  peace  between  Rus- 
sia and  Japan,  and  may  be  denounced  with  one 
year's  notice. 

(4)  When  the  treaty  has  come  into  force  Rus- 
sia will  take  the  necessary  steps  to  inform  France 
and  to  propose  to  her  to  adhere  to  it  as  an  ally. 

On  this  occasion  the  Emperor  was  accompanied 
by  Von  Tschirskj%  who  soon  after  became  German 
Foreign  Minister  and  who  countersigned  the 
agreement.  The  Russian  Foreign  Minister  was 
not  present  but  Admiral  Birileff,  the  Minister  of 
the  Navy,  was  called  in  to  countersign  the  Czar's 
signature.  After  his  return  to  St.  Petersburg, 
the  Czar  allowed  fifteen  days  to  pass  before  in- 
forming Count  Lamsdorff.  When  informed,  the 
Czar's  advisers  took  a  very  strong  position 
against  the  agreement,  with  the  result  that  not- 


78  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

withstanding  the  insistent  arguments  of  Emperor 
William,  who  in  his  telegram  signed  himself 
*'Your  friend  and  ally,"  the  treaty  was  never 
given  full  force.  William  •  strongly  appealed  to 
the  gratefulness  of  the  Czar  for  having  stood  by 
him  during  the  Japanese  war,  at  a  time  when, 
*'as  afterwards  the  indiscretions  of  Delcasse  have 
shown,  although  allied  to  Eussia,  France  had 
nevertheless  made  an  agreement  with  England  to 
attack  Germany  without  warning,  in  time  of 
peace."  The  latter  phrase  gives  the  effect  upon 
William's  mind  of  all  he  knew  or  believed  to  know 
about  the  arrangements  concluded  between  France 
and  Great  Britain  concerning  Morocco. 

The  Moroccan  intrigues  and  secret  negotiations, 
during  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century, 
contributed  in  no  small  measure  to  rendering  in- 
ternational relations  strained  and  generating  a 
general  sense  of  insecurity  and  suspicion.  In 
July,  1901,  a  protocol  was  signed  between  the  Sul- 
tan of  Morocco  and  the  French  Government  in 
which  the  latter  declared  its  respect  for  the  in- 
tegrity of  Morocco.  At  the  same  time  M.  Del- 
casse began  secret  negotiations  with  Spain  for 
a  delimitation  of  spheres  of  influence  in  that  coun- 
try. In  September,  1902,  the  first  Franco-Span- 
ish secret  treaty  concerning  Morocco  was  given  its 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  DIPLOMACY  79 

final  form.  It  was,  however,  not  ratified  because 
of  British  opposition  at  the  time.  In  1904,  the 
formation  of  the  Anglo-French  Entente  agree- 
ment, in  which  the  French  Government  declared 
that  it  had  no  intention  "of  altering  the  political 
status  of  Morocco,"  was  accompanied  by  the  con- 
clusion of  a  secret  understanding  concerning 
Morocco  which  was  not  revealed  until  1911.  Ac- 
cording to  the  terms  of  that  agreement  the  Brit- 
ish Government  was  to  be  informed  of  any  under- 
standing on  Morocco  which  might  be  concluded 
between  France  and  Spain.  These  two  coun- 
tries, in  fact,  on  October  3,  1904,  consummated  a 
convention  for  the  partition  of  Morocco  into 
spheres  of  influence.  A  copy  of  this  secret  agree- 
ment was  given  to  Lord  Lansdowne,  the  British 
Foreign  Minister,  who  wrote,  in  acknowledging  it : 
"I  need  not  say  that  the  confidential  character  of 
the  Convention  entered  into  by  the  President  of 
the  French  Republic  and  the  King  of  Spain  in 
regard  to  French  and  Spanish  interests  in  Mo- 
rocco is  fully  recognized  by  us,  and  will  be  duly 
respected." 

The  German  Government,  which  had  been  ig- 
nored, now  suggested  the  holding  of  an  interna- 
tional conference.  After  considerable  opposition 
the  conference  met  at  Algeciras,   in  February, 


80  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

1906.  The  Powers  represented  there  again  sol- 
emnly recognized  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  Morocco.  Meanwhile,  various  incidents  were 
brought  on  by  the  actions  of  French  and  Spanish 
commissaries  in  Morocco.  The  French  parlia- 
ment repeatedly  reiterated  its  intention  to  ob- 
serve the  act  of  Algeciras,  particularly  in  the  dec- 
laration of  February,  1909,  regarding  Morocco, 
in  which  declaration  Germany  joined.  In  1911, 
events  happened  which  induced  a  serious  Euro- 
pean crisis.  The  French  Government  undertook 
military  operations  against  Fez,  the  capital  of 
Morocco,  on  the  ground  that  the  foreign  colony 
there  was  in  danger.  In  reply  to  questions  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  Sir  Edward  Grey  con- 
firmed that  such  measures  were  being  undertaken 
by  the  French  Government  ''for  the  succor  of 
Europeans  in  Fez."  He  added:  "The  action 
taken  by  France  is  not  intended  to  alter  the  po- 
litical status  of  Morocco,  and  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment cannot  see  why  any  objection  should  be 
taken  to  it." 

The  facts  of  the  Fez  affair  have  been  thus  de- 
scribed by  the  French  publicist,  Francis  de  Pres- 
sense : 

"At  this  point  the  Comite  du  Maroc  and  its  organs 
surpassed  themselves.     They  organized  a  campaign  of 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  DIPLOMACY  81 

systematic  untruth.  Masters  of  almost  the  entire  press, 
they  swamped  the  public  with  false  news.  Fez  was 
represented  as  threatened  by  siege  or  sack.  A  whole 
European  French  Colony  was  suddenly  discovered  there, 
living  in  anguish.  The  ultimate  fate  of  the  women  and 
children  was  described  in  the  most  moving  terms.  .  .  . 
At  all  costs  the  Europeans — the  Sultan,  Fez  itself  must 
be  saved.  ...  As  ever  from  the  beginning  of  this  en- 
terprise, the  Government  knew  nothing,  willed  nothing 
of  itself." 


While  these  events  were  happening,  the  Foreign 
Offices  both  in  Paris  and  London  failed  to  give 
any  information  concerning  the  aims  which  un- 
derlay the  action  taken.  On  May  23d,  Mr.: 
Dillon  in  the  House  of  Commons  asked  to  what 
extent  England  was  committed  to  this  "ill-omened 
and  cruel  expedition."  The  Foreign  Secretary 
replied,  "We  are  not  committed  at  all."  The 
French  Foreign  Minister  declared  at  the  same 
time  that  he  had  never  heard  of  any  treaty  with 
Spain  concerning  Morocco. 

Wlien  the  international  crisis  came  to  a  head 
suddenly  in  July,  1911,  through  the  disconcerting 
action  of  the  German  Government  in  sending  a 
war  vessel  to  Agadir,  the  public  was  totally  taken 
by  surprise  and  was  absolutely  in  the  dark  as  to 
the  issues  and  interests  involved  as  well  as  to  the 
commitments  which  had  been  made  by  the  British 


82  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

and  French  foreign  offices.  The  text  of  the  se- 
cret treaty  between  France  and  Spain  had,  how- 
ever, now  been  secured  by  the  Paris  papers  Le 
Temps  and  Le  Matin.  This  revelation  led  to 
party  attacks  on  secret  diplomacy  in  the  British 
House  of  Commons  and  in  the  French  Parlia- 
ment. Baron  d'Estournelles  de  Constant,  in 
February,  1912,  said: 


.  .  .  "Why  was  the  French  Parliament  told  only  half 
the  truth  when  it  was  asked  to  pass  its  opinion  upon  our 
arrangement  with  England?  Why  was  it  allowed  to 
suspect  that  this  arrangement  had  as  its  complement 
and  corrective  some  secret  clauses  and  other  secret 
treaties  ?  It  is  this,  it  is  this  double  game  towards  Par- 
liament and  towards  the  world  which  becomes  morally 
an  abuse  of  trust.  .  .  .  Now  the  whole  effort  of  the  ar- 
rangement of  1904  appears  to-day  in  its  truth  and  in 
its  vanity.  It  was  a  treaty  of  friendship  with  England 
recognizing  the  freedom  of  our  political  action  in  Mo- 
rocco and  also  proclaiming  our  will  to  respect  the  integ- 
rity of  that  country;  that  was  what  the  public  knew 
and  approved.  But  the  public  was  ignorant  that  at 
the  same  time,  by  other  Treaties  and  by  contradictory 
clauses  hidden  from  it,  the  partition  of  IVIorocco  between 
Spain  and  France  was  prepared,  of  that  Morocco  of 
which  we  guaranteed  the  integrity. ' ' 

In  the  House  of  Commons,  Mr.  John  Dillon 
charged  that  "the  Foreign  Office  policy  has  be- 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  DIPLOMACY  83 

come  during  the  last  ten  years  progressively  more 
secret  every  year.  For  ten  years  the  foreign  pol- 
icy of  this  country  has  been  conducted  behind  an 
elaborate  screen  of  secrecy." 


VI 

ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY 

As  the  commitments  of  the  British  Government 
gradually  became  more  and  more  known  the  ques- 
tion arose  as  to  how  deeply  and  extensively  Great 
Britain  had  been  involved  in  continental  affairs. 
Lord  Rosebery,  who  was  uninformed,  with  the 
rest  of  Parliament  and  the  public,  as  to  the  actual 
details,  said  in  a  speech  at  Glasgow  in  January, 
1912: 

"This  we  do  know  about  our  foreign  policy,  that, 
for  good  or  for  evil,  we  are  now  embraced  in  the  midst 
of  the  Continental  system.  That  I  regard  a.s  perhaps 
the  gravest  fact  in  the  later  portion  of  my  life.  We 
are,  for  good  or  for  evil,  involved  in  a  Continental  sys- 
tem, the  merits  of  which  I  do  not  pretend  to  judge,  be- 
cause I  do  not  know  enough  about  it,  but  which,  at  any 
rate,  may  at  any  time  bring  us  into  conflict  with  armies 
numbering  millions,  and  our  oavu  forces  would  hardly 
be  counted  in  such  a  war  as  they  stand  at  present." 

Lord  Eosebery  realized  perhaps  more  fully  than 
most  of  the  leaders  of  English  public  life  the  com- 
plications adherent  to  what  had  already  become 
public  knowledge  at  the  time. 

84 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  85 

Meanwhile  the  government,  in  Parliament,  con- 
fined itself  to  plain  denials  whenever  the  matter 
of  international  undertakings  and  obligations  of 
a  general  nature  was  brought  up.  The  denials 
could  be  justified  from  the  point  of  view  that  the 
situation  as  stated  by  the  uninformed  questioner 
in  Parliament,  in  each  case  did  not  exactly  cor- 
respond to  the  facts.  But  the  impression  created 
by  such  denials  that  no  serious  obligations  had 
been  incurred  was,  as  the  result  showed,  entirely 
misleading. 

On  March  8,  1911,  Mr.  Jowett  asked  in  the 
House  of  Commons  whether  any  undertaking, 
promise  or  understanding  had  been  given  to 
France  that  in  certain  eventualities  British  troops 
would  be  sent  to  cooperate  with  the  French  army. 
The  Undersecretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
replied:  "The  answer  is  in  the  negative."  On 
December  6,  1911,  the  Prime  Minister  said: 

"As  has  been  stated,  there  were  no  secret  engagements 
with  France  other  than  those  that  have  now  been  pub- 
lished, and  there  are  no  secret  engagements  with  any 
foreign  Government  that  entail  upon  us  any  obligation 
to  render  military  or  naval  assistance  to  any  other 
Power. ' ' 

Upon  another  occasion  Mr.  Ycrburgh,  M.P.,  in- 
quired : 


86  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

*  *  May  I  ask  whether  or  not  we  are  to  understand  that 
the  Government  arrived  at  no  decision  upon  this  par- 
ticular question?  Is  the  right  honorable  gentleman  not 
aware  that  this  new  definition  of  the  two-Power  stand- 
ard is  a  question  of  supreme  importance,  and  that  in 
arriving  at  our  standard  of  naval  strength  previous 
Governments  had  regard  to  the  power  of  the  fleets  of 
other  countries?" 

The  Prime  Minister  replied  only : 

"I  think  this  question  shows  the  inconvenience  of 
dealing  with  these  matters  by  way  of  question  and  an- 
swer. ' ' 

In  December,  1912,  Lord  Hugh  Cecil  made  the  fol- 
lowing inquiry: 

"There  is  a  very  general  belief  that  this  country  is 
under  an  obligation,  not  a  treaty  obligation,  but  an 
obligation  arising  out  of  an  assurance  given  by  the  Min- 
istry in  the  course  of  diplomatic  negotiations,  to  send 
a  very  large  armed  force  out  of  this  country  to  operate 
in  Europe.  That  is  the  general  belief.  It  would  be 
very  presumptuous  of  any  one  who  has  not  access  to 
all  the  facts  in  possession  of  the  Government — " 

The  Prime  Minister  interrupted  him  with:  "I 
ought  to  say  that  it  is  not  true."  Lord  Cecil 
thereupon  expressed  his  satisfaction  for  having 
elicited  this  explanation,  ''because,"  he  stated, 
*'it  was  certainly  widely  believed  that  the  Gov- 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  87 

eminent  has  engaged  in  a  military  policy  of  an 
adventurous  kind  and  that  if  such  a  policy  had 
actually  been  contemplated  by  the  Government  it 
would  involve  a  very  serious  consideration  of  the 
military  resources  of  the  country. "  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  latter  was  a  just  conclusion  from  the 
actual  situation  as  it  really  existed,  notwithstand- 
ing the  denial  by  the  Prime  Minister. 

In  March,  1913,  when  during  the  discussion  of 
the  Navy  estimates,  the  Mediterranean  situation 
came  up.  Lord  Beresford  suggested  that  Mr. 
Churchill  (First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty)  must  be 
trusting  to  France  the  duty  of  guarding  the 
Mediterranean.  Mr.  Churchill  had  said  in  the 
course  of  these  discussions:  ''In  conjunction 
with  the  Na\^  of  France,  our  Mediterranean 
Fleet  would  make  a  combined  force  superior  to 
all  possible  combinations."  Sir  C.  Kinloch-Cooke 
referred  to  this  as  a  remarkable  statement,  and 
one  "somewhat  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  re- 
cent pronouncement  of  the  Prime  Minister  as  to 
our  understanding  with  France  in  the  matter  of 
armaments."  He  added:  "In  one  case  we  have 
the  Prime  Minister  repudiating  an  obligation  on 
our  side  of  any  kind,  and  in  the  other  we  have 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  relying  for  the 
safety  of  our  Eastern  Empire,  our  trade  and  our 


88  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

food  supply,  upon  the  assistance  which  he  pre- 
sumes will  be  ready  at  any  moment  to  be  given 
to  us  by  France." 

On  March  24,  1913,  Mr.  Asquith,  Prime  Minis- 
ter, made  a  comprehensive  answer  to  a  question 
of  Sir  W.  Byles  in  the  following  terms: 

"As  has  been  repeatedly  stated,  this  country  is  not 
under  any  obligation,  not  public  and  known  to  Parlia- 
ment, which  compels  it  to  take  part  in  a  war.  In  other 
words,  if  war  arises  between  European  Powers,  there 
are  no  unpublished  agreements  which  will  restrict  or 
hamper  the  freedom  of  the  Government  or  Parliament 
to  decide  whether  or  not  Great  Britain  should  partici- 
pate in  a  war." 

In  August,  IQ'IS,  Lord  Haldane  made  a  state- 
ment to  the  effect  that  the  very  friendly  relation- 
ships with  France  rendered  the  situation  in  the 
Mediterranean  most  satisfactory.  On  June  11, 
1914,  this  same  general  matter  was  up  again  for 
discussion.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  answering  a 
question,  referred  back  to  the  statement  made  by 
Mr.  Asquith  on  March  24,  1913,  and  added:  *'It 
remains  as  true  to-day  as  it  was  a  year  ago.'* 

The  nation  was  meanwhile  left  entirely  in  the 
dark  with  respect  to  the  actual  matter  of  the  re- 
lationships which  had  developed  between  Great 
Britain  and  France,  and  it  was  only  after  the 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  89 

Great  War  had  broken  out  that  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
in  his  speech  of  August  3,  1914,  gave  to  Parlia- 
ment some  account  of  what  had  actually  hap- 
pened. 

The  first  important  step  in  the  new  interna- 
tional policy  of  Great  Britain  was  taken  immedi- 
ately after  the  Liberal  Government  had  been 
formed  on  December  12,  1905.  It  appears  that 
Sir  Edward  Grey  consulted  in  this  matter  par- 
ticularly Mr.  Asquith  and  Lord  Haldane,  inform- 
ing the  Prime  Minister,  Sir  Henry  Campbell- 
Bannerman,  but  not  his  other  Cabinet  colleagues. 
The  above  three  men  were  the  leaders  of  the  Lib- 
eral Imperialist  faction,  and  it  is  not  at  all  cer- 
tain that  in  an  aggressive  foreign  policy  they 
would  have  been  at  that  moment  readily  followed 
by  their  whole  party. 

When  in  consequence  of  the  attempted  division 
of  Morocco,  relations  between  France  and  Ger- 
many became  somewhat  strained.  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  Foreign  Minister,  made  communications  to 
the  French  Ambassador  to  the  effect  that,  while 
no  promises  could  be  given  to  any  Foreign  Power, 
yet  in  Sir  Edward  Grey's  opinion,  if  war  was  then 
forced  upon  France  on  the  question  of  Morocco, 
public  opinion  in  England  would  rally  to  the  ma- 
terial support  of  France.     Sir  Edward  Grey,  as 


90  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

related  in  his  own  words,  said :  "I  made  no  prom- 
ises and  I  used  no  threats,  but  I  expressed  that 
opinion."  The  accuracy  of  that  opinion  has  been 
questioned,  in  view  of  the  temper  of  the  House 
of  Commons  elected  at  a  time  when  resentment  at 
the  imperialist  war  in  South  Africa  was  powerful. 
On  the  basis  of  the  statement  made  by  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  the  French  Government  said  to  the 
British  Foreign  Minister,  as  reported  by  him: 

''If  you  think  it  po&sible  that  the  public  .opinion  of 
Great  Britain  might,  should  a  sudden  crisis  arise,  jus- 
tify you  in  giving  to  France  the  armed  support  which 
you  cannot  promise  in  advance,  you  will  not  be  able  to 
give  that  support,  even  if  you  wish  it  when  the  time 
comes,  unless  some  conversations  have  already  taken 
place  between  naval  and  military  experts." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  saw  merit  in  this  proposal  and 
agreed  to  it.  He  authorized  that  conversations 
should  take  place,  but  with  the  distinct  under- 
standing that  nothing  which  would  bind  either 
Government  should  occur.  However,  the  holding 
of  conversations  between  two  Powers  concerning 
military  cooperation  is  in  itself  a  sufficiently  seri- 
ous matter  out  of  which  expectations  and  rela- 
tionships are  apt  to  arise  that  cannot  be  over- 
looked in  future  action.  The  Cabinet  was  not 
informed  of  the  authorization  given  by  Sir  Ed- 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  91 

ward  Grey  until  later.  He  did  not  state  how 
much  later. 

We  know  from  official  sources  that  Colonel  Bar- 
nardiston  proceeded  to  Belgium  and  had  inter- 
views with  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff 
concerning  combined  operations  in  the  event  ef  a 
German  attack  directed  against  Antwerp.  Colo- 
nel Barnardiston  confided  to  the  Belgian  Chief  of 
Staff  that  his  Government  intended  to  move  the 
British  base  of  supplies  from  the  French  coast 
to  Antwerp  as  soon  as  the  North  Sea  had  been 
cleared  of  all  German  warships.  When  the  Bel- 
gian documents  were  published  in  Germany,  it 
was  attempted  by  the  press  to  represent  tliese  con- 
versations as  an  actual  convention.  These  con- 
sultations occurred  during  the  first  quarter  of 
1906. 

From  an  official  source  comes  the  statement  that 
in  July,  1911,  the  British  Government  informed 
the  German,  that  on  certain  contingencies,  Great 
Britain  would  support  France  (if  Germany  should 
demand  the  whole  of  French-Congo  and  Agadir 
as  a  naval  base).  Wliat  actually  happened  at  this 
time  has  never  been  fully  revealed. 

In  April,  1912,  the  British  military  attache  at 
Brussels  informed  the  Belgian  General  Jungbluth 
that  Great  Britain  had  160,000  men  available  for 


92  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

despatch  to  the  continent,  and  added  that  the  Brit- 
ish Government  in  certain  contingencies  during 
recent  events  would  have  immediately  landed 
troops  on  Belgian  territory. 

About  this  time  the  Cabinet  had  a  discussion 
of  the  whole  situation  and  of  the  special  relation- 
ship with  Prance;  and  it  was  decided  that  there 
should  be  some  definite  expression  in  writing,  of 
the  latter.  Accordingly,  in  November,  1912,  an 
exchange  of  notes  took  place  between  Sir  Edward 
Grey  and  the  French  Ambassador.  The  British 
Foreign  Minister  wrote  the  following  letter: 

Nov.  22nd   (1912). 
My  de.vr  Ambassador: 

"From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and 
British  Naval  and  Military  experts  have  consulted  to- 
gether. It  has  always  been  understood  that  such  con- 
sultation does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either  Gov- 
ernment to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not 
to  assist  the  other  by  armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that 
consultation  between  experts  is  not  and  ought  not  to 
be  regarded  as  an  engagement  that  commits  either  Gov- 
ernment to  action  in  a  contingency  that  has  not  yet 
arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The  disposition,  for  in- 
stance, of  the  French  and  British  fleets  respectively  at 
the  present  moment  is  not  based  upon  an  engagement 
to  cooperate  in  war.  You  have,  however,  pointed  out 
that  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an 
unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power  it  might  become 
essential  to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  93 

upon  the  armed  assistance  of  the  other.  I  agree  that 
if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an 
unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  something  that 
threatened  the  general  peace,  it  should  immediately  dis- 
cuss with  the  other  whether  both  Governments  should 
act  together  to  prevent  aggression  and  to  preserve  peace, 
and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be  prepared  to 
take  in  common.  If  these  measures  involved  action,  tlie 
plans  of  the  General  Staffs  would  at  once  be  taken  into 
consideration  and  the  Governments  w^ould  then  decide 
what  effect  should  be  given  to  them." 

A  reply  from  the  French  Ambassador  accepted 
this  understanding. 

Side  by  side  with  the  Anglo-French  military 
and  naval  collaboration,  there  went  the  making  of 
joint  plans  by  France  and  Russia  which  culmi- 
nated in  the  Franco-Russian  military  convention 
of  August,  1912.  At  the  same  time  Russia  had 
pressed  upon  France  the  need  of  increasing  her 
army  by  raising  the  term  of  service  to  three 
years.  Concerning  the  new  disposal  of  the 
French  fleet,  according  to  the  desires  of  Russia, 
President  Poiucare  stated  to  Ambassador  Isvol- 
sky  in  November,  1912 : 

"This  decision  has  been  made  in  agreement  with  Eng- 
land, and  forms  the  further  development  and  completion 
of  arrangements  already  made  previously  between  the 
French  and  English  staffs." 


94.  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

Thus  the  chain  of  cooperation  was  completed,  and 
England  was  effectively  tied  up  with  the  situation 
in  the  Balkans,  in  which  only  Russia  had  a  pri- 
mary interest. 

Meanwhile,  the  repeated  denials  previously  set 
forth  kept  the  British  Parliament  and  public  from 
all  knowledge  of  the  exceedingly  important  rela- 
tionships which  were  growing  up  between  the 
Naval  and  Military  establishments  of  Great  Brit- 
ain and  France. 

How  these  relationships,  though  only  partially 
known  and  suspected,  were  looked  upon  by  out- 
siders is  shown  from  expressions  in  the  reports 
of  Belgian  diplomats.  Count  de  Lalaing  wrote 
from  London  in  1907 :  ' '  England  is  quietly  pur- 
suing a  policy  opposed  to  Germany  and  aimed  at 
her  isolation."  Baron  Greindl  wrote  from  Ber- 
lin in  1908:  ''Call  it  alliance  or  what  you  will, 
the  grouping  constitutes,  none  the  less,  a  diminu- 
tion of  Germany's  security."  Baron  Guillaume 
wrote,  in  1911,  from  Paris:  "I  have  less  faith  in 
the  desire  of  Great  Britain  for  peace.  She  would 
not  be  sorry  to  see  the  others  eat  one  another  up." 
These  expressions  are  not,  of  course,  evidences 
of  British  policy,  but  simply  of  the  impression 
which  whatever  leaked  out  concerning  that  pol- 
icy, made  upon  outside  diplomats. 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  95 

In  his  clear  and  convinchig  analysis  of  the  situ- 
ation created  by  the  gradual  formation  in  secret, 
of  these  relationships,  Lord  Loreburn  brings  out 
the  following  points:  Through  the  communica- 
tions with  the  French  Ambassador  and  military 
and  naval  conversations  concerning  plans  for 
joint  action,  France  was  encouraged  more  and 
more  to  expect  that  Great  Britain  would  stand 
by  her  in  arms  if  she  were  attacked  by  Germany. 
Such  a  policy  of  a  defensive  understanding  with 
France,  no  matter  how  right  in  itself,  was  obvi- 
ously a  new  departure  of  tremendous  importance. 
Its  execution  and  effectiveness  could  be  assured 
only  if  understood  by  Parliament  as  a  national 
policy,  with  all  the  risks  involved,  so  that  proper 
preparations  could  be  made.  Parliament  was, 
however,  never  warned  of  the  danger  England 
stood  of  being  thrown  suddenly  into  a  European 
war.  Had  Germany  been  told  in  July,  1914,  that 
Great  Britain  would  support  France  and  Russia, 
the  war  would  undoubtedly  have  been  prevented ; 
but  while  the  ministers  had  in  fact  incurred  moral 
obligations  over  against  France,  they  had  not  as- 
sured themselves  of  the  necessary  Parliamentary 
support  and  could  therefore  not  make  a  statement 
involving  such  risk  as  the  above  declaration  to 
Germany  would  have  created. 


96  SECRET  DIPLOIVIACY 

Of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech  of  the  3rd  of 
August,  1914,  Lord  Loreburn  says: 

"This  remarkable  speech  began  with  an  elaborate  ef- 
fort to  prove  that  the  House  of  Commons  was  perfectly 
free  to  determine  either  for  peace  or  war.  It  ended  with 
a  passionate  declaration  that  this  country  would  be  dis- 
graced if  we  did  not  declare  war,  and  the  reasoning  of 
the  speech  proved  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  committed 
himself  irretrievably.  It  left  the  House  of  Commons 
convinced  that  it  had  in  honor  no  choice  but  to  join 
France  in  arms.  It  is  an  epitome  of  the  reasoning  by 
which  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been  brought  to  believe  that 
he  could  say  and  do  what  he  said  and  did  without  limit- 
ing his  freedom  of  action.  But  if  this  is  legitimate  we 
ought  not  to  keep  up  the  pretense  that  we  are  a  self- 
governing  nation  in  foreign  affairs." 

Thus  a  minister,  to  whom  national  intrigne  and 
duplicity  were  essentially  foreign,  who  was 
trusted  by  his  country  and  who  wanted  peace,  was 
brought  by  the  methods  of  secret  diplomacy  into 
a  position  where  he  had  actually  incurred  the 
moral  obligation  to  assist  another  country  with- 
out having  the  power  for  peace  which  the  ability 
to  avow  that  relationship  openly,  to  take  the  re- 
sponsibility, and  to  confront  Germany  therewith, 
w^ould  have  given  him. 

As  early  as  November,  1911,  Lord  Lansdowne, 
one  of  the  founders  of  the  Entente,  in  speaking 
of  the  secret  agreement  of  1904  concerning  Mo- 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  97 

rocco,  which  had  then  just  become  known  to  the 
public,  had  admitted  that  in  such  a  case  the  prom- 
ise of  purely  diplomatic  support  might  easily 
bring  on  the  obligation  to  assist  in  other  ways; 
that  an  entente  cordiale  creates  close  relation- 
ships between  two  countries;  and  that,  should 
one  of  them  get  into  difficulties  without  its  guilt, 
it  would  expect  to  receive  support. 

The  moral  responsibilities  in  which  the  For- 
eign Minister  had  involved  the  British  Govern- 
ment were  not  simple,  nor  did  they  exist  against 
France  alone.  Because  of  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance  the  relationship  established  between 
Great  Britain  and  France  virtually  involved  shar- 
ing in  the  defense  of  France  against  the  conse- 
quences of  her  alliance  with  Russia,  as  the  subse- 
quent events  showed;  any  serious  situation  aris- 
ing in  the  Balkans  and  affecting  Russian  interests 
would  thereafter  involve  France,  and  through  her. 
Great  Britain.  Accordingly,  the  effect  of  this 
policy  was  to  make  the  peace  of  Great  Britain 
depend  upon,  and  to  involve  it  with,  the  complex 
struggle  for  influence  in  the  Balkans. 

After  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech  of  August 
3rd,  Mr.  T.  Edmund  Harvey,  M.P.,  said:  "I  am 
convinced  that  this  war  for  the  great  masses  of 
the  countries  of  Europe  is  no  peoples'  war.    It 


98  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

is  a  war  that  has  been  made  by  men  in  high  places, 
by  diplomatists  working  in  secret,  by  bureaucrats 
out  of  touch  with  the  people,  by  men  who  are  a 
remnant  of  an  older  evil  civilization." 

Lord  Loreburn  sums  up  his  indictment  of  se- 
cret diplomacy  in  the  following  language:  ''Se- 
cret diplomacy  has  undergone  its  'acid  test'  in 
this  country.  It  had  every  chance.  The  voice  of 
party  was  silent.  The  Foreign  Minister  was  an 
English  gentleman  whom  the  country  trusted  and 
admired,  who  was  wholly  free  from  personal  en- 
mities of  every  kind,  and  who  wanted  peace. 
And  secret  diplomacy  utterly  failed.  It  pre- 
vented us  from  finding  some  alternative  for  war, 
and  it  prevented  us  from  being  prepared  for  war, 
because  secret  diplomacy  means  diplomacy  aloof 
from  Parliament."  The  issue  is  here  quite 
clearly  stated.  Those  who  see  in  the  methods  and 
spirit  of  the  old  diplomacy  the  chief  cause  of  war, 
do  not  hold,  on  the  one  hand,  that  secret  diplo- 
macy involves  at  all  times  and  in  all  cases  un- 
scrupulous plotting.  But  they  believe  that  the 
method  of  dealing  with  foreign  affairs  as  a  mys- 
terious matter,  fit  to  be  handled  only  by  the  se- 
lect, and  the  reliance  on  a  policy  of  bargains  and 
compensations,  with  the  aim  thus  artificially  to 
maintain  a  balance  of  i^ower,  may  be  blamed  for 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  99 

this  great  catastrophe;  for  they  stood  in  the  way 
of  dealing  with  great  public  affairs  in  a  sounder 
manner,  that  is,  witlj  more  regard  of  the  actual 
public  interest  and  of  the  underlying  racial  and 
popular  factors. 

Those  British  critics  who  have  attacked  this 
method  as  practised  in  their  own  country  before 
and  during  the  war,  do  not  thereby  mean  to  im- 
pute to  British  statesmen  a  major  share  in  the 
responsibility  for  the  war.  The  high-mindedness 
and  public  spirit  of  the  responsible  statesmen  is 
recognized  by  all  fair  critics,  and  most  of  them 
imply  that  Great  Britain  has  far  less  to  fear  from 
this  system  than  have  nations  with  less  responsi- 
ble governments  and  a  less  sound  tradition  of 
statesmanship.  They  attack  the  system  as  a 
whole  as  it  exists  throughout  European  diplo- 
macy, and  as  it  has  been  used  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  historic  evidence, 
and  of  strict  reasoning  from  cause  to  effect,  a 
great  deal  of  doubt  still  remains  as  to  how  far 
secret  diplomacy  in  itself, — that  is,  the  failure  to 
publish  to  parliament  and  the  people,  details  of 
the  situation  as  it  developed, — could  properly  be 
considered  the  specific  cause  of  the  war;  no  mat- 
ter how  definite  may  be  our  judgment  and  belief 


100  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

that  the  secrecy  and  tortuousness  of  foreign  pol- 
icy are  bound  to  generate  an  air  of  uncertainty 
and  suspicion  which  will  so  greatly  favor  mili- 
tarist intrigues  and  influence  as  to  render  the 
making  of  wars  far  more  easy  than  they  would 
otherwise  be,  were  time  and  opportunity  given 
to  the  public  to  consider  the  details  of  a  critical 
situation.  Yet  it  might  be  difficult  to  prove  by 
historic  evidence,  the  specific  proposition  that  the 
war  of  1914  was  directly  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
development  of  international  affairs  was  quite 
generally  kept  from  the  knowledge  of  the  public. 
Nevertheless,  unquestionably  the  atmosphere  of 
secret  diplomacy  is  a  medium  exactly  suited  to 
the  most  baneful  influences. 

Viscount  Haldane  has  made  a  strong  defense  of 
the  policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey.  He  asserts  that 
''the  failure  of  those  who  had  to  make  the  effort 
to  keep  the  peace,  does  not  show  that  they  would 
have  done  better  had  they  discussed  delicate  de- 
tails in  public. ' '  He  continues :  ' '  There  are  top- 
ics and  conjunctures  in  the  almost  daily  changing 
relations  between  Governments  as  to  which  si- 
lence is  golden.  For  however  proper  it  may  be 
in  point  of  broad  principle  that  the  people  should 
be  fully  informed  of  what  concerns  them  vitally, 
the  most  important  thing  is  that  those  to  whom 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  101 

they  have  confided  their  concerns  should  be  given 
the  best  chance  of  success  in  averting  danger  to 
their  interests.  To  have  said  more  in  Parliament 
and  on  the  platform  in  the  years  in  question,  or 
to  have  said  it  otherwise,  would  have  been  to  run 
grave  risks  of  more  than  one  sort."  This  de- 
fense, however,  also  makes  certain  assumptions, 
particularly  the  underlying  one  that  the  war  was 
not  to  be  avoided  by  any  method.  It  is  based  on 
the  traditional  concept  of  foreign  affairs  which 
considers  that  it  is  best  to  leave  them  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  a  few  initiated  and  responsible  offi- 
cials. There  can  be  no  question  that  from  the 
highest  plane  conceivable  under  the  older  ideas 
and  norms  of  diplomacy,  the  conduct  of  foreign 
relations  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  must  be  consid- 
ered as  a  model  of  sagacity  and  caution.  But 
when  Lord  Cromer  describes  the  secret  arrange- 
ments concerning  Morocco  as  ''a  wise  measure 
of  preventive  diplomacy,"  it  is  not  easy  to  fol- 
low him. 


vn 

THE  CRISIS  OF  1914 

If  secret  diplomacy  exhibits  its  drawbacks  even 
in  a  country  where  parliamentary  government  is 
so  highly  developed  as  in  England  and  where  po- 
litical intelligence  and  independence  of  judgment 
exist,  we  shaU  not  be  surprised  at  the  continuous 
prevalence  of  devious  methods  in  diplomacy  in 
countries  where  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  is 
considered  quite  frankly  a  matter  only  for  the 
initiated,  and  where  little  pretense  is  made  of  an 
appeal  to  public  opinion  except  in  the  sense  of 
holding  it  in  subjection  by  vague  general  ideas 
of  national  danger,  necessity,  and  honor.  The 
main  faults  of  German  diplomacy  were  due  to 
its  bureaucratic  point  of  view  and  its  lack  of  con- 
tact with  public  opinion,  both  at  home  and  abroad. 
It  was  distinctly  an  expression  of  the  authorita- 
tive will  of  the  state,  guided  by  a  supposed  inner 
knowledge  of  its  dangers  and  needs,  but  without 
any  real  effort  to  strengthen  itself  through  con- 
tact with  the  public  mind.  The  Reichstag  was 
indeed  occasionally  informed  of  foreign  develop- 

102 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  103 

ments,  perhaps  as  frequently  as  in  England,  but 
there  was  no  real  mutual  influence  between  the 
nation  and  the  officials  conducting  foreign  affairs. 
As  has  already  been  pointed  out,  German  diplo- 
macy failed  to  reassure  either  the  neighbors  or 
the  people  of  Germany ;  its  lack  of  clear  objectives 
was  puzzling  and  disquieting.  It  was  also  hurt 
by  its  constant,  evident  dependence  on  what 
should  have  been  only  the  very  last  resort — mili- 
tary force.  A  further  disquieting  characteristic 
of  German  politics  was  that  there  seemed  to  be 
a  cynical  approval  of  certain  courses  of  action 
which  might  indeed  resemble  what  some  other  na- 
tions were  doing,  but  which  were  treated  by  the 
latter  rather  as  regrettable  necessities.  Thus 
there  is,  for  instance,  the  conception  of  Realpoli- 
tik,  of  which  Frederick  the  Great's  statement  is 
an  extreme  instance:  "Before  declaring  my  in- 
tentions I  consider  on  the  one  side  the  adverse 
incidents  which  I  must  risk ;  on  the  other,  the  good 
fortune  which  I  might  hope;  and  after  thorough 
consideration  of  pro  and  con,  I  decide  for  war." 
Coming  now  to  the  fateful  crisis  of  1914,  it 
would  appear  that  at  this  time  a  great  danger 
was  allowed  to  grow  up  without  the  men  in  con- 
trol of  the  government  giving  themselves  a  full 
account  as  to   the  fatal  probabilities   involved, 


104.  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

whereas  the  parliament  and  the  public  remained 
entirely  uninformed.     Germany  had  always  more 
or  less  backed  her  Austrian  ally  in  the  Balkan 
policy  of  the  latter.     Bismarck  had  indeed  been 
very  cautious  in  this  respect,  and  had  been  fully 
aware  of  the  danger  inherent  in  such  a  policy,  of 
committing  Germany  through  giving  Austria  too 
much  head.    When  the  Servian  question  became 
acute,  the  heads  of  the  German  Government  were 
indeed  so  reckless  in  encouraging  strong  Austrian 
action  as  to  justify  the  impression  that  they  de- 
sired to  push  Austria-Hungary  into  a  conflict.    It 
would,  however,  appear,  from  a  full  study  of  all 
the  data  which  is  now  possible,  that  the  Kaiser 
and  Bethmann-Hollweg  were  quite  optimistic  in 
believing  that  the  conflict  could  be  localized  and 
that  the  solution  could  be  left  to  Austria  and  Ser- 
via.    When  it  was  beginning  to  become  quite  clear 
'that  Russia  would  in  this  instance  not  stand  aside 
and  that  therefore  France,  too,  would  be  thrown 
into  the  conflict,  the  German  Chancellor  began  to 
make  belated  efforts  to  induce  Austria  to  accept 
the  mediation  of  the  Powers  on  the  basis  that  Bel- 
grade should  be  occupied  to  assure  compliance 
with  the  Servian  promises.    The  Austrian  pre- 
mier.   Count   Berchtold,   however,   was    not   in- 
clined to  reverse  his  engines.    He  took  advantage 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  106 

of  the  encouragement  given  to  Austria  in  the  first 
place,  to  persist  in  an  irreconcilable  attitude 
toward  Servia.  The  documentary  material  which 
has  so  far  been  published,  shows  that  Berchtold 
insinuated  to  the  Eussian  and  British  embiis- 
sies  that  he  was  favorable  to  mediation;  mean- 
while, he  did  not  answer  the  proposals  to  that 
effect  made  from  Berlin,  but  in  fact  stubbornly- 
pursued  his  stern  policy  against  Servia.  In  turn- 
ing a  deaf  ear  to  all  proposals  of  mediation  at 
this  time,  Berchtold  gave  the  militarists  at  Berlin 
and  Petrograd  the  control  of  the  situation. 

Berchtold  had  inherited  the  Balkan  policy  of 
Aehrenthal,  who  had  in  1909  carried  out  the  am- 
bition of  laying  the  two  Slavic  Provinces,  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  ''at  the  feet  of  Emperor  Fran- 
cis Joseph  at  his  Sixtieth  Jubilee."  Count 
Berchtold  himseK  was  not  considered  a  man  of 
strong  initiative;  he  vacillated  and  w^as  unde- 
cided upon  questions  of  great  moment;  he,  how- 
ever, displayed  great  stubbornness  on  the  fatal 
point  that  the  ''honor"  of  Austria-Hungary  did 
not  permit  of  any  mediation  with  Servia.  Count 
Forgach,  who  was  his  chief  adviser,  hated  Rus- 
sia and  Servia  intensely,  and  it  is  believed  that 
he  was  very  influential  in  spurring  Count  Berch- 
told   to    aggressive    action.     Countess    Leutrum 


106  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

holds  bim  responsible  for  the  war,  ''next  to 
Aehrenthal."  The  German  Ambassador  at  Vi- 
enna, Von  Tschirsky,  also  harbored  a  great  deal 
of  personal  resentment  against  Russia.  There 
would  appear  to  be  great  reason  to  doubt  whether 
such  efforts  as  Bethmann-Hollweg  made  to  urge 
moderation  upon  Berchtold  were  strongly  empha- 
sized by  the  personal  influence  of  the  German  am- 
bassador. Count  Czernin  states  that  all  of  Herr 
von  Tschirsky 's  private  speeches  at  this  time  were 
attuned  to  "Now  or  Never,"  and  he  asserts  that 
the  German  ambassador  declared  his  opinion  to 
be  "that  at  the  present  moment  Germany  was  pre- 
pared to  support  our  point  of  view  with  all  her 
moral  and  military  power,  but  whether  this  would 
prove  to  be  the  case  in  future  if  we  accepted  the 
Serbian  rebuff  appears  to  me  doubtful."  Count 
Czernin  believes  that  Tschirsky  in  particular  was 
firmly  persuaded  that  in  the  very  near  future  Ger- 
many would  have  to  go  through  a  war  against 
France  and  Russia,  and  that  he  considered  the 
year  1914  would  be  more  favorable  than  a  later 
date.  Count  Czernin  adds:  "For  this  reason, 
because  first  of  all  he  did  not  believe  in  the  fight- 
ing capacity  of  either  Russia  or  France,  and  sec- 
ondly, because — and  this  is  a  very  important  point 
— he  was  convinced  that  he  could  bring  the  Mon- 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  107 

archy  into  this  war,  while  it  appeared  doubtful  to 
him  that  the  aged  and  peace-loving  Emperor  Fran- 
cis Joseph  would  draw  the  sword  for  Germany  on 
any  other  occasion  where  the  action  would  center 
less  round  him,  he  wished  to  make  use  of  the  Ser- 
vian episode  so  as  to  be  sure  of  Austria-Hungary 
in  the  decisive  struggle.  That  was  his  policy, 
and  not  Bethmann's.  ...  I  am  persuaded,  how- 
ever, that  Tschirsky,  in  behaving  as  he  did,  widely 
overstretched  his  prescribed  sphere  of  activity. 
Isvolsky  was  not  the  only  one  of  his  kind." 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  essay  to  enter  into 
the  difficult  question  of  the  specific  guilt  for  bring- 
ing on  the  war  of  1914.  However,  in  examining 
the  quality  and  methods  of  contemporary  diplo- 
macy it  is  not  possible  to  avoid  considering  some 
of  the  phases  of  this  difficult  question.  The  docu- 
ments and  other  evidence  which  have  recently 
been  published,  make  it  appear  that  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  when  the  terrible  crisis  was  actually  at 
hand,  honestly  attempted  to  bring  about  a  mod- 
eration of  the  course  pursued  by  Austria.  The 
original  belief  of  the  German  statesman  itself 
could,  however,  be  accounted  for,  only  on  one  of 
two  alternative  reasons,  either  because  of  an  un- 
believable lack  of  foresight,  or  the  conviction  that 
a  threatening  attitude  would  again,  as  in  1909,  be 


108  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

successful,  and  that  Russia  would  not  dare  to  fol- 
low up  her  constantly  declared  interest  in  the 
Servian  situation.  And  if  w^orst  should  come  to 
worst,  "well  then,"  the  German  leaders  seemed 
to  think,  "now  will  be  better  than  later."  No 
matter  what  reasonable  occasion  German  states- 
men had  during  the  years  leading  up  to  the  war  to 
fear  a  hostile  policy  on  the  part  of  neighboring 
governments,  yet  their  attitude  and  action  at  a 
critical  time  shows  uppermost  in  the  minds  of 
these  statesmen  and  diplomats,  a  narrowly  tac- 
tical, primarily  bureaucratic,  view  of  the  factors 
involved.  There  was  always  present  in  the  back- 
ground the  notion  of  the  necessity  of  a  preventive 
war.  Those  who  make  the  actual  decision  to  be- 
gin a  war  without  any  immediate  provocation 
making  it  plainly  defensive,  who  begin  it  because 
of  contingent  dangers  in  the  future,  no  matter 
how  great,  take  a  very  serious  responsibility.  As 
has  been  said,  the  indicative  "Germany  made 
war,"  is  far  more  apt  to  leave  a  powerful  impres- 
sion in  the  record  of  history  than  the  subjunc- 
tive, "If  Germany  had  not  made  war  then  the 
others  would  have  done  so  later  on." 

The  fact  that  military  action  against  Servia 
would  probably  involve  Russia  and  thus  set  in 
motion  the  complete  chain  of  international  forces 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  109 

involving  Europe  in  a  world  war,  that  is,  the  fu- 
tility of  the  attempt  to  localize  the  struggle  in 
Servia,  is  practically  admitted  in  the  statement 
of  the  German  White  Book,  issued  August  3, 
1914,  to  the  following  effect:  "We  were  aware 
of  the  fact  that  warlike  undertaking  against  Ser- 
via would  bring  Eussia  into  the  war  and  that 
therefore  our  duty  as  an  ally  might  entangle  us 
likewise.  We  could,  however,  not  advise  our 
Ally  to  yield  in  a  manner  incompatible  with  its 
dignity,  nor  could  we  deny  our  assistance  at  this 
difficult  moment." 

Austria-Hungary  had  judged  that  it  would  be 
incompatible  with  its  dignity  and  honor  to  submit 
the  Servian  matter  to  arbitration.  This  illus- 
trates a  very  characteristic  feature  of  contempo- 
rary diplomacy,  still  adhering  to  the  traditions 
and  prejudices  of  the  past.  The  term  *' honor" 
is  one  that  is  not  translatable  into  terms  which 
can  be  reasoned  about.  It  is  in  fact  a  direct 
descendant  of  the  conception  of  "honor"  during 
the  eighteenth  century,  in  the  code  of  the  duelist. 
Men  constantly  translate  the  concepts  of  their 
private  life  into  public  affairs,  and  to  these  men. 
who  at  Vienna,  Petersburg  and  Berlin,  had  the 
destiny  of  the  world  in  their  hands,  honor  was 
an  indefinable  term  which  could  be  felt  but  not 


110  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

discussed.  In  practice,  when  applied  to  human 
affairs  of  the  utmost  importance,  it  cannot  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  character  of  the  personal 
duel,  in  which  the  conception  of  justice  was  en- 
tirely subordinate.  When  it  was  said  that  Aus- 
tria-Hungary found  arbitration  "beneath  its  dig- 
nity," there  was  speaking  the  mentality  of  the 
Feudal  junker  who  considers  himself  too  noble 
to  appeal  to  a  court  against  a  peasant  neighbor, 
but  prefers  to  send  his  servants  to  give  him  a 
thrashing.  The  honor  of  Austria-Hungary  is  of 
such  a  special  kind  in  the  mind  of  these  men  that 
it  does  not  suffer  arbitration,  but  sees  in  war  the 
only  possible  satisfaction.  In  this  as  in  many 
other  points,  secret  diplomacy  is  a  superstition 
of  the  past.  As  late  as  May,  1916,  the  Pester 
Lloyd,  a  semi-official  paper,  declared:  "Even  if 
the  Eussian  Government  had  stopt  its  mobiliza- 
tion, which  it  had  secretly  begun  notwithstanding 
all  its  hypocritical  assurances,  nevertheless  Aus- 
tria-Hungary would  not  have  gone  to  any  con- 
ference but  would  have  insisted  without  interfer- 
ence from  third  parties  to  settle  its  affairs  with 
Servia  in  consonance  with  the  future  security  of 
Austria-Hungary."  It  would  appear  plain  that 
the  Austrian  leaders  wanted  war,  but  with  Servia 
alone ;  trusting  that  the  formidable  power  of  their 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  111 

great  ally  would  again  block  outside  intervention. 
Thus  when  we  look  at  the  men  in  whose  hands 
at  this  time  such  a  fateful  power  of  decision  was 
placed,   we   find   them,   as   the   great   crisis   ap- 
proaches, themselves  stunned  by  the  enormity  of 
the  forces  about  to  be  unchained,  seeking  still  and 
hoping  for  some  fortunate  escape;  yet  guided  in 
their  specific  action,  not  by  a  general  masterly 
grasp  of  the  entire  situation,  such  as  is  ordinarily 
expected  of  the  diplomatic  superman,  but  just  by 
details  happening  to  be  most  prominent  in  their 
mind,  such  as  the  incompatibility  of  arbitration 
with  the  honor  of  Austria,  or  the  personal  judg- 
ments and  inclinations  of  individual  diplomats. 
As  to  a  correct  estimate  of  how  the  forces  would 
work  out,  as  to  foresight  of  determining  factors, 
these  men  showed  no  unusual  ability;  in  fact,  the 
guess  of  the  intelligent  man  on  the  street  would 
have  been  as  safe  as  their  judgment.     They  stood 
on  too  narrow-  a  base;  they  believed  that  Italy 
would  remain  neutral,  that  England  would  not 
enter  the  contest,  and  later  that  the  United  States 
would  never  engage  in  hostilities.     When  we  con- 
•sider  the  mental  attitude   of  the  controllers   of 
foreign  affairs  in  all  countries  during  this  long 
period  of  secret  manipulations,  we  can  find  noth- 
ing sacrosanct  about  the  deductions  and  judgments 


112  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

of  secret  diplomacy;  in  fact,  the  lack  of  contact 
with  public  opinion  and  the  deeper  forces  of  life, 
is  everywhere  painfully  apparent.  A  Swiss 
writer  has  stated:  "The  World  War  is  the  work 
of  a  small  minority  of  men  in  power.  Their 
power  rests  on  the  principle  of  authority,  and  on 
the  erroneous  supposition  of  wisdom  and  fore- 
sight exceeding  the  average.  The  means  of  main- 
taining this  erroneous  supposition  is  secret  di- 
plomacy, which  deprives  the  people  of  all  possi- 
bility of  insight  and  control  in  the  most  momen- 
tous questions.  The  result  of  this  system  is  the 
ruin  of  Europe."  It  is  too  great  a  risk  to  take, 
to  leave  in  the  hands  of  individual  men,  no  mat- 
ter how  highly  gifted  personally,  the  control  of 
such  forces  and  the  playing  of  such  chances. 

In  Russia,  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  under 
the  Empire  was  in  the  hands  of  a  narrow  group 
of  men  of  special  training  and  experience,  but 
without  an  element  of  responsibility  to  the  public 
at  large,  except  that  involved  in  the  general  re- 
sults of  diplomatic  policy.  It  is  a  notable  fact 
that  during  the  nineteenth  century  only  six  men 
held  the  position  of  foreign  ministers  in  Russia. 
This  is  by  far  the  longest  average  tenure  in  any 
country.  Sazonov,  who  became  foreign  minister 
in  1911,  further  emphasized  the  esoteric  charac- 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  113 

ter  of  foreign  policy  by  definitely  divorcing  it 
from  home  affairs.  He  did  not  consult  with  the 
Comicil  of  Ministers,  but  only  with  men  of  his 
own  chosen  environment,  a  select  group  of  a  few 
collaborators.  Russian  foreign  policy  was  there- 
fore controlled  by  a  very  small  clique,  represent- 
ing the  traditions  of  secret  diplomacy,  and  playing 
at  a  game  of  chance,  though  never  so  shrewdly, 
with  the  lives,  fortunes  and  interests  of  vast 
populations.  In  the  Balkan  states  Russian  di- 
plomacy had  for  a  long  time  applied  all  its  arts  in 
order  to  establish  the  predominance  of  Russian 
influence.  The  secret  alliance  between  Servia  and 
Bulgaria  was  nurtured  by  Russia  evidently  with, 
the  desire  of  raising  a  barrier  to  the  eastward  ex- 
pansion of  Austrian  influence.  In  1912,  the  fear 
was  entertained  that  the  alliance  might  spend  its 
main  efforts  against  Turkey  instead  of  Austria. 
At  this  time  a  loan  was  arranged  for  King  Ferdi- 
nand of  Bulgaria,  the  funds  for  which  were  ad- 
vanced by  the  Czar.  The  Russian  Foreign  Of- 
fice was  fully  informed  concerning  the  Balkan  al- 
liance, which  commenced  the  war  in  1912  with  Rus- 
sian assent  and  encouragement.  TOiat  direction 
the  thoughts  of  Russian  diplomats  were  taking,  is 
apparent  from  a  remark  of  Sazonov,  Russian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Servian  Min- 


114s  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ister,  on  April  29,  1913,  reported  by  the  latter  as 
follows : 

"Again  Sazonov  told  me  that  we  must  work  for  the 
future  because  we  would  acquire  a  great  deal  of  terri- 
tory from  Austria.  I  replied  that  we  would  gladly  give 
Bulgaria  Monastir  (Bitollia)  if  we  could  acquire  Bosnia 
and  other  territory  of  Austria." 

A  Belgian  diplomat,  in  a  report  written  from 
Berlin  in  1913,  says  that  notwithstanding  the 
great  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkans,  Russian 
diplomacy  had  vacillated  a  great  deal  there  since 
the  beginning  of  the  Balkan  war;  he  goes  on  to 
say :  "  In  a  moment  of  confidence  the  French  am- 
bassador spoke  particularly  concerning  the  influ- 
ence which  M.  Isvolsky  has  maintained,  who  has  a 
personal  desire  of  revenge  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary, and  takes  great  pains  to  spoil  the  game 
whenever  there  is  any  appearance  of  Austrian 
success."  (Baron  Bey  ens  to  the  Belgian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  March  18,  1913.) 

When  the  great  crisis  came  on,  the  diplomacy 
of  Russia  worked  in  close  connection  with  the 
militarists.  The  irreconcilable  stubbornness  of 
Count  Berchtold  greatly  strengthened  the  hands 
of  the  militarists,  both  in  Petersburg  and  Berlin, 
and  virtually  put  the  decision  in  their  hands.  The 
Russians  did  their  part  to  bring  on  the  war  by 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  115 

first  ordering  mobilization  and  making  that  mobi- 
lization general  almost  immediately.     The  facts 
concerning  this  matter  have  become  known.    On 
July  29,  1914,  General  Janushkevich,  the  Russian 
Minister  of  War,  under  directions  from  the  For- 
eign Minister  Sazonov,  gave  the  German  military 
attache  his  word  of  honor  as  a  soldier,  to  the  ef- 
fect that  *' no  general  mobilization  had  taken  place, 
or  was  desired."    At  the  very  time,  he  had  with 
him  the  Czar's  mobilization  order.    During  the 
night  of  July  29th,  the  Czar  gave  directions  to 
suspend  the  execution  of  the  order  for  general 
mobilization.     Generals  Janushkevich  and  Sukh- 
omlinoff,  with  the  approval  of  M.  Sazonov,  made 
the  momentous  decision  to  go  on  with  the  execu- 
tion of  the  order,  in  disregard  of  the  Czar's  com- 
mand.   It  is  quite  evident  that  this  action  made 
the  peaceful  settlement  of  the  crisis  far  more  dif- 
ficult, and  gave  full  control  into  the  hands  of  the 
military  party  in  Berlin.    As  late  as  July  31,  M. 
Viviani  told  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris 
that  he  was  in  no  way  informed  of  a  general  mobi- 
lization in  Russia.    The  Russian  militarists  had 
got  away. 


vni 

THE  SECRET  TREATIES  OF  THE  WAR 

While  the  war  lasted,  tlie  demands  of  self-pro- 
tection required  the  careful  concealment  of  nego- 
tiations and  policies  from  enemy  knowledge.  But 
though  it  is  easy  to  understand  the  need  of  se- 
crecy at  such  a  time,  yet  the  spirit  displayed  in 
these  negotiations  had  but  little  in  common  w^ith 
the  ideals  professed  in  the  same  breath.  More- 
over, there  was  a  lack  of  complete  sincerity  among 
the  Allies  themselves,  and  particularly  was  there  a 
concealment  from  some  of  them  of  important  facts 
and  agreements  affecting  their  interests.  How- 
ever, the  most  baneful  effect  of  secret  diplomacy 
during  the  war  is  found  in  the  undermining  of  pub- 
lic confidence  in  a  moral  foundation  of  public  ac- 
tion. As  Lord  Loreburn  says:  "It  was  not 
wholesome  that  while  our  people  were  stimulated 
to  unparalleled  exertions  by  a  parade  of  lofty  mo- 
tives there  should  be  at  the  same  time  in  existence 
agreements  of  this  kind,  of  which  no  public  men- 
tion could  be  made,  and  from  which  little  has  re- 
sulted except  the  right  of  foreign  Powers  to  de- 
ne 


SECRET  TREATIES  OF  THE  WAR       117 

mand  their  fulfilment  on  our  part."  That  at  a 
time  when  the  people  in  the  vast  armies  were 
actually  fighting  for  ideals  of  freedom  and  peace, 
common  to  humanity,  the  chief  care  of  responsi- 
ble statesmen  should  have  been  the  division  of 
prospective  spoils,  did  certainly  not  laj^  solid 
foundations  for  peace. 

Japan  in  her  action  with  respect  to  Shantung 
and  in  secretly  making  the  twenty-one  demands 
on  China,  was  first  in  the  attempt  to  utilize  the 
great  struggle  for  narrowly  selfish  gain,  in  this 
case  not  entirely  at  the  expense  of  tlie  enemy  but 
of  a  neutral  and  of  her  allies.  Nor  did  other  gov- 
ernments keep  themselves  free  from  the  tempta- 
tions of  prospective  conquest,  with  the  risk  of 
making  war  interminable  and  putting  the  world 
face  to  face  with  revolution,  anarchy  and  famine. 
As  early  as  February,  1915,  the  Russian  Foreign 
Minister  informed  the  French  and  British  am- 
bassadors of  the  territorial  acquisitions  which 
Russia  desired  to  make  through  the  war,  includ- 
ing a  great  part  of  Turkey  in  Europe  and  in  Asia. 
The  French  and  British  Governments  expressed 
their  readiness  to  agree,  provided  a  number  of 
claims  made  by  France  and  England  were  satis- 
fied. Italy  entered  the  war,  as  is  well  known,  on 
condition  of  her  claims  for  territorial  annexations 


118  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

being  satisfied.  She  agreed  to  the  Russian  de- 
mands on  the  same  condition. 

On  March  9, 1916,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister 
instructed  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to 
the  following  effect:  "It  is  above  all  necessary 
to  demand  that  the  Polish  Question  should  be  ex- 
cluded from  the  subjects  of  international  negotia- 
tion, and  that  all  attempts  to  place  Poland's  fu- 
ture under  the  guarantee  and  control  of  the 
Powers  should  be  prevented."  Thus  did  the  Rus- 
sian Government  attempt  secretly  to  lock  the  door 
against  any  chance  of  Poland  regaining  her  lost 
national  rights.  The  entry  of  Roumania  in  1916 
led  to  additional  arrangements.  These  agree- 
ments were  kept  strictly  secret  and  the  millions 
who  were  laying  down  their  lives  in  the  war  had 
no  conception  of  this  intricate  web  of  bargains. 

An  effort  to  settle  at  a  time  when  the  Allies 
were  united  in  their  main  aim  in  the  furnace  heat 
of  the  war,  questions  which  might  divide  them 
when  peace  had  come  in  sight,  could  be  under- 
stood; and  that  such  agreements  should  be  kept 
secret  during  the  war,  might  have  been  consid- 
ered a  necessity.  However,  the  necessity  of  war 
in  this  case  was  stretched  to  cover  arrangements 
which  in  themselves  went  diametrically  contrary 
to  the  publicly  professed  principles  for  which  the 


SECRET  TREATIES  OF  THE  WAR       119 

war  was  being  fought,  and  gave  rise  to  the  just 
suspicion  that  in  several  cases  at  least,  very  spe- 
cific advantages  had  been  the  controlling  incen- 
tive for  entering  the  war.    But  these  agreements 
have  aroused  the  greatest  resentment  because  they 
were  in  several  cases  directed  against  the  inter- 
ests  of  third  parties,   and  particularly  because 
when  the  United  States  was  making  its  enormous 
and  unselfish  sacrifices,  these  treaties  were  kept 
from  its  knowledge.    That  the  American  Govern- 
ment should  not  have  been  informed  of  the  secret 
treaties  made  at  the  instance  of  Japan  in  which 
American  interests  were  most  seriously  affected, 
and  that  just  after  these  agreements  had  been 
concluded  the  statesmen  who  had  been  closely  con- 
nected with  acceding  to  these  arrangements  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain,  at  the  price  of  the 
British  control  of  the  islands  of  the  South  Pa- 
cific, came  to  the  United  States  to  stimulate  the 
practical  devotion  there  to  the  cause  of  the  Al- 
lies, is  a  fact  that  will  unfortunately  help  to  give 
munition  to  those  who  are  unfavorable  to  any 
real  friendly  understanding  between  the  two  great 
English-speaking   powers.     The    secret   commer- 
cial policy  pursued  by  Great  Britain  during  the 
war  is  also  justly  subject  to  severe  criticism  as 
giving  food  and  subsistence  to  the  growth  of  deep 


I 


120  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

suspicion  on  the  part  of  even  the  most  faithful  of 
friends. 

I      The  secret  treaties  relating  to  the  division  of 
territories  in  Europe  did  not  come  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  public  until  1918.     At  that  time  they 
were  republished  by  one  or  two  British  papers, 
but    were    suppressed    by    the    remainder.     The 
treaties  were,  however,  distributed  in  innumerable 
I  copies    by    their    own    governments    among    the 
jtroops  of  the  Central  Powers  in  order  to  stimu- 
1  late  them  to  fight  in  a  spirit  of  self-defense,  "irt 
is  reported  from  various  reliable  sources  that  the 
Slovenes  were  the  most  eager  to  fight,  of  any  part 
of  the  Austrian  army,  after  the  Pact  of  London 
had  become  known  to  them,  with  its  various  prom- 
ises to  Italy. 

The  secret  assurances  which  had  been  given  to 
Italy  in  the  Compact  of  London  were  probably 
the  cause  of  prolonging  the  war,  with  its  enor- 
mous slaughter,  for  more  than  a  year.  In  the 
Spring  of  1917,  secret  negotiations  were  pursued 
between  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  the  President 
and  Premier  of  France,  and  the  British  Prime 
Minister.  The  intermediaries  in  these  negotia- 
tions were  the  Bourbon  Princes  Sixtus  and 
Xavier,  brothers  of  the  Empress  of  Austria.  The 
negotiations  were  carried  on  from  Switzerland 


SECRET  TREATIES  OF  THE  WAR       121 

with  a  confidential  envoy  of  tlie  Emperor  of  Aus- 
tria. Only  the  Emperor,  the  Empress  and  the 
Duchess  of  Parma  were  in  the  secret.  Count 
Czernin,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  at  this  time,  at  first  knew  only  of  the 
general  fact,  not  of  the  details.  A  note  of  Count 
Czernin,  with  a  secret  personal  note  written  by 
the  Emperor,  were  brought  to  Prince  Xavier  and 
taken  by  him  to  Paris.  The  proposals  in  Count 
Czernin 's  note  related  to  the  restoration  and  in- 
demnification of  Belgium,  and  the  German  renun- 
ciation of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  "Austria- 
Hungary  naturally  would  not  oppose."  Count 
Czernin  stated  that  Austria-Hungary  could  not 
make  a  separate  peace;  that  it  had  no  idea  of 
crushing  Servia,  but  needed  guarantees  against 
such  affairs  as  led  to  the  murder  at  Sarajevo; 
that  Austria-Hungary  had  no  desire  of  crushing 
Eoumania,  etc.  The  secret  addenda  made  by  the 
Emperor,  without  the  knowledge  of  Count 
Czernin,  stated:  '*We  will  support  France  and 
exercise  pressure  on  Germany  with  all  means  [in 
connection  with  Alsace-Lorraine].  We  are  abso- 
lutely not  in  Germany's  hands;  it  was  against 
Germany's  will  that  we  did  not  break  with 
America. ' ' 
When  President  Poincare  received  the  Prince's 


122  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

report  he  stated  that  the  secret  note  afforded 
a  basis  for  discussion,  that  he  would  communi- 
cate the  two  notes,  with  arrangements  of  ab- 
solute secrecy,  to  the  Premier,  and  inform  the 
Czar  by  personal  letter,  as  well  as  the  King  of 
England,  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  "who  is  a  dis- 
crete man."  But  the  President  thought  that 
Italy  would  be  the  stumbling  block.  After  this 
interview  the  Princes  proceeded  to  Vienna  for  a 
personal  interview  with  the  Emperor,  which  took 
place  on  the  night  of  March  23rd.  The  Emperor 
discussed  the  whole  situation,  saying  that  Servia 
was  naturally  the  friend  of  Austria,  and  that  all 
that  Austria  needed  was  the  suppression  of  revo^ 
lutionary  propaganda  there.  He  stated  that  one 
of  the  Entente  Powers  was  secretly  conversing 
with  Bulgaria;  Bulgaria  does  not  know  that  the 
secret  has  leaked  out.  ''It  has  not  much  impor- 
tance, because  all  these  dreams  of  empire  of  the 
East  will  have  to  end  in  the  status  quo,  or  very 
nearly  that."  Count  Czernin  later  joined  in  the 
conversation,  which  is  described  as  "rather  gla- 
cial." He  expressed  his  belief  that  peace  must 
be  made  at  any  price,  and  that  it  might  be  neces- 
sary for  Austria  to  secure  a  divorce  from  Ger- 
many because  the  latter  would  never  abandon  Al- 
sace-Lorraine.   After  a  second  visit,  the  Emperor 


SECRET  TREATIES  OF  THE  WAR       123 

gave  Prince  Xavier  an  autographed  letter,  en- 
joining absolute  secrecy  because  *'an  indiscre- 
tion would  force  him  to  send  troops  to  the  French 
front."  The  autographed  letter  of  Emperor 
Charles,  dated  March  24th,  contains  the  following 
proposals:  That  he  will  support  the  just  French 
claims  to  Alsace-Lorraine  by  all  means,  using  all 
his  personal  influence  with  his  allies ;  Belgium  and 
Servia  are  to  be  restored  to  full  sovereignty ;  Bel- 
gium is  to  secure  indemnities  for  her  losses ;  and 
Servia  is  to  have  access  to  the  Adriatic  Sea.  On 
the  basis  of  this  letter,  discussions  took  place 
among  the  men  concerned  in  France  and  in  Eng- 
land.   But  Italy  remained  the  obstacle. 

Another  trip  was  taken  by  Prince  Xavier  to 
Vienna,  where  he  met  the  Emperor  on  May  8th. 
The  question  now  was,  "What  compensations  should 
Austria  receive  for  ceding  its  territory  to  Italy 
in  accordance  with  the  Pact  of  London?  Count 
Czernin  joined  the  meeting  and  on  the  following 
day  prepared  a  memorandum,  which  was  based 
upon  the  principle,  ''Austria-Hungary  can  cede 
no  territory  without  compensation ;  but  if  the  ter- 
ritorial question  is  arranged,  then  a  separate 
peace  with  the  Entente  might  be  concluded." 
When  the  matter  was  taken  up  again  at  Paris, 
the  Italian  difficulty  remained.     M.  Ribot  strongly 


124  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

adhered  to  the  idea  that  without  Italy,  no  result 
could  be  had.  Meanwhile,  the  unsuccessful  Ital- 
ian offensive  of  July,  1917,  had  supervened,  and 
the  war  had  to  go  on  for  another  sixteen  months, 
although  the  acceptance  of  the  proposals  of  the 
Emperor  would  undoubtedly  have  brought  it  to 
an  early  end. 

Count  Czernin  has  given  in  his  book,  In  the 
World  War,  an  unimpassioned  and  coldly-bal- 
anced view  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  time.  He  does 
not  relate  the  details  of  the  secret  negotiations  of 
1917,  but  he  evidently  did  not  approve  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  they  were  carried  out  because  their 
effect  was  to  suggest  to  the  Entente  a  willingness 
of  Austria-Hungary  to  separate  from  her  allies, 
without  strengthening  her  position  in  any  way.  In 
a  letter  written  to  Count  Tisza  in  the  summer  of 
1917,  Czernin  said:  ''It  is  possible  to  turn  and 
steer  the  Entente  course  if  thought  feasible;  but 
then  courage  would  be  needed  to  make  the  turn 
fully.  Nothing  is  more  stupid  than  trifling  with 
treachery  and  not  carrying  it  out ;  we  should  lose 
all  ground  in  Berlin  and  gain  nothing  either  in 
London  or  Paris." 

The  policy  pursued  by  Japan  throughout  the 
war  made  use  of  all  the  devices  of  secret  diplo- 
macy for  the  attainment  of  ends  narrowly  na- 


SECRET  TREATIES  OF  THE  WAR       125 

tional.  After  having  possessed  herself  of  Tsing- 
tau,  with  a  marked  cold-shouldering  of  her  Brit- 
ish allies,  Japan  set  about  an  attempt  to  arrange 
things  in  China  so  that  no  effective  resistance 
might  be  offered  there  to  Japan's  expansionist 
desires.  In  January,  1915,  the  Japanese  minis- 
ter in  an  interview  with  the  President  of  China, 
after  enjoining  the  strictest  secrecy  on  the  pain 
of  most  disagreeable  consequences,  proposed  the 
famous  twenty-one  demands.  That  it  should  have 
been  attempted  to  dispose  of  matters  so  funda- 
mentally important,  involving  the  national  rights 
of  a  population  of  350,000,000  peoi)le,  through  de- 
mands secretly  forced  upon  a  President,  at  a  time 
when  the  national  representative  body  did  not 
function, — that  is  one  of  the  startling  facts  of  mod- 
ern history.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  Japa- 
nese Foreign  Office  had  apparently  persuaded 
itself  that  secrecy  could  be  maintained  in  a  mat- 
ter of  such  transcendent  importance.  For  when 
contrary  to  that  expectation  and  in  accordance 
with  nature  and  with  the  salutary  fact  that,  after 
all,  such  tremendous  issues  can  not  be  thus  se- 
cretly disposed  of,  the  facts  of  the  case  began  to 
leak  out,  categorical  denials  were  made  by  the 
Japanese  Foreign  Ofiice  and  by  various  embas- 
sies.    In  this  case,  those  who  had  the  right  to 


126  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

object  to  the  disposal  of  important  interests  in 
which  they  themselves  had  a  share,  were  not  mere 
neutrals  or  outsiders  but  the  allies  of  Japan,  en- 
gaged in  a  life  and  death  struggle  at  the  time. 
As  the  twenty-one  demands  aimed  at  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  predominant  position  in  China 
through  control  of  finance  and  armament,  every 
other  nation  there  interested  would  have  been  ad- 
versely affected  by  the  proposed  arrangement. 
The  Chinese,  though  isolated,  would  not  immedi- 
ately yield  to  the  threatening  attitude  of  their 
neighbor  and  the  negotiations  were  strung  out 
over  months.  Though  they  were  assiduously  kept 
secret,  the  nature  of  the  transaction  in  general 
and  in  detail  became  quite  well  known  outside,  so 
that  the  results  could  not  be  kept  hidden ;  yet  the 
whole  procedure  constituted  an  affirmation  that  it 
was  proper  to  deal  with  the  destinies  of  a  people 
in  a  secret  council  chamber,  where  the  demandant 
backed  by  strong  military  forces,  confronted  the 
first  official  of  a  vast,  peaceful  but  unmilitant  na- 
tion, which  would  never  in  the  world  agree  to  such 
procedure  and  the  resultant  undertakings.  Japan 
did  indeed  get  certain  concessions,  but  at  the  cost 
of  making  her  diplomacy  and  policy  universally 
suspected  on  account  of  the  methods  which  had 
been  used. 


SECRET  TREATIES  OF  THE  WAR       127 

The  policy  of  Japan  at  the  time  did  not  look 
with  favor  upon  China  associating  herself  with 
the  Allies.  Demarches  which  were  made  to  bring 
about  the  entry  of  China  into  the  alliance  were 
negatived  by  Japan.  This  in  itself  might  have 
been  based  on  sound  reasons,  yet  the  real  inward- 
ness of  this  policy  was  revealed  at  the  time  when 
the  United  States  had  broken  off  relations  with 
Germany  and  when  the  Chinese  Government  in 
the  days  immediately  thereafter  was  considering 
whether  to  follow  the  example  of  the  United 
States.  From  a  report  of  the  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor at  Tokio  concerning  an  interview  with  the 
Foreign  Minister  of  Japan,  which  took  place  on 
February  10,  1917,  we  learn  that  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  alluded  to  a  rumor  that  an  at- 
tempt might  be  made  Iq  induce  China  to  join, 
the  Allies  to  the  extent  of  breaking  off  relations 
with  Germany.  The  Foreign  Minister  said  in  ef- 
fect: "It  would  be  unwise  and  dangerous  to  at- 
tempt to  bring  China  to  the  side  of  the  Allies 
unless  we  can  be  sure  that  it  can  be  carried 
through.  This  is,  however,  doubtful.  Yet  the 
Japanese  Government  is  willing  to  undertake  the 
task  of  inducing  China  to  take  the  step.  But  be- 
fore making  any  such  proposal,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment desires  to  be  informed  as  to  the  attitude 


128  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

of  the  Russian  Government  in  the  matter  of  Shan- 
tung and  the  Pacific  Islands.  Will  the  Russian 
Government  support  Japan  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence in  these  matters  1 ' '  The  Russian  ambassador 
was  requested  to  get  the  opinion  of  his  govern- 
ment on  this  point.  In  other  words,  in  return 
for  a  commission  paid  largely  by  China  herself, 
the  Japanese  Government  was  ready  to  permit 
that  China  should  join  the  Allies  in  the  Great 
War.  It  was  assumed  by  the  Foreign  Minister 
that  Japan's  persuasion  should  be  necessary  to 
induce  China  to  take  this  step ;  but  in  fact,  at  the 
very  time  when  this  conversation  between  the 
minister  and  ambassador  was  going  on,  the  Cab- 
inet of  China  was  in  the  all-day  session  from 
which  resulted  the  decision  to  follow  the  United 
States  in  breaking  off  relations  with  Germany. 
This  step  was  taken  without  compulsion,  urgency 
or  the  promise  of  advantages,  upon  a  careful  con- 
sideration of  the  underlying  conditions  and  equi- 
ties, without  assurances  of  gain,  merely  in  the  ex- 
pectation of  fair  treatment  as  an  ally  and  as- 
sociate. 


IX 

HOPES  FOR  IMPROVEMENT  DEFERRED 

The  world  has  not  yet  recovered  from  the  sur- 
prise and  disillusionment  which  overcame  it  when 
the  secret  treaties  of  the  war  became  known  and 
when.it  becanae  evident  that  they  would  be  made 
the  basis  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  The  secrecy 
of  the  procedure  of  the  Peace  Conference — which 
had  been  heralded  as  an  assembly  of  the  peoples 
for  carrying  out  and  making  permanent  those 
great  principles  for  which  men  had  grimly  and 
silently  suffered  and  died  and  which  had  been 
eloquently  voiced  by  the  American  President — 
seemed  to  be  so  complete  a  return  to  the  old  meth- 
ods of  diplomacy  that  from  the  day  when  the 
muzzle  was  clamped  on,  public  faith  in  the  con- 
ference and  its  results  was  shaken.  The  motives 
of  the  men  who  made  this  decision  were  probably 
good.  It  was  their  desire  that  the  work  should 
be  rapidly  accomplished  and  should  not  be  con- 
fused by  divided  counsels.  But  again  the  results 
of  the  secret  method  are  hardly  apt  to  increase 
confidence  in  its  usefulness  as  a  procedure  for 

129 


130  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

dealing  with  the  affairs  of  the  peoples  of  the 
world  in  such  a  manner  as  to  place  them  upon  a 
sound  and  lasting  foundation. 

The  solemn  document  which  was  prepared  for 
the  information  of  the  newspaper  men  on  the  de- 
cision of  the  peace  conference  to  enforce  secrecy, 
did  not  satisfy  any  one.  To  the  public  there 
seemed  to  be  no  larger  principle  at  issue  than 
that,  on  this  occasion  if  ever,  open  covenants 
should  be  openly  arrived  at,  and  it  was  feared 
that  if  the  peace  conference  did  not  base  its  action 
upon  an  appeal  to  public  opinion,  no  adequate 
solution  could  be  found  at  all.  When  the  treaty 
itself  had  been  framed,  it  was  sedulously  kept  se- 
cret until  distributed  by  the  French  paper  Bon- 
soir.  The  deliberations  of  the  Council  of  Five 
were  secret  beyond  all  precedents  in  public  ac- 
tion. No  secretaries  were  admitted  and  no  offi- 
cial minutes  were  kept,  nor  were  there  communi- 
cations to  the  public  through  the  press.  Doctor 
Dillon's  description  of  the  Five  as  "a  gang  of 
benevolent  conspirators,  ignoring  history  and  ex- 
pertship,  shutting  themselves  up  in  a  room  and 
talking  disconnectedly,"  unfortunately  appears 
not  entirely  untrue ;  particularly  as  to  the  ignor- 
ing of  history  and  expertship,  which  was  quite 
patent,  although  from  the  nature  of  things  we 


HOPES  FOR  IMPROVEMENT  131 

cannot  exactly  know  how  disconnectedly  the  Five 
talked. 

Unfortunately,  after  the  war  the  use  of  secret 
diplomatic  policy  has  continued  without  noticeable 
diminution.  The  details  of  certain  situations 
make  one  feel  as  if  we  are  after  all  only  a  genera- 
tion removed  from  the  eighteenth  century.  These 
matters  are  so  recent  and  still  so  controversial 
that  I  do  not  desire  to  enter  upon  them  in  any 
detail. 

It  is,  however,  surely  to  be  regretted,  that  it 
should  have  been  found  necessary  to  surround  the 
mandates  with  peculiar  secrecy.  This  institution 
was  conceived  in  a  desire  to  create  a  trusteeship 
in  behalf  of  the  world  in  general  and  for  the  par- 
ticular benefit  of  the  populations  comprised  in  the 
mandates.  Not  only  has  the  assignment  of  cer- 
tain mandates  given  rise  to  great  popular  resist- 
ance indicating  that  the  local  populations  were 
far  from  ready  to  trust  their  interests  to  a  for- 
eign mandatory,  but  the  fact  that  these  arrange- 
ments are  so  carefully  guarded  with  secrecy 
comes  near  to  destroying  all  hope  that  there  is 
any  intention  to  handle  them  otherwise  than  from 
the  imperialist  point  of  view  and  for  the  benefit 
of  the  mandatory. 

Among  the  many  things  that  have  happened 


132  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

since  the  armistice,  the  Franco-Hungarian  in- 
trigues are  specially  to  be  noted  as  emphasizing 
the  great  danger  of  secret  methods,  in  which  a 
government  runs  the  risk  of  being  committed  by 
persons,  irresponsible  or  not  properly  controlled, 
into  embarrassing  and  harmful  situations.  We 
know  of  these  particular  facts  through  confiden- 
tial reports  discovered  and  published,  officially 
recognized  by  certain  governments,  though  for- 
mally denied  by  the  Magyar  Cabinet.  These 
papers  give  working  details  of  what  was  already 
known  in  general  terms  concerning  reactionary 
Hungarian  intrigues  in  Czecho-Slovakia  and  Aus- 
tria, including  preparations  for  an  armed  upris- 
ing, and  other  assistance  to  monarchists.  French 
interests  were  at  the  same  time  active  in  Hun- 
gary. They  made  an  agreement  for  a  leasing  of 
the  Hungarian  state  railways  for  fifty  years.  Ac- 
cording to  this  contract,  the  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment is  bound  to  consult  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative of  the  French  Government  concerning 
every  measure  which  may  have  a  bearing  on  any 
clause  of  the  agreement.  A  political  compact  was 
simultaneously  initialed  in  which  the  French  Gov- 
ernment withdrew  its  opposition  to  universal  mili- 
tary service  in  Hungary,  and  that  country  was  to 
be  assisted  in  boundary  rectifications  at  the  ex- 


HOPES  FOR  IMPROVEMENT  133 

pense  of  Czecbo-Slovakia  and  Roumania.  A  third 
agreement  provided  for  tlie  sending  of  a  Hun- 
garian army  against  Soviet  Russia  under  Frencli 
command.  These  agreements  were  undoubtedly 
accepted  by  many  people  as  fully  concluded.  The 
Magyar  Premier  in  open  session  of  the  national 
assembly  boasted  of  having  achieved  an  alliance 
with  France;  the  same  understanding  was  also 
accepted  by  certain  Paris  newspapers.  The 
French  Government,  however,  did  not  sanction 
what  secret  negotiators  had  prepared  in  Hungary 
and  disavowed  the  agreements,  with  the  exception 
of  the  lease  of  the  Hungarian  railways.  This  il- 
lustrates how  in  times  of  unsettlement  and  sharp 
national  rivalry,  representatives  on  the  spot  or 
agents  of  powerful  interests  in  close  touch  with 
the  home  government  may  by  secret  means  try 
to  bring  about  arrangements  which  the  conscience 
of  their  nation  does  not  approve  and  which  serve 
merely  to  generate  suspicion  and  distrust. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  draft  of  a 
secret  treaty  between  France  and  Yugo-Slavia 
which  was  published  in  1920  by  the  Idea  Nazlonale 
was  at  the  time  actually  being  considered  by  the 
two  governments  concerned.  One  of  the  points 
of  the  proposed  treaty  was  that  upon  the  declara- 
tion of  war  between  France  and  any  ]\reditorra- 


134  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

nean  power,  Yugo-Slavic  troops  would  be  massed 
along  the  hostile  boundary  according  to  previ- 
ously determined  plans.  In  connection  with  this 
provision  the  representatives  of  France  made  the 
following  suggestion:  "In  case  of  a  conflict  it 
would  be  better  that  the  Yugo-Slavic  troops,  in- 
stead of  massing  on  the  hostile  frontier,  should 
rather  provoke  a  'Casus  Belli'  on  the  part  of  the 
nation  at  war  with  France.  Otherwise  their  in- 
tervention might  bring  on  the  interference  of 
other  powers."  The  proposed  arrangements, 
even  though  not  adopted  by  the  two  governments, 
nevertheless  illustrate  the  methods  acceptable  to 
secret  diplomacy,  but  which  open  public  opinion 
would  never  sanction.  , 

Wliatever  we  may  think  about  the  exact  share 
of  the  blame  for  having  brought  on  the  great 
catastrophe  w^hich  should  be  attributed  to  secret 
methods  and  policies,  we  cannot  have  any  doubts 
about  their  influence  since  the  armistice.  Whether 
or  not  secret  diplomacy  brought  on  the  war,  it 
certainly  has  not  ended  it.  War  still  exists,  not 
only  when  actual  hostilities  are  going  on,  but  in 
the  whole  temper  of  international  affairs — con- 
tinuing enmity,  continuing  armaments,  unending 
waste  of  human  effort.  Thus,  for  one  thing,  the 
entire  Near  Eastern  situation  remains  unsettled. 


HOPES  FOR  IMPROVEMENT  135 

As  an  expert  on  this  troubled  region  has  said: 
**The  principle  of  settlement  as  revealed  by  these 
treaties  is  fundamentally  wrong.  The  East  must 
be  resuscitated,  not  exploited."  But  be  it  East 
or  West,  there  is  the  samo  rotnrn  to  ilio  old  game 
of  balancing  off  gains  and  changing  boundaries, 
without  consideration  of  the  rights  of  the  respec- 
tive peoples.  The  costly  mistakes  of  the  Con- 
gresses of  Vienna,  Paris,  and  Berlin  are  being  re- 
peated. 


X 

THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  PUBLIC  CONFIDENCE 

Our  historical  survey  of  diplomatic  policy  and 
practice  does  not  hold  much  assurance  that  the 
evils  of  secret  diplomacy  have  very  appreciably 
waned  since  the  eighteenth  century.  The  cruder 
methods  of  deception  and  corruption  which  were 
at  that  time  employed  would  indeed  now  be  con- 
sidered beneath  the  dignity  of  diplomats;  al- 
though it  is  unhappily  true  that  some  of  the  most 
despicable  tricks,  such  as  stealing  correspondence 
and  placing  informers  in  houses  to  be  watched, 
are  still  practised  occasionally.  However,  it  may 
be  said  that  while  in  general  the  trade-secrets  of 
diplomacy  have  lost  greatly  in  prestige,  the  spirit 
of  diplomatic  action  itself  has  not  yet  been 
brought  into  accord  with  democratic  ideals. 

A  secret  service  attached  to  the  diplomatic  es- 
tablishment is  still  considered  useful  by  some  gov- 
ernments. It  is,  however,  certainly  very  doubt- 
ful whether  the  results  thus  obtained  in  the  nature 
of  accurate  information,  are  at  all  commensurate 
to  the  expense  and  to  the  constant  danger  of  being 

136 


DESTRUCTION  OF  PUBLIC  CONFIDENCE     137 

misinformed  through  secret  agents  who  think  that 
they  must  earn  their  pay.  My  own  observation 
leads  me  to  believe  that  people  who  use  secret 
service  information  are  frequently  confused  and 
worried  by  an  abundance  of  unauthenticated  re- 
ports brought  to  them ;  they  would  have  been  far 
better  off  without  backstairs  information,  relying 
on  the  fundamental  facts  and  on  knowledge  wliich 
can  be  obtained  only  by  seeking  the  confidence 
of  the  men  who  control  public  action.  Secret  serv- 
ice gossip  may  often  give  the  key  to  the  aims  and 
desires  of  an  individual  person,  and  if  one  is 
willing  to  appeal  to  motives  through  corrupt  and 
deceitful  means,  the  information  may  be  actually 
useful.  However,  he  whose  policy  rests  upon  an 
essential  reasonableness  and  mutual  benefit,  can 
afford  to  disregard  such  gossip. 

We  might  distinguish  between  a  secrecy  which 
is  vicious  in  itself,  and  one  that  pursues  beneficent 
objects.  The  former  seeks  to  conceal  the  pres- 
ence of  harmful  motives  and  projects,  to  confuse 
and  mislead  people  to  their  disadvantage,  and  in 
general,  to  play  on  weakness  and  ignorance.  The 
other  keeps  secret  its  plans  and  negotiations  which 
in  themselves  have  honest  motives,  from  a  desire 
to  prevent  interference  Avith  their  prompt  and 
complete  realization.     Opinions  as  to  the  charac- 


138  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ter  of  a  policy  may  differ  widely  and  those  who 
secretly  advance  a  policy  generally  condemned  by 
many,  may  perhaps  claim  credit  for  honest  pur- 
poses. This  type  of  secrecy  is  common.  Unfor- 
tunately, though  it  may  advance  a  good  object,  it 
incidentally  has  an  evil  influence  upon  public  con- 
fidence. It  must  be  confessed  that  the  distinction 
here  pointed  out  is  difficult  to  apply  in  practice 
in  a  thoroughly  objective  manner,  because  there 
are  probably  among  diplomats  very  few  indeed 
who  do  not  persuade  themselves  at  least  that  the 
means  applied  by  them  are  designed  to  achieve 
useful  purposes. 

A  good  example  of  how  stratagem  may  be  used 
for  a  laudable  purpose  is  found  in  the  action  of 
William  J.  Buchanan,  American  Minister  to  Ar- 
gentina, in  adjusting  the  Chili- Argentinian  bound- 
ary dispute.  Buchanan,  one  of  the  most  original 
of  American  diplomats,  had  nothing  whatever  of 
the  suave  manipulator  of  the  old  school  of  diplo- 
macy. He  was  direct  to  the  verge  of  bruskness, 
yet  his  ability  to  go  straight  to  the  essential  point, 
and  his  mastery  and  bigness,  made  him  highly 
successful  as  a  negotiator.  In  this  particular 
case,  Buchanan  had  been  designated,  together  with 
a  Chilian  and  an  Argentinian  representative,  on 
a  commission  to  settle  boundary  questions  and  re- 


DESTRUCTION  OF  PUBLIC  CONFIDENCE     139 

quested  to  make  a  preliminary  report.  He  agreed 
to  act  only  on  the  following  conditions :  That  be- 
cause of  the  complexity  and  difficulty  of  the  ques- 
tions involved,  it  would  be  necessary  to  report  on 
the  suggested  boundary  by  sections,  that  each  sec- 
tion should  be  voted  upon  as  reported  by  him, 
and  that  a  majority  vote  on  each  section  should 
be  decisive.  This  proposal  was  accepted.  After 
a  careful  investigation,  Buchanan  made  his  report, 
and  it  was  found  that  on  each  section  the  sug- 
gested boundary  was  carried  by  two  votes  against 
one;  the  American  always  voted  in  the  affirma- 
tive; the  Chilian  and  Argentinian,  as  in  the  par- 
ticular section  the  allotments  seemed  favorable  or 
unfavorable  to  their  respective  country.  In  ac- 
cordance with  the  terms  agreed  upon,  the  entire 
report  had  thus  to  be  accepted,  and  all  the  thorny 
problems  of  long-standing  boundary  controversies 
were  settled.  Had  Buchanan  not  used  this  strata- 
gem it  is  very  unlikely  that  the  report  as  a  whole 
■would  have  been  accepted,  as  each  of  his  associ- 
ates would  have  felt  that  he  could  not  vote  for  a 
report  containing  arrangements  for  giving  up  spe- 
cific tracts  of  territory  which  his  country  had 
hitherto  always  insi'ited  upon  retaining.  By  this 
clever  arrangement  Buchanan  made  it  possible 
for  them  to  vote  against  such  relinquishment  in 


140  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

each  case  without  defeating  the  project  as  a 
whole ;  but  if  he  had  revealed  to  them  his  plan  at 
the  beginning,  the  object  could  not  have  been 
achieved. 

This  incident  illustrates  that  a  complete  solu- 
tion will  often  be  accepted  as  satisfactory  al- 
though it  may  contain  details  which,  by  them- 
selves, would  have  been  resisted  to  the  last.  It 
may  be  said  that  the  disadvantage  of  public  dis- 
cussion lies  in  the  emphasizing  of  such  points  of 
opposition,  and  the  obscuring  of  the  general  rea- 
sonableness of  a  solution. 

Mr.  Balfour  in  his  defense  of  the  secrecy  of 
diplomatic  intercourse,  says  that  the  work  of 
diplomacy  is  exactly  similar  to  the  work  which  is 
done  every  day  between  two  great  business  firms. 
He  then  argues  that,  in  all  such  relationships,  it 
is  unwise  to  air  difficulties  in  public.  Bismarck 
used  the  more  homely  illustration  of  a  horse  trade, 
the  participants  in  which  should  not  be  expected 
to  tell  each  other  all  they  know  about  the  prospec- 
tive bargain.  That  view  is  putting  diplomacy  on 
a  rather  lowly  footing.  One  might  expect  a 
somewhat  different  temper  among  men  dealing 
with  momentous  public  affairs  than  the  bluff-and- 
haggle  of  a  petty  private  transaction.  Yet  such 
tactics  have  actually  been  found  useful  in  diplo- 


DESTRUCTION  OF  PUBLIC  CONFIDENCE     141 

macy.  Mr.  Balfour  is  on  sounder  ground  when 
he  says,  *'In  private,  in  conversations  which  need 
not  go  beyond  the  walls  of  the  room  in  which  you 
are,  both  parties  may  put  their  case  as  strongly 
as  they  like  and  no  soreness  remains,"  but  "di- 
rectly a  controversy  becomes  public,  all  that  fair 
give-and-take  becomes  difficult  or  impossible." 
This,  of  course,  implies  a  somewhat  low  estimate 
of  public  intelligence  and  self-control,  of  which 
more  later. 

The  greatest  vice  of  a  secret  diplomatic  policy, 
working  in  the  dark  and  concealing  international 
undertakings,  lies  in  the  inevitable  generating  of 
mutual  suspicion  and  the  total  destruction  of  pub- 
lic confidence  among  the  different  countries  which 
compose  the  family  of  nations.  No  nation  is  so 
bad  as  imagination,  confused  and  poisoned  by 
secrecy  and  by  the  suggestion  of  dire  plottings, 
would  paint  it.  Agreements  and  understandings 
which  do  not  exist  at  all  are  imagined,  the  nature 
of  those  which  actually  have  been  made  is  mis- 
judged, and  animosities  are  exaggerated ;  thus  the 
public  is  quite  naturally  put  in  that  mood  of  sus- 
picion and  excitement  which  renders  it  incapable 
of  judging  calmly  when  apparently  startling  facts 
suddenly  emerge. 

Secret   diplomacy  destroys  public  confidence, 


142  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

however,  in  a  still  more  insidious  manner :  by  the 
^practice  of  using  a  language  of  ideal  aims  and 
J  i  humanitarian  professions  in  order  to  conceal  and 
[(veil  the  most  narrowly  selfish,  unjust  and  uncon- 
'  scionable  actions.  The  conventional  language  of 
diplomacy  still  carries  in  it  many  of  the  phrases 
and  concepts  instilled  by  the  false  idealism  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  to  which  at  that  time  diplo- 
macy gave  lip  worship.  The  most  disconcerting 
performances  of  this  kind  are  the  profuse  and 
reiterated  declarations  promising  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  sovereignty,  independence  and  in- 
tegrity of  certain  countries,  when  in  fact  the  ac- 
tion really  taken  was  quite  to  the  contrary  effect. 
The  diplomacy  of  Japan  has  manifested  pe- 
culiar expertship  in  the  use  of  phrases  that  are 
associated  with  some  wise  public  dispensation  or 
arrangement  and  which  have  a  calming  effect — 
to  cover  action  not  remotely  in  fact  contributing 
to  such  beneficent  providences.  The  sovereignty, 
integrity  and  independence  of  a  neighboring  coun- 
try are  guaranteed  in  solemn  terms  at  the  very 
moment  when  force,  intrigue  and  every  tricky  arti- 
fice are  secretly  employed  to  destroy  them. 
"Strong  popular  demand"  is  alleged  as  a  reason 
for  harsh  action  abroad,  in  a  country  where  the 
expressions  of  public  opinions  as  well  as  policy 


DESTRUCTION  OF  PUBLIC  CONFIDENCE     143' 

itself  are  controlled  by  a  narrow  group,  with  ab- 
solutist authority.  There  is  so  much  talk  of 
''frank  discussion"  that  every  one  is  put  on  his 
guard  as  soon  as  the  word  ''frank"  is  uttered. 

The  "peace  of  Asia,"  a  "Monroe  Doctrine  for 
Asia,"  the  "Open  Door,"  "greatest  frankness," 
"hearty  cooperation  with  other  powers,"  are  her- 
alded at  times  when  the  context  of  facts  makes 
a  strange  commentary.  But  while  such  a  dis- 
crepancy is  very  strident  in  a  country  where  mili- 
tary absolutism  wields  control  over  diplomacy, 
with  a  grudging  obeisance  to  representative 
forms,  yet  other  countries  are  by  no  means  free 
from  this  hypocrisy.  What  blasted  promise  of 
equity  in  all  that  succession  of  declarations  con- 
cerning Korea,  China,  Persia,  parts  of  Turkey, 
and  Morocco.  "What  confusion  of  political  ideals 
in  supporting  Denikin,  Wrangel,  and  Horthy  as 
defenders  of  "representative  government." 

When  Russia  and  Japan,  in  response  to  Secre- 
tary Knox'  Manchurian  proposal  had  made  their 
secret  arrangements  to  defeat  his  policy.  Great 
Britain,  though  it  had  made  many  reassuring  pro- 
testations at  Washington,  nevertheless  had  se- 
cretly acquiesced  (to  cite  a  Russian  diplomatic 
paper)  in  the  "recognition  of  our  (Russian) 
sphere  of  influence  in  Northern  Manchuria,  Mon- 


144  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

golia,  and  Western  China,  with  the  exception  of 
Kashgar,  as  well  as  the  undertaking  not  to  hinder 
us  in  the  execution  of  our  plans  in  these  terri- 
tories, and  herself  to  pursue  no  aims  which  we 
should  have  to  regard  as  incompatible  with  our 
interest."  And  it  was  also  stated  that  Great 
Britain,  in  return,  was  to  receive  ''recognition  of 
her  freedom  of  action  and  her  privileged  position 
in  Tibet."     This  was  in  1912. 

Thus  were  the  solemn  declarations  relating  to 
the  Open  Door  and  the  integrity  of  China  applied 
in  action. 

Subsequent  departure  from  the  letter  and  spirit 
of  such  declarations  may  indeed  sometimes  be  ex- 
cused on  account  of  changed  circumstances;  but 
frequently  it  is  quite  apparent  to  those  who  know 
what  is  going  on,  that  such  well-sounding  declara- 
tions are  made  for  public  consumption,  at  the 
very  time  when  the  contrary  action  is  taken  se- 
cretly. 

This  is  indeed  nothing  less  than  a  crime  against 
the  public  opinion  and  conscience  of  the  world, 
which  cannot  be  condemned  in  terms  too  strong. 
It  shows  a  thorough  contempt  of  the  people,  who 
are  supposed  to  be  either  of  so  little  intelligence 
or  of  so  short  a  memory  that  such  vain  profes- 
sions may  succeed  in  veiling  the  true  inwardness 


DESTRUCTION  Oi^  PUBLIC  CONFIDENCE     14^ 

of  political  intrigue.  This  practice  tends  to  en- 
gender tliorougli  confusion  in  the  public  mind  as 
to  standards  of  right  and  justice  in  international 
affairs;  it  shakes  the  basis  on  which  alone  sound 
international  relations  can  grow  up;  as,  indeed, 
all  social  relations  must  rest  upon  confidence  in 
an  underlying  justice  and  equity. 

Closely  allied  to  the  practice  of  making  public 
declarations  in  international  affairs  which  do  not 
correspond  with  the  specific  action  taken,  is  the 
control  of  the  press  and  the  censure  of  news. 
This  is  indeed  a  matter  which  transcends  the  sub- 
ject of  diplomacy,  because  a  system  of  press  con- 
trol and  censure  is  often  applied  by  other  de- 
partments of  the  government  than  the  diplomatic 
branch.  As  far  as  foreign  affairs  are  concerned, 
it  is  used  in  an  effort  to  support  foreign  policy, 
and  it  therefore  shares  the  same  defects  which  in- 
here in  the  old  diplomacy.  Like  secret  diplomatic 
control,  it  is  accounted  for  on  the  assumption  that 
the  people  cannot  be  trusted  with  the  entire  truth, 
and  that  carefully  selected  portions  of  the  truth 
have  to  be  put  forth  in  order  to  make  them  ready 
to  support  the  policy  considered  necessary  by  the 
leaders.  This  involves  the  assumption  of  an  enor- 
mous responsibility  by  a  few  leaders  in  determin- 
ing by  themselves  what  the  public  interest  re- 


146  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

quires  and  instead  of  relying  on  the  strength  nat- 
urally to  be  gained  from  a  spontaneous  public 
opinion,  to  attempt  to  fashion  that  opinion  for 
specific  purposes.  Press  control  and  censure, 
with  the  incomplete  and  warped  information 
which  it  implies,  is  one  of  the  evil  accompani- 
ments considered  necessary  in  the  conduct  of  a 
war,  for  the  safety  of  the  combatant  nation.  The 
principle  that  strategic  information  must  be  kept 
secret  is  extended,  at  such  times,  out  of  all  rea- 
son. After  hostilities  have  actually  been  con- 
cluded, this  practice  tends  to  subsist  and  to  con- 
tinue the  evils  of  misinformation  and  confusion 
in  the  public  judgment.  The  manner  in  which 
all  news  emanating  from  the  Balkan  and  Near 
Eastern  countries  has  been  censured  since  the 
war,  has  made  it  impossible  for  the  public  of  the 
world  to  form  a  just  conception  as  to  what  is 
there  going  on.  Control  of  the  press  and  censor- 
ship likewise  resulted  in  such  confusion  in  the 
public  mind  concerning  the  problems  of  Russia, 
that  there  remained  no  reliable  basis  for  a  policy 
which  would  facilitate  the  restoration  of  more  nor- 
mal conditions  there,  in  a  sympathetic  spirit  with 
the  struggles  and  difficulties  of  the  Russian  peo- 
ple. 

On  account  of  the  natural  fact  that  men  are 


DESTRUCTION  OF  PUBLIC  CONFIDENCE     147 

apt  to  be  influenced  in  their  action  unconsciously 
through  persons  with  whom  they  have  constant 
associations,  it  is  a  matter  of  no  mean  impor- 
tance that  the  armament  interests  should  have 
been  so  strongly  represented  in  many  capitals  by 
men  of  high  professional  and  social  standing,  al-, 
ways  on  the  ground,  eager  to  advance  the  busi- 
ness in  military  supplies.  In  many  capitals,  very, 
close  relationships  have  grown  up  between  the  " 
diplomatic  officers  and  the  representatives  of  the 
great  armament  firms.  As  a  mutual  apprehen- 
hension  of  excessive  preparation  for  war  greatly 
stimulates  these  industries,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  their  representatives  do  not  exert  themselves 
to  prevent  occasional  war  scares.  In  fact,  highly 
misleading  information  on  war  plans  has  often 
been  given  out,  as  in  the  case  of  a  representative 
of  the  Coventry  Ordnance  Works,  who  in  1909 
informed  the  British  Government  of  excessive 
shipbuilding  by  Germany.  The  news  was  later 
found  to  be  erroneous;  but  new  orders  had  been 
given  in  Great  Britain,  and  through  action  and 
reaction  armaments  were  stimulated  elsewhere. 
The  close  connection  of  the  Krupp  Iron  AVorks 
with  the  German  Government  and  with  associa- 
tions favoring  aggressive  foreign  action  is  weU 
known. 


148  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

It  has  often  happened  that  what  represents 
itself  to  be  a  national  interest  and  enlists  diplo- 
matic and  political  support  in  that  way,  is  really 
only  the  enterprise  of  individuals  to  make  profits. 
The  men  who  support  it  with  their  best  energies 
and  talents  are  not  villains,  but  their  method  of 
assuming  a  great  national  interest  where  only  a 
tradition,  a  prejudice  or  a  private  plan  of  profit 
are  involved,  renders  their  doings  far  from  bene- 
ficial to  the  commonweal.  Similarly,  those  who 
operate  on  the  principle  that  the  public  mind  must 
be  nourished  with  certain  carefully  selected  facts 
and  kept  from  the  knowledge  of  others,  may  have 
honest  motives,  but  their  ideas  of  public  action 
are  obsolete  or  deserve  to  be  so,  as  they  are  left 
over  from  the  absolutist  regime  in  politics. 


XI 

PARLIAMENT  AND   FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 

In  considering  the  relation  of  legislative  bodies, 
and  of  the  public  opinion  therein  represented,  to 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  it  will  be  useful  to 
glance  briefly  at  the  relevant  historical  facts. 
"When  the  United  Colonies  of  America  formed  a 
separate  political  organization  from  the  mother 
country,  the  conduct  of  foreign  aifairs  was  en- 
trusted to  a  committee  of  Congress,  a  successor 
to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence.  In 
1781  a  Secretaryship  for  Foreign  Affairs,  with  a 
permanent  department,  was  created  and  in  1782 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  was  regulated  in 
the  following  terms: 

"All  letters  to  sovereign  powers,  letters  of  credence, 
plans  of  treaties,  conventions,  manifestoes,  instructions, 
passports,  safe  conducts,  and  other  acts  of  Congress 
relative  to  the  department  of  foreign  affairs,  when  the 
substance  thereof  shall  have  been  previously  agreed  to 
in  Congress,  shall  be  reduced  to  form  in  the  office  of 
foreign  affairs,  and  submitted  to  the  opinion  of  Con- 
gress, and  when  passed,  signed  and  attested,  sent  to  the 

149 


150  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

office  of  foreign  affairs  to  be  countersigned  and  for- 
warded. ' ' 

Congress  therefore  retained  a  very  close  control 
over  this  matter ;  a  control  which  under  the  Con- 
stitution passed  to  the  Senate,  though  in  a  re- 
stricted form.  In  no  other  country  did  a  legisla- 
tive committee  participate  in  the  conduct  of  for- 
eign affairs  with  similar  power  and  influence. 
The  policy  of  the  arrangements  under  the  Con- 
stitution is  explained  by  John  Jay  m  the  Feder- 
alist as  follows : 

''It  seldom  happens  in  the  negotiation  of  treaties,  of 
whatever  nature,  but  that  perfect  secrecy  and  immedi- 
ate despatch  are  sometime  requisite.  There  are  cases 
where  the  most  useful  intelligency  may  be  obtained,  if 
the  persons  possessing  it  can  be  relieved  from  appre- 
hensions of  discovery.  Those  apprehensions  will  oper- 
ate on  those  persons  whether  they  are  actuated  by  mer- 
cenary or  friendly  motives;  and  there  doubtless  are 
many  of  both  descriptions,  who  would  rely  on  the  se- 
crecy of  the  President,  but  who  would  not  confide  in 
that  of  the  Senate,  and  still  less  in  that  of  a  large  ponu- 
lar  assembly. ' ' 

Jay^s  explanation  is  dominated  by  the  conception 
which  the  eighteenth  century  had  of  the  functions 
of  diplomacy  and  the  conditions  of  its  work.  The 
constitutional  system  as  conceived  at  that  time 


PARLIAMENT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS     151 

implied  (1)  Full  power  of  negotiation  in  the 
President,  (2)  Taking  counsel  with  the  Senate, 
(3)  Formal  ratification  of  treaties  by  the  Senate, 
and  publication  thereof  as  parts  of  the  law  of  the 
land.  The  system  has  been  highly  praised  by 
European  publicists  as  reconciling  the  mainte- 
nance of  confidential  relations  with  publicity  of 
the  results,  in  that  treaties  are  given  the  charac- 
ter of  laws. 

In  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century  there 
occurred  many  instances  resulting  in  a  growing 
practice  of  making  special  agreements  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  alone,  without  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate.  When  President  Roosevelt 
in  1905  attempted  to  deal  with  the  Dominican  sit- 
uation in  this  manner,  the  Senate  objected  and  in- 
sisted that  all  international  agreements  of  any 
kind  must  be  submitted  to  its  action.  The  sys- 
tem of  the  United  States,  however,  actually  per- 
mits of  the  current  conduct  of  foreign  affairs 
without  information  to  the  people  or  even  without 
constant  and  complete  information  to  the  Senate 
which  is,  moreover,  usually  preoccupied  with  mat- 
ters of  internal  legislation. 

In  England,  the  mother  of  Parliaments,  we 
might  expect  that  there  should  have  been  a  con- 
stant effort  at  parliamentary  control  of  foreign 


152  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

affairs,  with  strong  remonstrance  when  effective 
control  was  denied;  yet  on  account  of  the  spe- 
cific nature  of  the  system  of  Cabinet  government, 
such  has  not  been  the  case.  Under  the  two-party 
system  as  it  exists  in  England  the  conduct  of  for- 
jeign  affairs  is  always  in  the  hands  of  a  minister 
Itrusted  and  supported  by  the  majority  in  the 
-'Lower  House.  Even  if  the  minority  should  at- 
tempt to  censor  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  as 
being  carried  on  apart  from  the  knowledge  and 
active  consent  of  the  House,  the  majority  whose 
leaders  form  the  Cabinet  which  is  managing 
things,  will  always  prevent  such  a  vote  from  suc- 
ceeding. Only  in  case  of  a  cabinet  going  abso- 
lutely and  openly  counter  to  the  policy  of  its  own 
party  in  Parliament  could  a  real  conflict  of  this 
nature  arise ;  and  such  a  contingency  is  itself  im- 
possible, because  of  the  party  control  exercised  by 
the  cabinet. 

According  to  the  theory  of  the  Stuarts,  the  man- 
agement of  foreign  affairs  belonged  entirely  to 
the  Crown  which  had  not  at  that  time  been  put  in 
commission.  In  1677  the  House  of  Commons  ob- 
jected to  granting  money  for  alliances  and  for 
wars,  unless  the  matter  in  question  had  been  pre- 
viously communicated  to  it.  Charles  IT,  however, 
declared  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  to  be  the 


PARLIAMENT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS     153 

Crown's  fundamental  prerogative  in  which  it  must 
remain  free  from  direct  control  of  Parliament. 
William  III  was  in  fact  to  a  very  large  extent  his 
own  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  With  the  in- 
troduction of  responsible  Government  under  the 
Hanoverians,  however,  the  situation  changed. 
The  dominant  party  being  represented  by  the 
ministers  was  quite  ready  to  submit  to  their 
guidance  in  matters  of  foreign  affairs.  It  was 
the  opposition  who  occasionally  attacked  the  gov- 
ernment on  its  foreign  policy,  and  particularly 
the  opposition  in  the  House  of  Lords.  In  a  Lords ' 
protest  of  March  26,  1734,  it  was  urged  that  "the 
interposition  of  the  British  Parliament  would  be 
more  effectual  than  the  occasional  expedients  of 
fluctuating  and  variable  negotiations."  In  1740 
it  was  moved  that  a  select  committee  consisting 
of  peers  should  be  appointed  to  inquire  into  the 
conduct  of  the  Spanish  War.  The  motion  was  re- 
jected. Another  Lords'  protest  in  the  same  year 
opposes  the  argument  that  absolute  secrecy  is  es- 
sential because  this  claim  is  often  used  in  bar  of 
all  inquiries.  Such  secrecy  is  "much  oftener  the 
refuge  of  guilt  than  the  resort  of  innocence." 

Wyndliam,  in  1733,  on  a  motion  calling  for  cer- 
tain letters  of  instructions,  argued  for  the  neces- 
sity of  giving  such  information  to  Parliament. 


154  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

He  asked  how  could  members  of  the  House  of 
Commons  judge  of  the  estimates  to  be  laid  before 
them  as  a  provision  for  national  safety  if  they 
did  not  know  by  what  danger  the  nation  was  con- 
fronted.    The  motion,  however,  was  rejected. 

Wlien  Pelham  was  criticized  in  the  House  for 
not  having  informed  Parliament  of  the  prelimina- 
ries of  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  he  argued: 
*'If  Parliament  should  encroach  upon  the  pre- 
rogative of  the  Crown,  by  assuming  a  right  to 
make  peace  or  war,  and  to  inquire  into  foreign 
transactions  under  negotiation,  our  affairs  will  be 
reduced  to  a  dangerous  predicament;  for  no  for- 
eign State  will  negotiate  with  our  ministers,  or 
conclude  any  treaty  with  them,  either  political  or 
commercial."  This  is  an  argument  often  made 
in  the  eighteenth  century  to  show  the  unwisdom 
of  Parliamentary  control.  The  change  of  min- 
isters following  party  changes  in  the  House,  and 
the  fact  that  the  Foreign  Minister  would  not  by 
his  own  word  be  able  to  give  complete  assurances 
to  foreign  governments,  were  considered  to  put 
the  British  Government  under  a  disadvantage  in 
negotiations.  It  was  therefore  considered  unde- 
sirable that  negotiations  should  be  submitted  to 
the  control  and  sanction  of  Parliament.  Walpole 
had  stated  the  matter  in  the  foljowing  words : 


PARLIAMENT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS     155 

"Therefore  while  our  happy  constitution  remains  en- 
tire, while  the  Parliament  meets  but  once  a  year,  and 
does  not  continue  assembled  above  three  or  four  months 
in  the  twelve,  it  is  impossible  for  either  House  of  Parlia- 
ment to  intermeddle,  much  less  to  prescribe  to  the 
Crown,  in  any  affairs  relating  to  peace  or  war,  without 
exposing  the  nation  to  imminent  danger." 

Throughout  the  nineteenth  century  Parliament 
interfered  very  little  with  the  conduct  of  foreign 
affairs.  The  minister  for  foreign  affairs  or  the 
premier  would  from  time  to  time  give  information 
or  make  a  systematic  discourse  on  foreign  affairs 
and  it  was  understood  that  the  House  would  be 
kept  informed  concerning  the  aims  and  tendencies 
of  the  Government's  foreign  policy.  Specific 
questions  w^ere  asked  by  members  but  not  fre- 
quently. The  nature  of  the  British  system  would 
have  rendered  unmeaning  any  struggle  for  control 
between  the  House  and  the  Cabinet. 

The  manner  of  keeping  Parliament  and  the  pub- 
lic informed  on  foreign  affairs  was  discussed. 
The  Earl  of  Clarendon  spoke  of  the  practice  of 
laying  before  Parliament  ofiicial  information  in 
the  Blue  Books.     He  stated : 

"I  am  perfectly  certain  there  is  always  laid  before 
Parliament  a  very  fair  and  complete  view  of  the  trans- 
actions between  this  country  and  any  otner  to  whicli 
those  papers  may  relate.     I  know  that  foreign  Govern- 


156  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ments  rather  complain  of  our  Blue  Boolis,  and  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  they  may  curtail  some  of  the  communications 
that  are  made  to  our  foreign  Ministers,  but  I  should  be 
extremely  sorry  to  see  our  system  of  publication  of  diplo- 
matic papers  in  any  way  curtailed,  or  different  from 
what  it  is;  of  course,  there  must  always  be  care  taken 
not  to  compromise  individuals  for  the  information  they 
have  given,  but  I  believe  it  is  an  immense  advantage  to 
this  country  that  our  despatches  and  diplomatic  transac- 
tions should  be  known,  because  if  they  have  the  appro- 
bation of  Parliament  and  of  the  country,  the  Government 
then  has  the  whole  weight  of  public  opinion  in  its  favor, 
and  it  is  that  which  gives  such  strength  to  our  policy 
and  to  our  opinions  in  foreign  countries." 

That  is  a  very  statesmanlike  presentation  of  the 
advantages  of  constant  public  knowledge  of  for- 
eign policy  in  giving  the  government  a  secure  base 
of  intelligent  support. 

When  dissatisfaction  or  doubt  was  felt  by  large 
numbers  concerning  the  foreign  policy  of  the  gov- 
ernment, as  in  1857  and  again  in  1878  after  the 
concealment  of  the  Schuvalof  agreement,  com- 
plaint was  frequently  made  in  Parliament  and  in 
the  press  to  the  effect  that  Parliament  on  the  one 
hand  was  not  given  a  chance  to  acquire  a  com- 
plete knowledge  of  foreign  policy,  and  on  the  other 
it  was  not  sufficiently  alert  and  active  in  using 
its  opportunities  for  control.  In  1886  the  follow- 
inir  resolution  was  moved: 


rARLIAMENT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS     157 

"That  in  the  opinioa  of  this  House  it  is  not  just  or 
expedient  to  embark  in  war,  contract  engagements  in- 
volving grave  responsibilities  for  the  nation,  and  add 
territories  to  the  Empire,  without  the  knowledge  and 
consent  of  Parliament," 

Like  other  similar  resolutions,  it  did  not  pass. 
Mr.  Gladstone  opposed  it  on  the  ground  that  the 
House  of  Commons  under  existing  arrangements 
actually  possessed  all  necessary  power  of  control 
and  that  the  passage  of  this  resolution  would 
mean  simply  that  the  House  of  Lords  would  share 
this  power  with  it. 

In  1885  when  Earl  Granville  had  objected  to 
public  criticism  of  negotiations  which  were  still 
in  progress  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain  re- 
garding Afghanistan,  Lord  Salisbury  made  the 
following  interesting  and  important  statement 
with  respect  to  the  relations  of  foreign  policies 
to  public  opinion,  which  in  temper  resembles  that 
of  Lord  Clarendon  cited  above: 

"The  noble  Earl  seemed  to  me  to  lay  down  a  doctrine 
which  we  cannot  pass  unnoticed,  when  he  sa^'s  it  is  the 
duty  of  an  Opposition  not  to  canvas  or  condemn  the 
conduct  of  the  Government,  if  by  so  doing  it  should  have 
the  effect  of  discouraging  friends  and  allies  in  other 
parts  of  the  world.  That  seems  to  be  a  very  far-reaching 
doctrine,  and  one  which  it  is  impossible  to  assent  to. 
...  If  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  course  of  public  af- 


158  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

fairs  is  going  ill,  and  that  our  Government  has  misman- 
aged, that  faults  are  being  committed  and  dangers  are 
being  incurred,  we  have  no  absolute  Sovereign  to  whom 
we  can  appeal  in  order  to  correct  the  evil;  our  abso- 
lute Sovereign  is  the  people  of  this  country,  and  it  is 
they,  and  they  alone,  who  can  bring  a  remedy  to  the 
mischief  which  is  going  on.  You  have  a  form  of  Gov- 
ernment which  in  many  points  is  purely  democratic, 
and  you  must  take  it  with  the  incidents  which  naturally 
adhere  to  it,  and  one  of  these  incidents  is  publicity  of 
deliberation.  The  Cabinet  is  the  people,  and  their  de- 
liberations are  conducted  in  the  open  field.  If  they  are 
to  be  rightly  informed,  you  must  deal  fully  and  frankly 
with  the  subjects  which  form  the  basis  of  their  deter- 
mination. It  is,  no  doubt,  a  drawback  so  far  as  it  goes, 
but  it  is  a  drawback  you  must  face,  and  you  cannot  help 
it  if  Foreign  Powers  overhear,  so  to  speak,  the  privi- 
leged communications  between  you  and  those  by  whose 
verdict  you  must  stand.  You  cannot  suppress  the  argu- 
ment because  somebody  else  outside  hears  it  and  you 
may  be  adversely  affected  by  it.  .  .  ." 

The  concealment  of  important  obligations  and 
the  growing  secrecy  of  diplomatic  affairs  during 
the  first  decade  of  the  Twentieth  Century  brought 
on  many  expressions  of  dissatisfaction  in  the 
House  of  Commons.  After  the  secret  agreement 
concerning  Morocco  became  known,  Mr.  John 
Dillon  expressed  himself  as  follows,  in  a  speech 
in  the  House  of  Commons  in  September,  1911 : 

''I  do  not  believe  any  representative  assembly  in  the 
history  of  the  world  has  ever  been  called  upon  to  dis- 


PARLIAMENT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS     159 

cuss  a  matter  so  vital  and  so  far-reaching  a.s  tliat  which 
the  House  of  Commons  has  before  it  to-day  to  consider, 
and  with  so  absolute  a  lack  of  information.  ,  ,  .  The 
House  was  summoned  for  this  discussion  to-day  without 
any  papers  whatsoever.  .  .  .  We  ought  at  all  events  to 
have  had  an  account  of  diplomatic  correspondence  be- 
tween the  four  great  Powers  intimately  interested  in 
the  question  of  Morocco,  as  is  customary  to  be  given  to 
the  House  of  Commons  on  such  an  occasion.  This  would 
have  enabled  members  of  the  House  before  the  debate 
commenced,  to  form  a  really  well-grounded  judgment 
upon  the  whole  matter.  We  have  heard  a  good  deal  to- 
night of  the  secrecy  of  the  Foreign  policy  of  this  coun- 
try. It  is  no  use  attempting  to  deny  it.  Those  of  us 
who  have  been  a  long  time  in  this  House,  and  can  re- 
member the  methods  of  the  Foreign  Office  twenty-five 
years  ago,  know  as  a  matter  of  fact,  which  cannot  be 
successfully  denied,  that  the  Foreign  Office  policy  has 
become  during  the  last  ten  years  progressively  more 
secret  every  year.  Until  this  present  year  this  has  gone 
on,  when  the  intense  pressure  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the 
danger  of  war  has  forced  the  hands  of  the  Minister  to 
give  some  time  for  the  discussion  of  Foreign  Office  af- 
fairs. For  ten  years  the  Foreign  policy  of  this  coun- 
try has  been  conducted  behind  an  elaborate  screen  of 
secrecy.  Some  of  us  pointed  out  years  ago  that  the  se- 
crecy of  Foreign  Affairs  was  the  inevitable  and  logical 
result  of  that  new  departure  which  was  heralded  about 
len  years  ago,  and  which  we  heard  praised  once  more 
on  the  floor  of  this  House  to-night.  I  refer  to  what  is 
known  as  the  policy  of  the  continuity  of  the  Foreign 
policy  of  this  country' ;  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  For- 
eign policy  of  this  country  from  the  sphere  of  party 
politics." 


160  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

At  the  same  session  Mr.  Swift  MacNeill  ex- 
pressed himself  very  strongly  on  the  subject  of 
withholding  information  from  Parliament,  in  the 
following  terms: 


"From  generation  to  generation,  you  have  allowed 
treaties  involving  the  highest  international  obligations 
— involving  questions  of  peace  and  war — to  be  taken 
absolutely  out  of  the  hands  of  the  House.  It  is  no  ex- 
aggeration to  say,  so  far  as  international  policy  is  oon- 
cerned,  you  have  rendered  the  House  as  little  effectively 
powerful  as  any  man  walking  over  Westminster  Bridge. 
Over  and  over  again  treaties  involving  matters  of  life 
and  death,  involving  questions  of  first-class  importance, 
have  been  ratified  behind  the  back  of  Parliament.  .  .  . 
The  people  themselves  must  be  allowed  to  know  all  about 
this  diplomacy  and  what  it  is.  And  there  should  be  no 
secrecy  in  regard  to  high  diplomatic  statecraft  about  it. 
The  House  of  Commons  is  sample  judge  of  what  is  dis- 
creet and  what  is  indiscreet,  and  it  is  a  complete  ab- 
surdity for  others  to  treat  us  as  children  or  for  us  to 
allow  ourselves  to  be  so  treated  in  matters  of  such  high 
international  importance  as  those  involving  questions  of 
peace  and  war. ' ' 


Sir  Edward  Grey  in  his  reply  stated  that  secrecy 
up  to  a  certain  point  was  necessary  and  that  par- 
ticularly the  ratification  of  treaties  could  not  be 
previously  discussed.  He  then  made  the  very  sig- 
nificant remark  that  not  until  the  House  of  Com- 


PARLIAMENT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS     161 

mons  "was  really  free  to  devote  itself  to  discus- 
sions of  imperial  affairs  would  it  get  control." 
In  other  words  as  long  as  the  House  of  Conunons 
remains  a  body  occupied  primarily  with  domestic 
and  local  legislation  it  cannot  spare  the  attention 
necessary  for  an  effective  control  of  foreign  pol- 
icy. 

Early  in  1914,  evidence  was  taken  by  a  select 
committee  on  House  of  Commons  procedure.  Mr. 
Balfour  during  these  discussions  rather  empha- 
sized the  need  of  secrecy  in  dealing  with  foreign 
affairs.  He  thinks  that  such  matters  should  not 
be  aired  too  frequently  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
because  indiscreet  speeches,  which  can  be  per- 
fectly appraised  in  the  House,  may  make  bad 
blood  when  reported.  Diplomatic  conversations 
nmst  be  kept  confidential  if  you  are  to  work  the 
European  system  at  all.  But  though  the  House 
of  Commons  does  not  and  cannot  know  the  cur- 
rent details  of  international  negotiations,  it  is  not 
uninformed.  This  plainly  is  the  language  of  a 
statesman  to  whom  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the  Euro- 
pean system  are  so  familiar  that  they  seem  to  be 
the  only  natural  state  of  affairs.  The  statement 
is  made  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  expert  who 
rather  resents  any  sort  of  interference  on  the  part 
of  the  less  well  informed. 


162  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

In  March,  1918,  it  was  moved  in  the  House  of 

Commons : 

"That,  in  the  opinion  of  this  House,  a  Standing  Com- 
mittee of  Foreign  Affairs  should  be  appointed,  repre- 
sentative of  all  parties  and  groups  in  the  House,  in  order 
that  a  regular  channel  of  communication  may  be  estab- 
lished between  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  the  House  of 
•  Commons,  which  will  afford  him  frequent  opportunities 
of  giving  information  on  questions  of  Foreign  policy  and 
which,  by  allowing  Members  to  acquaint  themselves  more 
fully  with  current  international  problems,  will  enable 
this  House  to  exercise  closer  supervision  over  the  general 
conduct  of  Foreign  Affairs.  ..." 

Mr.  Balfour  expressed  himself  quite  in  length  on 
!  this  motion  and  further  elaborated  the  ideas 
which  he  had  put  forward  in  1914.  In  a  speech 
delivered  March  19th,  he  gave  what  is  probably 
the  most  complete  and  persuasive  exposition  of 
the  value  of  traditional  methods  in  diplomacy: 

"...  A  Foreign  Office  and  a  Diplomatic  Service  are 
great  instruments  for  preventing,  as  far  as  can  be  pre- 
vented, and  diminishing,  even  when  you  cannot  prevent, 
friction  between  States  which  are,  or  which  ought  to  be, 
friendly.  How  is  the  task  of  peace-maker — because  that 
is  largely  the  task  which  falls  to  diplomatists  and  to  the 
Foreign  Office,  which  controls  diplomatists — to  be  pur- 
sued if  you  are  to  shout  your  grievances  from  the  house- 
top whenever  they  occur?  The  only  result  is  that  you 
embitter  public  feeling,  that  the  differences  between  the 


PARLIAMENT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS     1G;3 

two  States  suddenly  attain  a  ma^itude  they  ought 
never  to  be  allowed  to  approach,  that  the  newspapers  of 
the  two  countries  agitate  themselves,  that  the  Parlia- 
ments of  tiio  two  countries  have  their  passions  set  on 
fire,  and  great  crises  arise,  which  may  end,  have  ended 
sometimes,  in  international  catastrophes.  .  .  .  Office  of- 
ficials, or  officials  of  any  Department, — to  expend  some 
of  their  energy  in  getting  ready  for  cross-examination, 
you  will  really  be  destroying  tbe  public  service.  There 
is  nothing  on  which  I  feel  more  strongly  than  that. 
They  are  not  accustomed  to  it,  and  they  ought  not  to 
be  accustomed  to  it.  ...  I  do  not  hold  the  view  that 
antique  methods  are  pursued  by  diplomatists  which  no 
man  of  common  sense  adopts  in  the  ordinary  work  of 
everyday  life.  On  the  contrary,  the  work  of  diplomacy 
is  exactly  the  work  which  is  done  every  day  between  two 
great  firms,  for  instance,  which  have  business  relations, 
or  between  two  great  corporate  entities  which  have  in- 
terests diverging  or  interests  in  common.  If  you  are  a 
man  of  sense  you  do  not  create  difficulties  to  begin  with. 
You  try  to  get  over  all  these  things  without  the  embit- 
terment  which  advertisement  always  brings  with  it.  It 
is  when  you  begin  to  press  your  case  in  public  that  an- 
tagonism arises.  In  private — in  conversation  which  need 
not  go  beyond  the  walls  of  the  room  in  which  you  are, — 
you  can  put  your  case  as  strongly  as  you  like,  and  the 
gentleman  with  whom  you  are  carrying  on  the  discus- 
sion may  put  his  case  as  strongly  as  he  likes,  and  if  good 
manners  are  observed  and  nothing  but  fair  discussion 
takes  place  no  soreness  remains  and  no  one  is  driven  to 
ignore  the  strong  points  of  his  opponent's  case.  Di- 
rectly a  controversy  becomes  public  all  that  fair  give- 
and-take  becomes  either  difficult  or  impossible.  .  .  .  But 
if  all  you  mean  ...  is  that  it  is  wrong  for  the  nations 


164  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

of  the  world  to  find  themselves  hampered  in  their  mu- 
tual relations  by  treaties  of  which  those  countries  know 
nothing,  that,  I  think,  is  an  evil.  I  do  not  say  that 
there  have  not  been  secret  treaties  which  were  inevitable ; 
but  I  do  say  that,  if  they  are  necessary,  they  are  a 
necessary  evil.  Please  remember  that  two  nations  make 
a  treaty  together  for  their  mutual  advantage.  Both  are 
desirous  of  passing  it.  One  nation  says,  'It  is  against 
our  interest  that  this  treaty  should  be  made  public  at 
present.'  The  other  says,  'We  do  not  like  being  com- 
mitted to  any  treaty  the  terms  of  which  we  cannot  make 
public  at  once.'  Which  is  going  to  prevail?  ...  It 
does  not  rest  with  any  single  Foreign  Office,  British  or 
other.  It  is  always  an  arrangement  between  two — pos- 
sibly three  or  four.  Foreign  Offices.  You  cannot  lay 
down — and  I  do  not  think  you  would  be  wise  to  lay 
down,  an  absolute  rule  that  under  no  circumstances,  and 
for  no  object,  could  you  so  far  concede  the  point  as  to 
say  that  a  treaty  is  to  be  made  which  is  not  to  become 
public  property.  I  am  perfectly  ready  to  admit  that 
that  is  not  a  process  which,  to  me,  is  a  very  agreeable 
one.  To  reduce  secret  treaties  to  the  narrowest  possible 
limits  should,  I  think,  be  the  object  of  every  responsible 
statesman  who  has  the  control  of  foreign  affairs.  Be- 
yond that  I  do  not  feel  inclined  to  go.  I  do  not  see  any 
signs  of  a  grasp  of  the  true  realities  of  life  in  the  Mo- 
tion before  us.  You  should  have  your  control  over 
those  who  manage  your  affairs,  but  it  is  not  the  kind  of 
control  which  the  honorable  Member  wishes  to  set  up 
with  his  Committee  of  forty  or  fifty.  It  is  quite  a  dif- 
ferent control.  You  must  know,  broadly  speaking,  what 
the  general  lines  of  policy  are,  and  I  maintain  that  that 
is  thoroughly  known  with  regard  to  foreign  affairs  at 
this  moment  by  every  man  in  this  House  who  takes  the 


PARLIAMENT  AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS     165 

trouble  to  think.     The  general  lines  on  which  we  are 
proceeding  are  thoroughly  known." 


This  argument  brings  out  all  the  strong  points 
of  the  system  of  secret  diplomacy  under  the  ex- 
isting conditions  of  international  politics,  but  it 
contains  no  hint  that  these  conditions  need  im- 
provement. They  cannot,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  be 
improved  until  some  strong  nations,  even  at  the  \  y 
risk  of  disadvantage  to  themselves,  take  the  lead 
in  placing  diplomatic  affairs  on  a  broader  basis. 


xn 

THE  PUBLIC  AND  DIPLOMACY 

In  consequence  of  the  startling  developments 
in  diplomacy  which  preceded  and  accompanied 
the  great  war,  the  relation  of  democracy  to  diplo- 
macy has  been  earnestly  discussed  of  late,  par- 
ticularly in  Great  Britain. 

When  considering  this  important  matter,  the 
distinction  between  the  methods  of  diplomacy  and 
diplomatic  policies  should  be  borne  in  mind  for 
the  sake  of  clearness  of  thought.  The  develop- 
ment of  public  opinion,  the  disappearance  of 
purely  dynastic  aims  of  state  action,  and  the  con- 
stantly broadening  outlook  of  political  life,  have 
led  to  the  elimination  of  most  of  the  cruder  meth- 
ods of  deception  and  intrigue.  But  two  questions 
still  remain:  Should  diplomatic  negotiations  be 
carried  on  in  the  public  view,  that  is  with  con- 
stant and  full  information  given  to  the  public  or 
parliament,  on  all  important  details?  and,  Should 
the  diplomatic  policy  of  a  democratic  government 
at  all  times  be  kept  fully  before  the  representative 
bodies,  and  the  public? 

166 


THE  PUBLIC  AND  DIPLOMACY  167 

Most  discussions  which  favor  the  use  of  secret 
diplomacy,  refer  to  the  presumed  necessity  of 
confidential  methods  of  negotiation.  But  there  are 
some  publicists  and  statesmen  who  believe  that 
the  policy  of  foreign  affairs  itself  can  best  be 
handled  by  responsible  statesmen  keeping  their 
own  counsel  and  giving  to  the  public  only  a  gen- 
eral adumbration  of  the  trend  of  policy.  These 
two  questions  are  constantly  mixed  up  in  current 
discussion;  and  their  absolute  separation  is  in- 
deed difficult.  Thus,  a  strictly  secret  diplomatic 
policy  will  naturally  accentuate  the  secrecy  of 
the  methods  employed.  Abstractly  considered,  it 
would  be  quite  possible  to  have  the  foreign  policy 
of  a  country  determined  by  public  action,  and 
still  to  surround  diplomatic  negotiations  with  se- 
crecy. But  if  the  substance  of  the  policy  were 
definitely  known  in  detail,  the  secrecy  of  methods 
would  lose  much  of  its  effectiveness. 

The  use  of  such  methods  is  defended  from  two 
points  of  view;  from  that  of  the  trader  who  looks 
for  a  better  bargain  through  not  having  given 
away  his  entire  hand  at  the  beginning ;  and  from 
that  of  the  builder  who  desires  to  work  quietly 
without  interruptions  from  an  excitable  public, 
w^ho  desires  to  avoid  difficulties  and  smooth  away 


168  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

contrasts  which  publicity  would  tend  to  exag- 
gerate. 

There  is  an  ex  post  facto  publicity  of  diplomatic 
policy.  If  this  is  afforded  as  soon  as  a  new  situ- 
ation has  arisen  or  a  new  agreement  has  been  cre- 
ated, some  of  the  harm  of  secrecy  is  avoided.  In 
such  a  case  the  statesmen,  cabinet,  or  conference, 
practically  give  assurance  that,  if  allowed  to  work 
quietly  on  a  certain  problem,  they  will  produce 
a  solution  which  will  commend  itself  in  general 
to  the  sense  of  equity  of  the  nation  or  nations  con- 
cerned ;  although  the  sum  total  of  the  arrangement 
may  contain  details  which,  considered  by  them- 
selves, would  be  unacceptable  and  which  might 
have  interfered  with  the  making  of  an  accord,  if 
unduly  emphasized  or  given  publicity  during  the 
negotiations. 

Mr.  Balfour  in  his  speech  of  March  19,  1918, 
which  has  already  been  referred  to,  indeed  speaks 
quite  convincingly  of  the  advantage  of  confiden- 
tial relations  and  of  secrecy  in  negotiations,  but 
he  goes  so  far  as  strongly  to  deprecate  a  demand 
for  information  on  the  part  of  Parliament.  In 
that  he  certainly  shows  a  measure  of  anti-demo- 
cratic bias,  as  when  he  says,  "Do  not  suppose 
that  we  can  do  the  work  better  by  having  to  ex- 
plain it  to  a  lot  of  people  who  are  not  responsible. 


THE  rUBLIC  AND  DIPLOMACY  169 

That  is  not  the  way  to  get  business  properly 
done."  He  therefore  rejects  the  idea  of  a  par- 
liamentary committee  of  control  in  the  matter  of 
foreign  relations.  He  agrees,  however,  that  the 
existence  of  secret  treaties  is  an  evil,  although  he 
thinks  that  it  may  be  at  certain  times  necessary, 
because  the  associated  treaty  power  may  desire  it. 
He  is  mildly  deprecatory,  at  best. 

Count  Czernin,  speaking  to  the  Austrian  dele- 
gations on  June  24,  1918,  concerning  President 
Wilson's  fourteen  points,  stated  that  he  has  no  ob- 
jection to  the  introduction  of  the  principle  of 
"open  covenants,"  although  he  confesses  that  he 
does  not  know  by  what  means  effective  adherence 
thereto  can  be  assured.  Concerning  diplomatic 
negotiations,  which  he  treats  simply  as  a  matter 
of  business,  he  points  out  the  advantages  of  se- 
crecy from  the  point  of  view  of  trading.  More- 
over, if  there  were  full  publicity,  the  general  pub- 
lic might  passionately  oppose  every  action  involv- 
ing any  concession  as  a  defeat.  This  would  not 
be  conducive  to  peaceable  relations. 

There  are  those  who  believe  that  the  chief  evils 
of  secret  diplomacy  would  be  avoided  if  ample 
opportunity  were  given  for  discussion  in  repre- 
sentative assemblies,  if  there  were  a  parliamen- 
tary committee  keeping  constantly  in  touch  w^th 


170  SECRET  DIPLOIVIACY 

the  conduct  of  foreign  relations,  and  if  treaties 
and  declarations  of  war  could  not  be  made  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  national  legislature.  Some 
advocates  of  democratic  control  go  so  far  as  to 
reason  that  a  decision  to  make  war  and  thereby 
to  order  the  shedding  of  human  blood,  should  not 
be  made  without  a  national  referendum  vote. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  opposed  to  all  public- 
ity of  diplomatic  affairs  argue  that  international 
policies  cannot  be  determined  in  the  market  place. 
They  hark  back  to  DeTocqueville,  who  holds  that 
as  democracy  cannot  be  expected  to  regulate  the 
details  of  an  important  undertaking,  it  is  particu- 
larly unqualified  to  deal  with  international  mat- 
ters where  secrecy,  discretion,  and  patience  are 
required.  Followers  of  this  opinion  believe  that 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  is  best  placed  quite 
unreservedly  in  the  hands  of  responsible  states- 
men, who  have  greater  information,  larger  experi- 
ence and  more  self-control  than  the  average  of 
humanity.  They  generally  have  in  view  the  pres- 
ervation of  national  interests,  under  conditions 
of  peace  if  possible ;  they  will  not  be  inflamed  by 
exciting  incidents,  but  will  keep  these  in  proper 
subordination  to  the  general  plan.  Such  details, 
if  made  public,  would  easily  lead  to  occurrences 
that  would  upset  the  results  of  wise  planning. 


THE  rUBLIC  AND  DIPLOMACY  171 

As  Lord  Cromer  has  said,  it  is  such  untoward 
chance  incidents  which  cannot  be  controlled  that 
are  to  be  feared,  rather  than  any  deliberate  plot- 
ting on  the  part  of  diplomats.  Such  responsible 
statesmen  always  remain  accountable  for  the  gen- 
eral results  of  their  policy;  they  are  conscious  of 
the  importance  of  their  trust,  and  therefore  are 
a  safer  repository  of  discretionary  powers  than 
a  general  committee. 

Back  of  these  arguments,  however,  there 
usually  lies  the  conviction  that  the  public  is  su- 
perficial, easily  swayed,  excitable  and  altogether 
delighting  more  in  the  hurrah  of  war  than  in  the 
humdrum  of  peace.  It  might  be  remarked  that 
if  such  had  actually  been  the  case,  the  most  re- 
cent experience  of  the  people  with  war  has  prob- 
ably given  them  a  different  idea  of  the  attractive- 
ness of  that  kind  of  excitement;  unless  indeed  the 
mass  of  humanity  are  irremediably  and  forever 
fools,  when  taken  in  the  aggregate. 

The  sensational  character  of  the  daily  press 
must  be  considered  in  this  connection.  The  news 
value  of  normal,  peaceable  developments  is  very 
small.  It  is  therefore  a  godsend  to  the  news- 
papers when  something  extraordinary  happens, 
particularly  in  international  affairs.  For  this 
reason,  the  daily  news  frequently  presents  an  un- 


172  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

true  or  warped  picture  of  the  actual  situation. 
Gilbert  Murray  asks  what  people  are  referred  to 
by  those  who  demand  popular  control  of  diplo- 
macy; are  they  the  people  of  educational  socie- 
ties, or  of  the  music  halls?  The  public  is  not 
homogeneous,  or  so  organized  as  to  give  expres- 
sion to  convictions  on  current  aifairs  which  have 
been  maturely  considered.  It  lacks  the  leisure 
and  training  for  penetrating  superficialities  and 
going  to  the  bottom  of  difficult  questions.  Lord 
Cromer  believes  in  general  that  democracies  are 
not  peaceful,  and  he  refers  particularly  to  the 
American  democracy  for  proof ;  Lord  Lytton  said, 
^'Governments  are  generally  for  diplomacy,  the 
people  for  war." 

Men  of  all  shades  of  opinion  are  agreed  that 
the  people  are  not  greatly  interested  in  foreign 
affairs,  and  the  opponents  of  proposals  of  demo- 
cratic control  argue  that  it  would  be  useless  to 
create  machinery  for  action  where  there  exists 
no  interest,  nor  purpose  to  act. 

It  is  quite  true  that  the  public  during  the  nine- 
teenth century  seemed  less  interested  in  foreign 
affairs  than  during  the  eighteenth.  At  the  ear- 
lier time,  diplomacy  was  a  fascinating,  personal 
game,  about  which  the  wiseacres  in  the  coffee 
houses  were  eager  to  make  their  criticisms  and 


THE  PUBLIC  AND  DIPLOMACY  173 

prognostications.  When  the  middle  class  came 
to  power  in  the  nineteenth  century,  it  was  pri- 
marily interested  in  economic  and  other  domes- 
tic questions,  and  was  satisfied  to  leave  the  con- 
duct of  foreign  affairs  to  statesmen  and  diplo- 
mats. The  constantly  growing  political  con- 
sciousness of  the  public  at  large  was  concentrated 
chieHy  on  questions  of  internal  politics  and  re- 
form. Foreign  affairs,  as  they  reached  the  pub- 
lic, were  thought  of  still  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  onlooker,  rather  than  of  him  who  actually 
had  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  burden.  Those  who 
had  to  bleed  and  die  when  hostilities  had  been 
brought  about,  never  had  any  chance,  nor  deter- 
mination, to  influence  the  course  of  diplomacy 
leading  up  to  wars. 

With  such  a  general  apathy  of  the  public,  it 
was  not  surprising  that  diplomacy  should  cling 
to  its  caste  privileges,  should  try  to  preserve  its 
discretionary  powers,  and  should  often  attempt 
deliberately  to  keep  people  in  the  dark.  "In  the 
public  interest"  is  the  curtain  beyond  which  no 
one  may  peer.  Even  in  the  American  Grovern- 
ment,  particularly  during  and  since  the  war,  for- 
eign affairs  have  been  handled  with  what  would 
ordinarily  seem  insufficient  infonnation  to  the 
public;  in  fact,  -with  occasional  putting  forth  of 


174  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

misleading  and  entirely  partial  information,  or 
the  refusal  to  furnish  information  even  When  re- 
quested by  those  having  official  responsibilities. 
This  is  a  notable  change,  as  up  to  1914  it  was 
substantially  true  that  the  United  States  had  no 
diplomatic  secrets. 

While  from  the  point  of  view  of  traditional 
diplomacy,  and  of  international  relations  as  they 
were  up  to  the  Great  War,  it  seems  quite  natural 
that  democratic  control  should  be  thought  by 
many  to  be  unpractical;  and  while  indeed  no 
one  can  flatter  himself  that  through  a  change  of 
method  the  conduct  of  international  affairs  could 
suddenly  be  rendered  more  wise  and  entirely  ef- 
fective towards  the  public  welfare,  yet  I  cannot 
avoid  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  wrong  ori- 
entation in  the  emphasis  of  the  need  of  secrecy 
and  of  the  unfitness  of  the  people  to  deal  with 
problems  of  foreign  affairs.  The  belief  in  the 
unfitness  of  the  people  in  this  matter  appears  to 
be  the  result  of  a  preconceived  notion  as  to  the 
overpowering  difficulty,  complexity  and  almost 
sanctity  of  foreign  affairs.  Modern  governments 
are  based  on  the  principle  that  all  legislation 
must  meet  the  test  of  public  criticism  and  rest 
on  public  consent;  certainly  it  cannot  be  argued 
that  matters  of  the  incidence   of  taxation,  the 


THE  PUBLIC  AND  DIPLOMACY  175 

proper  organization  of  credit,  and  the  determina- 
tion of  commercial  policies,  are  less  complex  and 
intricate  than  are  foreign  affairs.    It  is  indeed 
true  that  it  is  difficult  for  one  nation  thoroughly 
to  appreciate  in  detail  the  conditions  of  life  in 
another.     This   truth    should    have    its    greatest 
value  in  dissuading  a  nation  from  meddling  with 
the  internal  affairs  of  another,  even  from  good 
motives.     Those    international    questions    which 
are  apt  to  produce  war  may  indeed  relate  to  in- 
tricate matters,  but  the  essential  point  is  always 
the  contention  for  power,  influence  or  commercial 
advantage,  and  it  is  not  apparent  why  the  public 
in  general  should  be  unfit  to  judge  as  to  whether 
national  treasure  and  life  are  eventually  to  be 
spent  in  huge  quantities  to  bring  about,  or  to 
prevent,  any  such  shifting  of  power  or  influence. 
It  is,  however,  because  the  motives  involved  are 
so  largely  connected  with  class  interests,  or  sur- 
vivals of  pride  of  race,  that  those  concerned  in 
them  are  eager  to  deny  the  fitness  of  the  general 
public,  which  if  called  on  to  decide  would  put  into 
the  foreground  the  question,  ^'How  does  the  con- 
trol of  this  or  that  group  of  capitalists  in  Mo- 
rocco, for  instance,  or  the  greater  or  smaller  in- 
fluence of  Austria  or  Russia  in  Servia,  affect  the 
daily  life  and  welfare  of  our  people?"    It  is  cer- 


176  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

tainly  true  that  questions  of  peace  and  war  have 
never  definitely  been  reasoned  out  on  that  basis. 
There  has  always  been  the  assumption  that  cer- 
tain things  were  essential  to  national  prestige 
and  could  not  be  questioned;  it  is  only  when  the 
actually  existing  broader  base  of  national  political 
life  is  organized  also  for  active  control  of  foreign 
affairs,  that  these  considerations  will  have  their 
full  weight.  Only  the  most  exceptional  states- 
men could  lift  themselves  out  of  the  narrow 
groove  of  tradition  and  precedent;  and  more  ex- 
ceptional still,  in  fact  all  but  impossible,  is  the 
capacity  of  one  man  to  represent  in  himself  in 
just  proportion,  all  the  interests  and  feelings  of 
a  nation. 

Infallibility  cannot  be  expected  in  the  handling 
of  foreign  affairs,  whether  under  a  broad  discre- 
tion of  statesmen  or  under  strict  democratic  con- 
trol. There  will  always  be  an  alternative  of  wis- 
dom and  rashness,  constructive  planning  and 
headlong  action,  carefulness  and  negligence.  But 
past  experience  has  certainly  established  beyond 
peradventure  of  doubt  that  secret  diplomacy  is 
not  infallible,  and  particularly  that  diplomacy 
acting  under  absolutist  traditions,  as  in  Germany 
before  the  war,  may  make  the  most  fatal  mistakes 
of  judgment  and  of  policy.     Balfour  said:     "I 


THE  PUBLIC  AND  DIPLOMACY  177 

do  not  think  the  Government  in  June,  1914,  had 
the  slightest  idea  that  there  was  any  danger 
ahead."  A  remarkable  statement,  when  we  con- 
sider the  actions  and  reactions  of  secret  diplo- 
macy during  the  decade  preceding  the  war.  It 
has  been  quite  truly  said  that  diplomacy  is  far 
more  eminent  in  autopsy  than  in  diagnosis.  M. 
Cheradame  somewhat  severely  observes,  ''The 
typical  diplomat  lives  in  a  world  of  his  own.  His 
information  is  rarely  obtained  by  direct  observa- 
tion of  people  and  facts."  And  while  ordinarily 
men  of  exceptional  talents  are  selected  for  the 
difficult  position  of  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
yet  all  considered,  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  were 
decisions  on  the  essential  matters  of  international 
life  made  on  a  broader  basis,  and  influenced  more 
by  a  direct  action  of  public  opinion,  the  result 
would  be  less  wise. 

Active  participation  of  the  people  in  the  mak- 
ing of  momentous  decisions  regarding  foreign  af- 
fairs, is  denied  either  under  the  assumption  that 
the  people  might  not  be  ready  to  face  the  fateful 
test,  or,  by  the  majority,  with  the  thought  that 
the  people  are  too  excitable  and  rash  to  be  trusted 
with  such  far-reaching  decisions.  While  it  is  in- 
deed easy  to  generate  warlike  excitement  among 
the  masses,  it  must  be  remembered,  when  such  a 


178  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

charge  of  rashness  is  made,  that  the  people  have 
never  been  currently  informed  of  the  develop- 
ment of  international  dangers,  but  usually  at  a 
critical  time  shreds  of  information  have  been 
flashed  on  them,  designed  or  at  least  apt  to  stir 
up  all  their  atavistic  love  of  fight  and  fear  of  at- 
tack. Even  thus,  the  greatest  noise  is  made 
usually  by  those  who  do  not  in  the  event  of  hos- 
tilities actually  have  to  risk  their  blood  and  bones. 
It  stands  to  reason  that  if  honestly  kept  in- 
formed about  international  relationships,  the  peo- 
ple would  be  far  less  prone  to  sudden  excitement. 
Very  few  people  indeed  appear  to  doubt  that  had 
the  decision  of  war  or  no  war  been  laid  before  the 
peoples  of  Europe  in  1914,  with  a  full  knowledge 
of  the  facts,  the  terrible  catastrophe  would  never 
have  come  about.  As  Mr.  Lowes  Dickinson  has 
said,  if  the  people  had  been  allowed  to  share  the 
apprehension  and  precautions  of  the  diplomats 
before  1914,  there  would  have  been  quite  a  sim- 
ple and  clear  question  before  the  English  people, 
for  one.  It  could  have  decided  whether  it  would 
pursue  a  policy  that  might  lead  at  any  moment 
to  a  general  European  war,  or  to  take  the  alterna- 
tive which  Sir  Edward  Grey  later  spoke  of, 
namely,  ' '  to  promote  some  arrangement,  to  which 
Germany  could  be  a  party  by  which  she  could  be 


THE  PUBLIC  AND  DIPLOMACY  179 

assured  that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would 
be  pursued  against  her  by  France,  Russia  and  our- 
selves, jointly  or  separately."  Without  the  sup- 
port of  the  people,  kept  in  line  by  fear  of  hidden 
dangers,  not  even  the  militarists  of  Germany 
could  have  forced  military  action. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Russian  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment was  to  announce  its  hostility  to  secret 
diplomacy.  When  it  first  published  the  secret 
treaties  and  documents  of  the  Czarist  Govern- 
ment, its  motive  was,  as  shown  by  Trotsky's  dec- 
laration made  at  the  time,  thoroughly  to  discredit 
the  management  of  affairs  under  the  old  regime. 
In  the  same  connection,  it  announced  its  own  pur- 
pose of  conducting  foreign  affairs  in  the  open. 
Such  seems  indeed  to  have  been  its  general  prac- 
tice with  respect  to  the  announcement  of  policies, 
though  its  agents  continued  to  use  underground 
methods.  One  thing,  however,  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment is  evidently  trying  to  bring  about,  namely, 
a  broad  public  interest  in  the  conduct  of  foreign 
affairs.  It  desires  the  Russian  people,  and  more 
particularly  the  members  of  the  ruling  Commu- 
nist Party,  to  be  currently  informed  about  the 
progress  of  international  affairs  and  about  ar- 
rangements concluded.  Observers  report  that  at 
the  meeting  of  the  provincial  Soviets  the  first  busi- 


180  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ness  ordinarily  taken  up  is  the  reading  and  dis- 
cussion of  a  report  on  international  relations  sent 
by  the  central  government.  We  have  no  means 
to  check  up  the  truth  of  these  reports;  but  this 
effort  to  interest  the  broad  mass  of  the  popula- 
tion in  the  outward  relations  of  the  state  is  cer- 
tainly worth  notice.  The  expectation  is  encour- 
aged that  the  reason  for  acts  relating  to  foreign 
affairs  will  be  explained,  particularly  when  sac- 
rifices are  demanded. 


xni 

A  SURVIVAL  OF  ABSOLUTISM 

Those  who  view  the  modern  state  as  a  purely 
predatory  organization, — for  exploitation  within 
and  without, — point  to  the  methods,  practices  and 
results  of  diplomacy  as  one  of  the  plainest  indi- 
cations of  the  sinister  nature  of  the  political  state. 
Such  criticism  cannot  be  safely  brushed  aside  as 
utterly  unreasonable ;  it  should  rather  call  forth  a 
searching  inquiry  as  to  whether,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  could  not  and 
should  not  be  brought  into  greater  consonance 
with  genuinely  democratic  principles,  and  be 
placed  on  the  sound  basis  of  well-informed  pub- 
lic support. 

No  matter  what  opinion  one  may  hold  with  re- 
spect to  the  necessity  of  secret  diplomacy,  it  must 
be  recognized  that  this  practice  involves  a  very 
narrow  conception  of  the  active  scope  of  democ- 
racy. It  is  in  fact  a  historical  survival  from  the 
period  of  the  absolutist  state;  or  in  other  words, 
that  aspect  of  the  modern  state  which  deals  with 

181 


182  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

foreign  affairs  has  retained  the  character  of  abso- 
lutism. It  is  a  superstition,  in  the  picturesque 
sense  of  that  word  used  by  Lowell,  when  he  de- 
fines it  as  "something  left  standing  over  from 
one  of  the  world's  witenagemotes  to  the  other." 
In  this  case,  indeed  the  most  recent  witenagemote 
approached  the  question  and  proposed  a  step  in 
advance  towards  its  solution.  But  the  difficulty 
still  persists. 

In  its  relations  with  other  states,  the  state  is 
considered  to  be  absolute,  not  bound  by  any  laws, 
responsible  only  for  its  own  security,  welfare  and 
progressing  influence.  The  struggle  for  political 
power  still  exists  among  states,  in  essentially  the 
same  keenness  and  rigidity  with  which  it  appeared 
to  the  eyes  of  Machiavelli.  The  importance  of 
world-wide  human  relationships,  and  of  interna- 
tional cooperation  in  scientific  and  economic  life, 
has  indeed  been  brought  forth  and  given  its  place 
in  the  public  mind ;  but  because  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  conduct  of  international  affairs  is 
actually  handled,  the  feeling  thus  generated  does 
not  have  much  chance  to  influence  action  at  crit- 
ical times,  when  the  people  are  startled  and  ex- 
cited by  the  sudden  revelation  of  dangers,  which 
awaken  in  them  all  the  bitter  feelings  engendered 
by  the  past  struggles  of  mankind. 


A  SURVIVAL  OF  ABSOLUTISM  183 

This  survival  is  given  strength  by  class  inter- 
ests, pride  of  race,  and  by  the  manipulations  of 
plutocratic  control.  Where  affairs  are  handled 
by  a  narrow  circle  of  men,  no  matter  how  high- 
minded  and  how  thoroughly  conscious  of  their 
public  responsibility,  yet  with  the  necessary  limi- 
tations of  the  human  mind,  they  cannot  but  be 
influenced  at  every  turn  by  the  opinions  of  others 
with  whom  they  are  actually  in  contact;  so  that 
in  decisions  on  these  momentous  matters,  the 
thing  which  is  concretely  present  is  very  often 
an  interest  comparatively  narrow  in  itself,  and 
related  to  the  public  welfare  only  by  a  series  of 
remote  inferences  which  are  accepted  at  their  face 
value.  The  most  successful  statesman  of  the 
nineteenth  century  said  that  the  whole  Balkan 
question  was  not  worth  the  bones  of  one  Pom- 
eranian grenadier;  yet  his  successors  in  power 
risked  the  very  existence  of  the  nations  of  Europe 
for  one  phase  of  that  question. 

Powerful  interests  will  always  have  means,  for- 
mal or  informal,  to  lay  their  needs  and  desires 
before  the  men  in  power.  They  may  indeed  be 
very  important  and  may  deserve  special  atten- 
tion, but  unfortunately,  many  cases  have  hap- 
pened in  which  their  point  of  view  has  been 
adopted  without  making  sure  that  there  existed  a 


184  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

general  public  interest  sufficiently  important  to 
warrant  taking  the  risks  involved. 

A  diplomatic  caste  recruited  from  a  certain 
class  of  society,  trained  in  the  traditions  of  au- 
thority, in  contact  all  the  time  with  men  of  simi- 
lar views  and  principles,  cannot  in  the  nature  of 
things  free  itself  from  the  limitations  of  such 
environment  and  such  training. 

From  the  personal  point  of  view  diplomacy  has 
adhered  to  the  belief  in  the  superior  intelligence, 
ability  and  foresight  in  the  handling  of  foreign 
affairs,  on  the  part  of  those  who  by  inherited  tra- 
ditions and  special  experience  may  be  said  to  be- 
long to  a  caste  distinguished  from  the  mass  of 
humanity.  Some  one  has  said,  there  is  a  great 
danger  in  that  there  exists  a  caste  of  people  who 
have  taken  the  making  of  history  as  their  profes- 
sion; who  still  cling  to  the  erroneous  idea  that 
the  manipulation  of  large  masses  of  people,  the 
redistribution  of  territories,  and  the  modification 
of  the  natural  processes  of  grouping  and  settle- 
ment, is  history.  But  such  people  who  believe 
they  are  making  history  are  really  obstructing  it. 
Even  so  unusual  a  man  as  Bismarck,  working 
as  he  did  on  a  great  national  problem,  did  not 
gain  lasting  success  in  action  whereby  he  endeav- 
ored to  anticipate  the  developments  of  history. 


A   SURVIVAL  OF  ABSOLUTISM  185 

The  artful  contrivance  and  harsh,  ruthless  exe- 
cution of  many  of  his  plans  left  a  heritage  of  evil 
to  the  world;  but  the  greatest  evil  lay  in  the  ex- 
ample given  by  so  successful  a  man  in  making  it 
seem  that  history  could  actually  thus  be  made. 
The  attitude  which  is  taken  in  behalf  of  such  men, 
in  claiming  for  them  a  completely  free  and  full 
discretion  in  controlling  foreign  affairs,  recalls  a 
statement  made  by  H.  G.  Wells  concerning  a  Brit- 
ish leader:  ''He  believes  that  he  belongs  to  a 
particularly  gifted  and  privileged  class  of  beings 
to  whom  the  lives  and  affairs  of  common  men  are 
given  over — the  raw  material  for  brilliant  careers. 
It  seems  to  him  an  act  of  insolence  that  the  com- 
mon man  should  form  judgments  on  matters  of 
statecraft,"  The  diplomats  of  the  old  school  in- 
deed do  require  the  people,  but  only  as  material 
with  which  to  work  out  their  grandiose  projects. 
Their  view  not  too  distantly  resembles  that  of  the 
German  militarists  to  whom  ordinary  humanity 
existed  only  for  one  purpose,  "to  do  their  damn'd 
duty." 

We  should  naturally  expect  to  jBnd  the  great- 
est secrecy  and  the  most  callous  use  of  secretive 
methods,  where  absolutism  remains  most  com- 
pletely established.  In  the  last  remaining  abso- 
lutism, that  of  Japan,  these  expectations  are  ful- 


186  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

filled,  both  as  regards  carefully-guarded  secrecy 
of  all  diplomatic  action,  and  the  habitual  use  of 
well  phrased  declarations  of  a  theoretical  policy, 
announced  for  public  consumption,  but  bearing 
only  a  Platonic  relation  to  the  details  of  actual 
doings.  But  more  liberally  governed  states  have 
not  by  any  means  all  freed  themselves  from  this 
practice,  even  to  the  extent  of  faithfully  keeping 
the  representative  bodies,  and  the  public,  in- 
formed of  the  true  character  and  aims  of  impor- 
tant national  policies. 

During  the  discussions  of  the  last  few  years,  a 
great  many  remedies  for  this  state  of  affairs  have 
been  suggested.  The  Constitutional  practice  of 
the  United  States  has  been  taken  as  a  model  in 
England  in  the  suggestion  that  there  should  be  a 
representative  committee  on  foreign  affairs  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  which  should  keep  in  con- 
stant touch  with  the  diplomatic  officials  and  su- 
pervise the  conduct  of  foreign  relations;  that 
there  should  be  at  least  two  days  given  to  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  Foreign  Office  Vote;  that  there 
should  be  full  reports  made  on  the  progress  of 
all  important  negotiations;  and  that  treaties  and 
alliances  should  not  be  concluded,  nor  war  made, 
without  a  previous  authorization  on  the  part  of 
Parliament.     The   last   formal  proposal   of  this 


A  SURVIVAL  OF  ABSOLUTISM  187 

kind  was  the  motion  made  in  March,  1918,  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  the  opposition  to  which  by 
Mr.  Balfour  has  already  been  alluded  to.  That 
he  should  object  particularly  to  the  prying  into 
foreign  affairs  on  the  part  of  persons  "not  re- 
sponsible," and  by  ''politicians,"  that  the  pro- 
posed committee  of  the  Plouse  of  Commons  should 
be  thus  characterized,  throws  light  on  the  preju- 
dices involved;  but  it  also  reveals  the  absurdity 
of  the  present  arrangement  from  the  point  of  view 
of  free  government.  In  France  there  has  existed, 
since  1902,  a  standing  committee  on  foreign  and 
colonial  affairs  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 

AVhen  he  was  premier,  in  1920,  Signor  Giolliti 
introduced  a  bill  carrying  the  following  provi- 
sion: "Treaties  and  International  understand- 
ings, whatever  be  their  subject  and  character,  are 
valid  only  after  they  have  been  approved  by  Par- 
liament. The  Government  of  the  King  can  de- 
clare war  only  with  the  approval  of  the  two  Cham- 
bers." The  ministry  of  Giolliti  foil  before  this 
sound  measure  could  be  passed. 

It  may  be  questioned  whether  many  of  the  ar- 
rangements suggested  could  be  more  than  pallia- 
tives, as  long  as  an  intelligent  and  constant  pub- 
lic interest  in  foreign  affairs  has  not  been  aroused, 
and  as  long  as  the  absolutist  aspect  of  foreign 


188  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

policy  continues.  The  suggestion  that  war  should 
not  be  made  without  a  previous  national  referen- 
dum, has  indeed  logic  on  its  side  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  democratic  theory  of  state,  but  it 
has  thus  far  not  entered  into  the  state  of  practical 
consideration. 

The  most  important  remedy  as  yet  attempted 
is  the  provision  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  that  all  treaties  shall  be  made  public. 
No  greater  encouragement,  indeed,  could  be  given 
to  the  growth  of  confidence  and  the  destruction 
of  baneful  suspicions  and  fears,  throughout  in- 
ternational life,  than  if  it  were  possible  to  assure 
the  nations  of  the  world  that  all  engagements  im- 
posing international  obligations  of  any  kind  what- 
soever would  be  made  known  immediately  upon 
their  conclusion.     This  provision  of  the  Covenant 
has  already  gone  into  force,  and  numerous  new 
treaties  have  been   submitted,   even  by  govern- 
ments who  are  not  as  yet  members  of  the  League. 
But  certain  governments  have  delayed  compliance 
in  cases  where  treaties  are  known  to  have  been 
made  secretly.    As  there  is  no  specific  sanction  for 
this  provision  in  the  Covenant,  and  as  actually 
binding  agreements  can  be  made  without  taking 
the  form  of  a  treaty  or  convention,  this  remedy 
is  not  in  itself  powerful  enough  to  remove  the 


A  SURVIVAL  OF  ABSOLUTISM  189 

evil.  If  two  or  three  states  are  willing  to  keep 
an  engagement  secret  at  the  risk  of  later  incur- 
ring a  certain  amount  of  opprobrium  when  the 
fact  is  discovered,  there  is  no  means  as  yet  avail- 
able for  obliging  them  to  abandon  such  course. 
Nevertheless,  this  provision  of  the  Covenant  con- 
stitutes a  great  advance  in  the  work  of  placing 
the  public  business  of  the  world  on  the  only  sound 
basis,  and  cultivating  that  confidence  upon  which 
depends  the  future  immunity  of  mankind  from 
constant  danger  of  suffering  and  destruction.  It 
will,  however,  not  be  a  real  remedy  until  the  na- 
tions agree  actually  to  outlaw  all  secret  agree- 
ments as  a  conspiracy  against  the  general  wel- 
fare and  safety. 

The  other  important  advance  made  in  the  Cove- 
nant is  found  in  the  provisions  for  the  investi- 
gation of  any  cause  of  conflict  before  hostilities 
shall  be  resorted  to.  If  after  the  first  shock  of 
excitement,  which  accompanies  the  revelation  of 
a  serious  international  crisis,  public  opinion  can 
be  given  a  certain  space  of  time  to  inform  itself, 
then  it  may  indeed  be  hoped  that  a  different  tem- 
per will  control  the  giving  of  the  fateful  doom 
of  war.  As  Count  Czernin  has  stated,  on  the 
night  of  August  4, 1914,  between  the  hours  of  nine 
and  midnight  the  decision  as  to  whether  England 


190  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

would  come  into  the  war,  lay  with  the  German 
Government.  A  system  under  which  such  tremen- 
dous issues  have  to  be  decided  in  such  a  manner, 
is  absurd  to  the  verge  of  insanity.* 

While  the  above  arrangements,  if  they  could  be 
effectively  carried  out,  would  undoubtedly  serve  to 
moderate  the  evils  which  now  result  from  the  con- 
duct of  international  affairs  on  so  narrow  a  basis, 
yet  it  is  difficult  to  expect  from  them  more  than 
relatively  superficial  results.  It  is  only  if  a  new 
spirit  can  be  developed  among  the  nations,  and 
if  the  absolutist  conception  of  the  state  as  far  as 
it  still  remains,  can  be  transformed  into  some- 
thing more  consonant  with  the  complexity  and 
delicacy  of  human  relationships,  that  we  may  hope 
to  hail  the  dawn  of  a  new  era.  It  would  be  as 
great  a  transformation  as  that  which  separates 
the  Pagan  from  the  Christian  ideal.  Mankind  is 
still  somewhat  blinded  by  the  glitter  and  pa- 
geantry of  the  absolutist  state ;  the  pride  of  power 
manifests  itself  now  particularly  in  foreign  in- 
tercourse.    When  Portugal  became  a  republic,  it 

*  A  German  writer  puts  the  blame  for  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  on  the  telegraph.  He  says  that  if  there  had  been  no  tele- 
graphic communication  between  the  capitals,  the  fatal  crisis 
would  not  have  arisen;  tliere  would  have  been  time  for  reflection 
and  a  decision  to  make  war  would  never  have  been  taken  in 
blood. 


A  SURVIVAL  OF  ABSOLUTISM  191 

desired  at  first  to  abolish  the  entire  diplomatic 
establishment,  and  to  allow  all  international  busi- 
ness to  be  done  by  the  consuls.  That  proposal 
may  have  resulted  from  an  instinctive  feeling  that 
there  was  something  incompatible  between  a 
really  free  community,  and  the  sense  of  absolute 
power  embodied  in  diplomacy. 

A  change  can  be  brought  about  only  when  the 
underlying  unity  of  mankind  is  more  intensely 
felt  and  when  the  common  interests  in  science, 
commerce,  industry  and  the  universal  language 
of  art  are  valued  at  their  true  importance  to  the 
welfare  of  the  people  of  all  nations.  Joint  effort 
in  the  constructive  work  of  developing  resources, 
particularly  in  the  tropics,  will  make  it  possible 
for  vastly  increased  populations  to  live  in  com- 
fort on  their  present  sites,  without  the  need  of 
crowding  each  other.  A  higher  valuation  of  hu- 
manity, a  more  just  proportion  in  the  influence 
permitted  different  interests,  a  keener  scrutiny 
of  traditions  and  watch-words — all  this  is  neces- 
sary. Men  and  women  to-day  feel  an  intense  ap- 
prehension, when  they  think  of  the  fate  of  their 
children  in  a  world  in  which  the  unreasoning 
prejudices  and  unenlightened  practices  that  have 
recently  again  come  to  the  fore  in  international 
life  should  prevail,  leaving  mankind  in  a  dazed 


192  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

confusion,  and  pushing  the  people  from  time  to 
time  into  wholesale  slaughter  with  ever  more  hor- 
rible instruments  of  destruction.  They  feel  also 
that  if  secret  policies,  engendering  fears  and  sus- 
picion, are  to  continue  to  be  the  dominant  factor, 
then  all  improvement  in  human  welfare,  education 
and  science,  will  have  to  be  in  a  large  measure 
postponed  to  the  preparation  of  constantly  more 
formidable  engines  of  death.  One  cannot  but  re- 
member the  worst  imprecations  of  the  Greek 
tragic  poets  and  philosophers,  on  the  miserable 
destiny  of  man.  In  fact,  if  we  should  have  to  be- 
lieve that  no  better  way  could  be  found  to  man- 
age the  vital  interests  of  mankind,  a  great  nat- 
ural catastrophe,  which  would  extinguish  once  and 
for  all  the  miserable  breed  on  this  planet,  would 
almost  appear  in  the  light  of  a  redemption. 

But  we  cannot  believe  that  the  peoples  of  the 
world  will  be  so  foolish  as  to  allow  themselves 
to  remain  in  this  condition  and  not  to  find  their 
way  to  a  reorganization  of  public  affairs  which 
will  make  such  a  haphazard  and  perilous  situation 
impossible.  It  seems  plain  that  the  idea  of  the 
state  and  of  state  action  will  have  to  be  trans- 
formed in  accordance  with  the  greater  self-con- 
sciousness of  humanity  which  has  developed  in 
the  last  century,  or  the  desire  to  scrap  the  po- 


A  SURVIVAL  OF  ABSOLUTISM  193 

litical  state  and  to  find  some  more  adequate  and 
natural  form  of  organization  will  rapidly  gain  in 
strength.  Meanwhile,  there  is  a  need  of  the 
formation  of  a  great  freemasonry  of  all  publi- 
cists, political  men  and  teachers  of  the  people, 
united  in  the  resolve  to  know  and  make  known 
the  essential  elements  in  current  international  af- 
fairs, to  arouse  the  public  to  a  sense  of  the  im- 
portance of  these  matters  to  their  every-day  life, 
and  to  support  the  men  more  directly  responsible 
for  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy,  with  an  intelli- 
gent, searching,  reasonable  and  broad  public 
opinion. 


XIV 

RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE 

Up  until  a  recent  date  Americans  could  con- 
template the  play  of  secret  diplomacy  in  Europe 
and  Asia  with  a  feeling  of  entire  aloofness,  as 
belonging  to  a  political  society  which  had  neither 
need  nor  inclination  to  utilize  such  methods.  Our 
unmenaced  continental  position,  the  natural  pro- 
tection and  separation  implied  in  distance  and 
ocean  boundaries,  and  the  conscious  intention  of 
keeping  clear  of  international  entanglements,  all 
contributed  to  make  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States  entirely  public  and  straightforward. 
The  fathers  of  the  Constitution  had  established 
the  sound  principle  that  treaties  are  the  law  of 
the  land.  This  not  only  involves  mature  consid- 
eration of  a  treaty  before  it  is  made,  but  publicity 
as  well.  The  American  people  have  known  at  all 
times  what  obligations  had  been  incurred,  and  the 
world  had  the  same  information.  There  has  been 
no  room  for  guesswork  and  suspicion. 

The   instructions  which  were   issued  to   John 
Jay  when  he  was  sent  as  special  envoy  to  Eng- 


194 


RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE      195 

land  in  1794  lay  down  the  following  rule  of  con- 
duet:  ''It  is  the  President's  wish  that  the  char- 
acteristics of  an  American  minister  should  be 
marked  on  the  one  hand  by  a  firmness  against  im- 
proper compliances,  and  on  the  other  by  sincer- 
ity, candor,  truth  and  prudence,  and  by  a  horror 
of  finesse  and  chicane."  These  straightforward 
words  began  a  tradition  which  has  ever  since  ani- 
mated the  American  diplomatic  service.  Wlien 
after  the  Spanish  war,  under  Secretary  Hay, 
American  diplomacy  entered  more  fully  into 
world-wide  problems  than  in  any  previous  era, 
the  expression  ''the  new  diplomacy"  was  cur- 
rently used  in  a  laudatory  sense  to  designate  what 
Hay  had  implied  when  in  a  public  address  he  had 
declared  the  Golden  Rule  to  be  the  cardinal  prin- 
ciple of  American  diplomacy — an  ideal  which 
makes  secrecy  and  intrigue  unnecessary. 

In  order  to  give  the  public  an  opportunity  of 
informing  itself  concerning  the  conduct  and  de- 
velopment of  foreign  affairs,  the  United  States 
Government  has  from  an  early  date  published  an 
annual  collection  of  diplomatic  correspondence. 
Since  1861,  this  publication  is  known  as  Papers 
Relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  formerly  published  within  two  or 
three  years  of  the  year  to  which  it  related,  but 


196  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

during  the  war  this  interval  was  considerably  ex- 
tended. The  precedents  and  principles  elabo- 
rated in  the  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the 
United  States  have  been  collected,  codified  and 
published  in  a  very  important  and  useful  com- 
pendium by  Francis  Wharton,  under  the  title  of 
Digest  of  International  Law.  This  work  was  ex- 
panded, amplified  and  brought  down  to  date  by 
Prof.  John  Bassett  Moore,  under  the  same  title, 
in  1906.  It  is  of  the  highest  importance,  not  only 
as  a  repository  of  diplomatic  and  legal  precedent, 
but  as  a  definite  and  public  record  of  the  position 
taken  by  the  American  Government  on  all  inter- 
national questions  that  had  arisen  up  to  the  date 
of  its  publication.  The  preparation  of  such  di- 
gest on  the  part  of  other  governments  is  highly  to 
be  desired  for  the  purpose  of  clarifying  interna- 
tional law  and  policy,  and  for  giving  them  a  sound 
basis  of  reason  and  experience  upon  which  the 
people  and  governments  may  rely.  The  fact  that 
a  precedent  reported  in  this  digest,  might  be  cited 
against  the  American  Government  as  an  admis- 
sion, does  not  imply  a  disadvantage  which  would 
at  all  offset  the  benefits  resulting  in  general  from 
public  knowledge. 

With  respect  to  the  details  of  negotiation,  there 
are  confidential  relationships  which  have  always 


RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE      197 

been  observed  by  the  American  Government.  Or- 
dinary considerations  of  courtesy  require  that 
those  who  may  speak  to  us  frankly  in  confidence 
shall  not  be  made  to  suffer  by  being  quoted  and 
thus  perhaps  be  exposed  to  misunderstanding  and 
criticism.  On  our  part,  in  preparing  a  sound 
basis  of  action,  favorable  as  well  as  unfavorable 
matters  have  to  be  considered;  yet  there  is  ordi- 
narily no  need  of  publicly  advertising  the  short- 
comings of  individuals  and  governments  as  set 
forth  in  reports  on  such  unfavorable  matters. 
Such  considerate  action  is  not  based  on  a  desire 
to  mislead  or  to  take  advantage,  but  to  save  un- 
necessary irritation.  For  the  purpose  of  permit- 
ting complete  freedom  of  discussion  and  of  criti- 
cism without  the  risk  of  giving  offense,  the  United 
States  Senate,  as  a  matter  of  its  ordinary  pro- 
cedure, goes  into  secret  session  when  discussing 
a  treaty  submitted  to  it.  There  have,  however, 
been  several  exceptions.  Thus,  for  instance,  the 
debates  on  the  Bayard-Chamberlain  Fisheries 
Treaty  of  1888,  on  the  Taft  arbitration  treaties 
of  1912,  and  on  the  Nicaragua  Treaty  of  1916, 
were  carried  on,  and  concluded,  in  open  session. 
Many  senators  are  in  favor  of  making  this  the 
common  practice. 

Before  the  war,  as  Prof.  John  Bassett  ]Moore, 


198  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

whose  knowledge  of  the  records  is  unequaled, 
said  to  me,  the  State  Department  had  no  secrets 
whatsoever,  with  the  exception  of  personnel  re- 
ports. "We,  too,  however,  can  depart  from  a  well- 
established  tradition,  as  is  shown  by  our  diplo- 
matic history  during  the  war.  I  do  not  believe  it 
will  ever  be  charged  that  in  any  matter  big  or 
little  the  American  Government  sought  narrow, 
selfish  advantages.  Secrecy  due  to  such  motives, 
there  was  none.  There  was  no  American  policy 
or  enterprise  that  needed  concealment,  apart  from 
military  policies  and  strategy  during  a  war. 
When  I  glanced  over  at  the  end  of  my  mission 
in  Peking  the  extra-confidential  cable  correspond- 
ence, I  was  inwardly  amazed  by  the  entire  lack  of 
anything  that  really  needed  concealing,  in  that 
closely  guarded  dossier. 

Yet  American  diplomacy  did  during  the  war  fall 
somewhat  under  the  spell  of  the  traditional  meth- 
ods still  in  vogue  in  Europe.  "We  were  not  a 
party  to  any  secret  engagements  for  the  division 
of  spoils  after  the  war,  although  from  the  time 
of  the  peace  conference  on,  the  influence  of  the 
American  Government  was  exercised  mostly  in  se- 
cret, and  the  agreements  subsidiary  to  the  gen- 
eral settlement  were  secretly  signed.  These  did 
not  contain  any  apportionment  of  advantage  to 


RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE      199 

the  United  States,  but  on  the  contrary  were  sup- 
posed to  contain  the  nearest  approach  to  the 
equitable  ideas  of  American  policy  which  was,  un- 
der existing  conditions,  obtainable.  But  through- 
out this  trying  period  the  conduct  of  American 
diplomacy  did  not  rest  on  the  foundation  of  a  con- 
tinuous, frank  appeal  to  the  public  opinion  of  our 
own  nation  or  of  the  world. 

Even  before  the  armistice  some  very  important 
matters  were  dealt  with  in  this  fashion.  Though 
the  permanent  importance  of  the  Lansing-Ishii 
note  as  affecting  in  a  concrete  and  specific  way  the 
definition  of  rights  and  policies  in  the  Far  East 
is  very  doubtful,  yet  in  its  immediate  effect  under 
all  of  the  circumstances  of  the  time,  this  was  cer- 
tainly a  noteworthy  document  to  issue  from  the 
American  foreign  office.  Yet,  its  conception  and 
execution  was  absolutely  surrounded  with  secrecy 
so  that  not  even  the  high  officials  normally  con- 
sulted in  such  matters,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  himself,  were  informed  as  to 
what  was  coming.  This  secrecy  worked  entirely 
in  the  interest  of  the  Japanese  government.  By 
privately  giving  out  the  agreement  in  Japan  and 
in  China  before  the  date  when  its  publication  had 
been  agreed  upon,  the  Japanese  government  suc- 
ceeded to  a  certain  extent  and  for  a  time,  in  giv- 


200  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ing  this  matter  the  appearance  of  a  great  Japa- 
nese diplomatic  victory  and  of  a  highly  important 
concession  on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  recall  the  general  disil- 
lusionment that  came  about  when  President  Wil- 
son agreed  to  the  policy  of  secrecy  at  the  peace 
conference.  Undoubtedly  this  decision  was  based 
on  the  motive  to  secure,  with  a  promptness  re- 
quired by  the  stress  of  the  times,  a  settlement 
which  would  in  general  commend  itself  to  the  sense 
of  justice  of  the  world,  although  it  might  neces- 
sarily contain  details  which,  if  published  by  them- 
selves, would  cause  lengthy  public  discussion  and 
delay  the  final  solution.  If  such  an  expectation 
was  entertained,  it  was  not  as  a  matter  of  fact 
fulfilled  in  the  results  of  these  secret  consulta- 
tions. The  method  adopted  did  not  favor  the 
broad  and  permanent  view,  but  rather  the  more 
shortsighted  bargaining  in  which  the  old  diplo- 
macy excels.  In  their  solutions  neither  the  con- 
sultations of  the  peace  conference,  nor  the  sub- 
sequent diplomatic  negotiations  among  the  Al- 
lies, got  beyond  the  old  methods  of  bartering  the 
destinies  of  small  and  weak  peoples,  which  had 
been  used  by  the  Congresses  of  Vienna  and  of 
Berlin  with  disastrous  results.  The  various  con- 
ferences of  1919  to  1920  recorded  a  complete  re- 


RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE      201 

turn  to  the  system  of  secret  diplomacy,  to  such 
an  extent  that  it  appeared  constantly  as  if  the 
plenipotentiaries  feared  to  let  their  doings  be 
known.  Even  when  there  was  no  reason  from 
any  point  of  view  for  concealment,  information 
came  out  in  a  roundabout  fashion  w^hich  left  the 
public  mind  confused ;  as  for  instance  in  the  giv- 
ing out  of  a  decision  regarding  the  fate  of  Con- 
stantinople, and  in  the  reports  concerning  the 
text  of  President  Wilson's  Adriatic  memorandum 
which  were  current  before  its  publication. 

From  the  entanglements  of  this  procedure 
American  diplomacy  did  not  keep  itself  free,  nor 
did  it,  at  this  time,  assist  the  world  in  finding  a 
more  straightforward  method  more  in  accord  with 
American  political  experience. 

The  disadvantages  of  secret  methods  of  trans- 
acting public  business  have  been  brought  home  to 
the  American  people  through  several  incidental 
matters  of  no  small  importance.  It  evidently  was 
the  intention  of  President  Wilson  to  reserv^e 
American  rights  as  to  the  Island  of  Yap  which  is 
a  vital  link  in  the  chain  of  cable  communication 
between  America  and  the  Far  East,  and  a  reser- 
vation of  this  kind  is  indicated  by  references  in 
the  official  minutes,  though  not  by  a  written  proto- 
col.    Without  the  knowledge  of  the  United  States, 


202  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  later  dis- 
posed of  the  mandate  for  all  of  the  North  Pacific 
Islands.  As  this  action  was  secret,  it  could  not 
be  known  whether  the  American  interest  bearing 
on  Yap  Island  had  been  safeguarded  or  not.  It 
was  stated  as  late  as  January  26,  1921,  that  the 
American  Government  was  not  in  possession  of 
the  greater  part  of  the  minutes  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. Notwithstanding  the  protests  of  the 
United  States,  Japan  based  her  claim  to  the 
North  Pacific  Islands  on  the  secret  treaties  made 
during  the  war. 

The  secrecy  of  the  peace  conference,  and  the 
revelations  before  and  during  its  sessions,  con- 
cerning the  secret  treaties  for  the  division  of  the 
spoils,  produced  a  great  disillusionment  in  the 
public  mind.  The  fact  that  the  United  States 
though  asked  to  make  enormous  sacrifices  in  the 
common  cause  had  been  kept  in  the  dark  concern- 
ing at  least  some  of  these  treaties,  and  particu- 
larly of  those  which  affected  its  own  interest,  did 
not  inspire  the  American  public  with  any  confi- 
dence in  the  general  conduct  of  affairs  among  the 
nations. 

After  the  adjournment  of  the  conference  the 
American  President  and  Government  still  contin- 
ued to  take  a  part  in  the  various  attempts  to  set- 


RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE      203 

tie  outstanding  questions,  particular!}^  with  re- 
spect to  the  Adriatic.  "When  President  Wilson 
towards  the  end  of  February,  1920,  addressed  a 
note  to  the  allied  powers  concerning  the  Adriatic 
settlement,  the  documents  and  negotiations  which 
had  gone  before  were  entirely  unknown  to  the 
public.  On  December  9,  1919,  an  agreement  had 
been  signed  by  Great  Britain,  France  and  the 
United  States,  Undersecretary  Polk  signing  for 
the  latter.  On  January  9th,  the  British  and 
French  premiers  had  agreed  with  the  Italian 
premier  on  a  modified  plan  of  settlement.  On 
February  10th,  the  American  Secretary  of  State 
wrote  a  note  containing  President  Wilson's  ob- 
jections to  the  plan  of  January  9th.  The  allied 
premiers  replied  to  this  note  on  February  18th. 
All  these  agreements  and  this  correspondence 
were  kept  secret,  nor  was  President  Wilson's  final 
answer  given  out  for  some  time;  only  more  or 
less  accurate  prognostications  appeared  in  the 
press. 

The  American  Government  at  this  time  was  at 
a  disadvantage  in  not  participating  in  the  ne- 
gotiations directly,  the  American  ambassador  at 
Paris  was  invited  from  time  to  time  to  hear  what 
the  conference  of  premiers  cared  to  tell  him,  but 
the  proceedings  of  the  conference  were  apparently 


204  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

not  transmitted  to  the  American  Government. 
The  British  press  at  the  time  quite  generally  ex- 
pressed great  dissatisfaction  with  the  methods 
followed  by  the  diplomats.  The  Westminster  Ga- 
zette w^rote:  "The  whole  of  both  peoples  is 
acutely  concerned  in  the  result.  We  must,  there- 
fore, register  a  protest  against  the  manner  in 
which  the  negotiations  are  being  conducted. 
They  are  being  carried  on  in  secrecy,  only  broken 
by  unreliable  rumors,  by  the  three  principal  gov- 
ernments. The  peoples  have  a  right  to  know 
what  is  being  done  in  their  name,  so  that  they 
may  be  able  to  protest,  if  need  be,  against  deci- 
sions which  may  affect  their  future  relations.'' 
The  Times  protested:  "We  are  not  going  to 
stand  by  and  have  our  friendship  and  relations 
with  America  jeopardized  by  the  proceedings  of 
a  triumvirate  sitting  behind  closed  doors.  The 
American  democracy,  we  imagine,  will  not  be  less 
resolved  to  assert  their  rights  and  stifle  this  ef- 
fort at  secret  diplomacy." 

At  this  time  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  the  government 
spokesman  in  the  House  of  Commons,  denied  ab- 
solutely that  a  harsh  and  uncompromising  reply 
had  originally  been  drafted  to  President  Wilson's 
despatch,  and  that  it  had  subsequently  been 
changed  through  the  influence  of  Viscount  Grey 


RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE      205 

and  Lord  Robert  Cecil.  The  Times  characterized 
tiiis  denial  as  '*an  example  of  verbal  quibbling 
which  inferior  intelligences  mistake  for  diplo- 
macy," and  maintained  that  '*  though  it  may  be 
verbally  true,  it  conveys  and  is  designed  to  con- 
vey what  is  untrue";  and  the  Daily  Mail  stated 
that  the  country  owed  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  Lord 
Grey  for  his  activities  in  the  matter.  This  all 
illustrates  on  how  insecure  a  foundation,  and  mth 
what  chances  of  confusion,  public  opinion  has  to 
work  in  matters  of  foreign  affairs  where  the  prac- 
tices of  the  old  diplomacy  are  followed. 

The  American  people  at  this  time  very  nearly 
lost  patience  with  the  entire  business,  and  turned 
away  from  European  affairs  with  complete  dis- 
gust. This  is  the  most  outstanding  effect  pro- 
duced by  the  secret  diplomacy  of  Europe  as  far 
as  the  American  people  are  concerned.  The  dan- 
ger now  is  that  their  feeling  of  disgust  and  con- 
fusion, and  their  impatience  with  the  selfish  and 
shortsighted  manipulations  of  European  diplo- 
macy, will  over-emphasize  the  desire  of  America 
to  live  by  and  for  herself  alone.  If  such  a  mood 
and  temper  should  prevail,  it  would  be  a  great 
loss  to  America  and  to  the  world.  At  no  time  has 
the  world  needed  America  more  than  at  present, 
not  so  much  from  the  point  of  view  of  direct  eco- 


206  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

iiomic  assistance,  as  on  account  of  the  fact  that 
American  experience,  principles  and  ideals  con- 
stitute at  the  present  time  the  hope  of  the  peo- 
ples of  the  whole  world;  and  America  could,  if 
she  desired,  exercise  an  enormous  influence  in 
making  the  popular  desire  for  such  action  active, 
vital  and  fruitful. 

But  even  aside  from  the  general  confidence 
which  is  felt  by  the  peoples  of  Europe  and  Asia 
in  the  character  and  ideals  of  the  United  States, 
there  are  a  great  many  specific  contributions 
which  America  could  make  to  the  solution  of  Eu- 
ropean problems.  No  matter  how  much  we  shall 
desire  during  the  next  decade  to  hold  aloof  from 
Europe  and  to  concentrate  on  our  own  affairs, 
nevertheless,  should  European  affairs  go  radically 
wrong  through  a  constant  denial  and  deception  of 
the  hopes  and  aspirations  of  the  people  for  hon- 
est and  sensible  solutions,  America  in  the  end  will 
again  have  to  share  the  burden  thus  laid  on  the 
shoulders  of  mankind. 

The  fundamental  American  principle  that 
treaties  have  the  force  and  status  of  law  con- 
tains in  itself  the  promise  of  solving  some  of  the 
worst  troubles  of  the  world,  if  it  could  be  gener- 
ally applied.  America  should  continue,  for  her 
own  safety  and  that  of  the  world,  to  use  her  whole 


RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE      207 

influence  for  making  that  principle  a  part  of  the 
universal  public  law.  No  international  engage- 
ment shall  be  binding  unless  ratified  by  a  repre- 
sentative body,  and  published  to  all  the  nations. 
Otherwise  it  shall  be  absolutely  void,  and  shall 
not  give  rise  to  any  rights  or  obligations ;  in  fact, 
an  attempt  to  make  an  agreement  contrary  to 
these  conditions  shall  be  considered  an  act  hostile 
to  the  peace  of  the  world.  That  should  be  the 
recognized  law. 

Nothing  shows  so  clearly  how  human  develop- 
ment has  halted  at  this  point,  as  the  fact  that  it 
should  still  require  an  argument  to  show  the  ne- 
cessity of  publicity  and  lawfulness  wdth  respect 
to  the  most  essential  interests  of  the  vast  popula- 
tions that  make  up  the  international  family. 

The  record  and  constant  practice  of  the  United 
States,  as  well  as  her  great  actual  and  potential 
power,  fit  her  above  all  others  to  be  a  leader  in 
the  establishment  of  this  principle.  The  Amer- 
ican nation  possesses  a  great  moral  capital  in  the 
confidence  and  trust  that  the  peoples  of  the  world 
repose  in  it.  No  matter  if  unsympathetic  chan- 
ceries should  plot  to  prevent  America  from  mak- 
ing her  influence  felt  in  the  affairs  of  the  world, 
no  matter  how  European  diplomacy  may  occa- 
sionally sneer  at  American  idealism,  the  peoples 


208  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

■themselves,  great  and  small,  including  particu- 
larly those  areas  so  immensely  important — Kus- 
sia  and  China — would  willingly  look  to  America 
for  leadership  and  guidance,  with  complete  trust 
and  confidence.  When  this  is  fully  realized,  we 
shall  also  be  able  to  judge  how  vitally  what  Amer- 
ica stands  for  in  the  world  will  be  strengthened 
by  a  constant  adherence  to  open  and  straightfor- 
ward methods  in  international  intercourse. 

But  America  herself,  it  will  be  said,  cannot  fun- 
damentally change  the  spirit  that  animates  for- 
eign policies,  and  bring  about  the  universal  use 
of  honest  and  open  practices.  We  are  living  un- 
der a  system  which  is  the  result  of  historic  forces 
that  have  not  yet  fully  spent  themselves  and 
which  put  the  potential  enmity  among  nations  in 
the  foreground. 

I  do  not  believe  that  it  is  necessary  to  shut  our 
eyes  to  reality  and  to  seek  recourse  in  a  Utopian 
policy,  in  order  to  escape  the  menace  inherent  in 
current  international  practices.  If  America  will 
only  not  fall  in  line  with  the  absolutist  tradition 
in  diplomacy,  but  will  emphasize  at  all  times,  with 
all  her  influence,  those  principles  of  international 
conduct  which  our  natural  freedom  from  entan- 
glements has  permitted  us  to  develop  as  of  actual 
experience,  America  will  contribute  in  a  most  po- 


RECENT  AMERICAN  EXPERIENCE      209 

tent  manner  to  the  realization  of  that  new  spirit 
which  must  surely  come  to  deliver  humanity. 
That  spirit  is  not  a  mere  ideal, — it  is  fortunately 
already  present  in  much  of  international  prac- 
tice; but  it  needs  constantly  to  be  followed  up  and 
supported  in  order  that  it  may  become  the  custo- 
mary and  instinctive  guide,  superseding  such 
prejudices  as  are  still  current  which  favor  tor- 
tuous manipulation  and  perpetuate  an  uninformed 
and  confused  state  of  the  public  mind. 

In  order  to  fulfil  this  promise  and  destiny  the 
United  States  would  have  to  rely  in  the  first  place 
on  the  inherent  merit  of  her  ideals  and  princi- 
ples of  action,  and  on  the  support  which  they  will 
receive  from  the  approval  of  the  peoples  of  the 
world.  As  far  as  organized  governments  go,  as 
distinguished  from  the  people,  some  will  be  more 
inclined  than  others  to  cooperate  ^vith  the  United 
States  in  a  reform  of  international  practice. 
There  is  no  question  but  that  the  great  majority 
of  governments  will  thus  cooperate,  though  some 
of  the  most  important  may  for  a  time  be  left  on 
the  other  side. 

With  those  peoples  and  governments  who  are 
in  language,  political  traditions  and  general  im- 
pulses most  closely  related  to  us,  there  should 
grow  up  a  particularly  strong  feeling  of  confi- 


210  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

dence  making  all  our  intercourse  absolutely  open. 
There  certainly  need  not  be  any  secrets  between 
the  United  States  and  the  great  commonwealths 
of  Canada  and  Australia.  Our  interests,  our  con- 
dition, our  institutions,  all  make  for  the  closest 
understanding.  Through  them  there  may  be  also 
realized  that  harmony  which  ought  by  every  nor- 
mal reason  to  exist  between  the  United  States  and 
the  English  people,  and  which  is  disturbed  only 
from  time  to  time  when  the  policy  of  the  British 
government  is  determined  more  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  supposed  needs  of  the  British  Em- 
pire in  India,  than  of  that  of  the  true  tradition 
of  the  English-speaking  world.  I  do  not  think  of 
'treaties  or  of  alliances,  but  of  something  much 
stronger — an  intimate  understanding  among  peo- 
ples, based  on  mutual  trust  and  confidence,  and 
the  consciousness  of  a  common  destiny,  common 
purposes,  and  a  common  belief  in  the  things  which 
'  alone  will  prevent  civilization  from  extinguishing 
itself  in  senseless  hatreds. 


CONCLUSION 

In  modern  diplomacy  there  still  persists  the 
image  of  the  chess  players  intent  on  their  compli- 
cated game,  planning  each  move  with  long  fore- 
sight of  all  the  combinations  that  could  possibly 
be  organized  by  the  opponent.  In  the  popular 
image,  too,  the  great  diplomat  is  conceived  as 
spinning  a  complicated  web  of  actions  and  rela- 
tionships in  which  every  detail  is  subordinate  and 
subservient  to  a  general  dominant  purpose.  Then 
comes  the  international  publicist  and  with  inge- 
nuity still  more  refined  than  that  of  the  imagined 
diplomat,  he  reasons  out  the  innermost  ambitions 
that  dominate  and  inspire  the  makers  of  foreign 
affairs.  So  it  has  remained  possible  for  the  most 
extravagant  imaginary  constructions  to  be  put 
forth  in  volumes  of  sober  aspect,  which  purport 
to  give  the  key  to  diplomacy  or  to  expose  the  per- 
nicious ambitions  of  this  or  that  foreign  office. 
It  has  become  a  game  in  wliich  nothing  is  impos- 
sible to  the  constructive  imagination. 

To  any  one  familiar  with  the  usual  methods  of 
foreign  offices  and  of  diplomatic  representatives, 

211 


212  SECRET  DirLOMACY 

the  idea  that  foreign  affairs  are  really  handled  in 
this  manner,  like  mental  legerdemain,  becomes 
quite  grotesque.  Complicated  manipulations  with 
respect  to  movements  far  in  the  future,  looking 
to  still  more  distant  results, — that  kind  of  diplo- 
matic planning  exists  more  in  the  imagination 
than  in  the  actual  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  In 
the  majority  of  cases  foreign  offices  meet  each 
situation  as  it  arises,  relying  indeed  on  prece- 
dents and  having  certain  underlying  aims  and 
purposes,  but  giving  most  attention  to  the  facts 
immediately  present  and  often  satisfied  with  any- 
thing that  will  case  a  troublesome  or  embarrassing 
situation.  Foreign  offices  indeed  differ  greatly  in 
the  definiteness  and  constancy  of  their  objectives 
and  the  completeness  with  which  they  subordi- 
nate details  to  central  aims.  The  Russian  for- 
eign office  always  had  the  reputation  of  great  con- 
tinuity of  policy;  it  gave  the  central  place  to 
fundamental  objectives  to  which  problems  that 
arose  from  day  to  day  could  be  referred ;  and  thus 
it  solved  them  with  a  cumulative  effect  upon  the 
advancement  of  its  political  aims. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  older  traditions 
of  diplomacy,  there  would  be  a  decided  advantage 
in  definiteness  of  plan  and  in  the  harmonious  sub- 
ordination of  all  details  to  the  main  idea.    How- 


CONCLUSION  213 

ever,  the  advantage  of  this  method  is  frequently 
defeated  through  the  narrowness  of  the  objects 
aimed  at,  when  diplomatic  policy  is  conceived  in 
this  manuer.  Immediate  purposes  may  indeed  be 
achieved  more  readily,  but  the  permanent  results 
will  usually  be  barren  or  lead  ultimately  to  con- 
flicts of  forces.  In  such  a  system  there  is  too 
much  abstraction  from  the  multiform  forces  of 
actual  life;  and  Avhile  those  who  pursue  it  may 
flatter  themselves  that  they  are  making  history, 
they  are  not  often  building  in  accordance  with 
natural  and  historic  forces. 

The  concept  of  diplomacy  which  has  been  criti- 
cized in  these  pages  does  not  exclude  the  possibil- 
ity of  immediate  brilliant  success;  but  its  inef- 
fectiveness appears  when  we  view  it  over  longer 
periods  of  history.  It  is  built  on  too  narrow  a 
foundation.  We  have  seen  that  even  with  the 
greatest  statesmen,  any  plan  of  action  conceived 
in  this  manner  has  such  positive  limitations  that 
the  very  success  in  executing  such  policies  through 
a  shrewd  play  of  diplomatic  forces,  conjures  up 
new  dangers  and  difficulties.  The  Av^sdom  of  no 
man  nor  small  self-contained  group  of  men  is  at 
present  sufficient  to  measure  the  needs  of  society 
and  to  transform  its  impulses  into  effective  ac- 
tion.   A  broader  basis  for  policy  is  needed.    But 


214  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

the  greatest  weakness  of  the  old  method  lies  in 
the  fact  that  just  at  the  very  times  when  men 
are  most  in  need  of  confidence  and  of  a  spirit  of 
reason  and  sane  judgment,  this  mode  of  action 
leaves  the  public  mind  in  confusion,  excitement 
and  the  darkest  fears. 

If  democracy  means  anything,  its  significance 
for  the  welfare  of  humanity  must  lie  in  the  value 
of  allowing  constantly  more  and  more  minds  to 
participate  in  the  great  things  of  the  world.    Not 
only  would  such  participation  seem  to  be  a  nat- 
ural right  of  the  human  mind  but  also  the  things 
most  worth  while  can  be  achieved  only  when  the 
ablest  and  best  can  freely  lend  their  ei¥orts.    To 
all  this  a  narrow  system  of  secret  management  by 
a  limited  hierarchy  is  hostile.     The   old   diplo- 
macy rests  entirely  on  skepticism  as  to  the  wis- 
dom and  self-control  of  the  people.     The  people 
are    merely    material    for    statesmanship.     This 
conception  is  blind  to  the  fact  that  everything  that 
is  great  in  modern  life  has  arisen  through  the 
freedom  with  which  talent  may  manifest  itself 
wherever  found  and  that  in  all  pursuits  of  hu- 
manity that  are  worth  while,  innumerable  minds 
cooperate,  in  a  degree  as  warranted  by  their  ca- 
pacity to  bring  about  sound  action  and  improve- 
ment.    The  older  diplomacy  assumed  that  the  peo- 


CONCLUSION  215 

pie  furnished  only  passive  material  for  states- 
manship to  work  upon,  and  it  saw  in  the  public 
only  potentialities  for  vague  and  general  influ- 
ences which  statesmanship  in  turn  was  to  mold 
and  utilize.  The  greatest  distance  it  went,  was 
to  admit  that  national  policy  must  rest  on  popu- 
lar instinct ;  a  principle  which  is  quite  compatible 
with  the  practice  of  secret  diplomacy.  "WTien  we 
come  to  talk  of  political  instincts,  however,  we 
are  dealing  with  one  of  the  vaguest  and  most  in- 
definite concepts  known  to  thought.  These  in- 
stincts may  be  interpreted  and  given  active  ex- 
pression as  it  suits  any  diplomatic  policy.  Un- 
fortunately the  ''instincts"  most  to  the  fore  are 
not  usually  helpful  to  calm  and  sound  action.  In 
international  affairs,  an  instinctive  dislike  or 
hatred  of  anything  different  has  again  and  again 
been  made  the  basis  of  aggressive  action,  stirring 
up  otherwise  peaceful  populations  to  warlike  and 
murderous  intent.  Great  national  policies  may 
often  truly  be  said  to  rest  on  instinct  in  the  sense 
that  undivided  popular  support  is  given  to  a  pol- 
icy from  a  variety  of  motives  which  are  not  clearly 
reasoned  out  but  which  all  express  themselves  in 
an  overpowering  impulse  which  may  be  called  in- 
stinctive. Thus  the  Monroe  policy  in  which  the 
most  fundamental  motive  is  the  desire  for  peace 


216  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

and  for  the  safety  of  the  continental  position  of 
the  American  nation,  may  be  said  to  rest  on  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation. 

But  it  is  quite  plain  that  unless  what  is  here 
called  instinct  can  be  transformed  into  an  intelli- 
gent, wise  and  discriminating  public  opinion,  such 
instinct  is  but  a  shifting  sand,  affording  material 
which  may  be  molded  into  any  desired  form  by  an 
ambitious  policy  working  through  suggestion  and 
propaganda.  Instinct  can  be  transformed  into  a 
true  public  policy  only  through  publicity  and 
through  the  training  of  large  groups  of  men  to 
see  things  with  true  eyes  and  to  judge  with  rea- 
son and  wisdom.  Here  is  the  crux  of  the  mat- 
ter. Secret  diplomacy  treats  all  except  the  inner 
official  ring  as  outsiders  and  ''persons  without  re- 
sponsibility." Among  these  outsiders  there  may 
be  numerous  persons  actually  better  qualified  than 
the  officials  themselves,  through  experience  and 
thought,  to  judge  of  international  affairs.  No 
one  can  here  assume  infallibility.  Safe  counsel 
can  come  only  if  the  entire  intelligence  and  moral 
sentiment  of  a  nation  can  find  expression  and  if 
its  fittest  individuals  can  concentrate  their  atten- 
tion upon  every  great  problem  as  it  arises.  A 
sound,  just,  wise  public  policy  without  publicity 
cannot  be  imagined.     To   consider   publicity  an 


CONCLUSION  217 

evil,  to  consider  it  as  impeding  the  proper  flow 
of  international  influences  and  obstructing  the 
solution  of  international  difficulties,  appears  as  an 
unbelievable  perversion  when  we  consider  the  true 
implications  of  such  a  thought. 

It  is  therefore  inestimably  important  that  the 
facts  of  international  life,  the  materials  out  of 
which  policies  are  formed,  should  be  known  freely 
and  fully  to  the  public  of  every  nation.  The 
manipulation  of  international  communications  for 
political  purposes  is  the  most  sinister  and  dan- 
gerous part  of  the  system  with  which  secret  di- 
plomacy is  entwined.  According  to  this  theory 
it  is  not  only  not  good  for  the  people  to  know 
everything  but  they  must  also  be  made  to  know 
things  about  the  truth  of  which  we  need  not  bother 
our  heads  but  which  will  stimulate  the  passions 
and  arouse  the  instincts  our  policy  desires  to 
work  upon.  Thus  the  void  left  by  secrecy,  by  a 
concealment  of  the  true  nature  and  character  of  in- 
ternationally important  matters,  is  frequently  sup- 
plied by  an  intelligence  service  carrying  distorted 
and  colored  versions  of  facts;  all  this  confuses 
and  discourages  the  public  mind  to  such  an  extent 
that  it  becomes  unable  to  sever  fact  from  fiction 
and  to  form  a  consistent  and  firm  judgment. 

The  abolition  of  secret  diplomacy  is  not  a  mat- 


218  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ter  of  agreeing  to  have  no  more  secrets.  It  is  a 
matter  of  arousing  among  the  public  so  powerful 
a  determination  to  know,  so  strong  a  sentiment  of 
the  value  of  truth,  such  a  penetrating  spirit  of 
inquiry,  that  the  secrets  will  fade  away  as  they 
always  do  when  the  importance  of  a  situation  is 
really  understood  by  a  large  number  of  people. 

Meanwhile  it  need  not  appear  futile  to  work  for 
the  positive  elimination  of  secrecy.  No  one  can 
doubt  that  the  provision  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  which  requires  that  all  treaties 
shall  be  made  public,  is  salutary  and  that  its  en- 
forcement would  greatly  increase  public  confi- 
dence. But  it  is  necessary  to  go  beyond  this  and 
to  outlaw  any  agreement  which  is  kept  secret,  by 
making  it  the  public  law  of  the  world  that  no 
rights  or  obligations  can  be  founded  on  such  at- 
tempts against  the  peace  and  common  welfare  of 
the  nations. 

The  personal  relationships  of  diplomacy  also 
require  attention.  The  spirit  of  the  Diplomatic 
Service  should  be  transformed  in  accordance  with 
the  modern  organization  of  society.  The  most  es- 
sential weakness  of  caste  diplomacy  lies  in  the 
fact  that  it  does  not  provide  means  for  a  suffi- 
cient contact  among  the  peoples  of  the  world. 
Contact  is  maintained  only  within  a  narrow  class. 


CONCLUSION  219 

The  diplomatic  fraternity  lives  in  its  own  realm 
of  precedences,  rivalries  and  traditions.  To  con- 
fine the  intercourse  and  interchange  of  influences 
so  narrowly,  is  a  great  weakness  of  our  present 
political  system. 

The  diplomatic  office  should  be  conceived  as 
having  the  function  to  represent  not  only  the  spe- 
cial national  interest  of  the  respective  country, 
but  also,  on  an  equal  plane,  its  participation  in 
all  the  activities  and  interests  which  are  common 
to  the  nations  of  the  world.  The  legations  and 
embassieis  should  be  provided  with  a  personnel 
of  attaches  not  only  for  political  and  military  af- 
fairs, but  for  commerce,  education,  science  and 
social  legislation.  All  these  matters  are  already 
dealt  with  to  some  extemt  by  common  action  among 
the  nations.  The  sending  of  ministers  as  dele- 
gates to  international  technical  conferences  has 
often  been  criticized  as  importing  into  such  con- 
ferences the  narrow,  separatist  point  of  view  of 
diplomatic  politics.  It  should  be  exactly  the 
other  way;  participation  in  sucli  conferences 
ought  to  impart  to  diplomats  a  broad  spirit  of  co- 
operation instead  of  a  desire  to  maintain  intact 
a  theoretical  isolation.  That  is  the  essence  of  the 
matter.  As  long  as  it  is  supposed  that  by  jeal- 
ously  scrutinizing  every   international  relation- 


220  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ship  from  the  point  of  view  of  abstract  political 
independence,  and  assuming  that  it  is  best  to 
make  the  very  least  possible  contribution  of  en- 
ergy and  cooperation,  the  national  interest  can  be 
most  promoted;  so  long  will  diplomatic  action  con- 
tinue on  a  strained  basis,  always  being  painfully 
conscious  of  the  potential  enmity  among  nations. 
But  when  it  is  realized  that  in  nearly  every  case 
the  national  interest,  or  the  interest  of  the  people 
of  the  nation  which  ought  to  be  synonymous  there- 
with, is  best  advanced  by  whole-souled  coopera- 
tion in  constructive  work  in  commerce,  industry, 
science  and  the  arts,  then  the  political  factor  of 
diplomatic  rivalry  will  assume  more  just  propor- 
tions as  compared  with  the  other  interests  of  hu- 
manity. 

This  borders  upon  a  very  broad  subject  dealing 
rather  with  general  international  policy  than  with 
the  specific  problems  we  were  considering;  and 
yet  we  ought  to  be  aware  of  this  background. 
We  need  not  give  up  our  conviction  that  the  au- 
tonomy of  the  national  state  must  be  preserved 
and  that  each  political  society  shall  dispose  of  its 
own  affairs  within  its  borders  as  its  wisdom  and 
judgment  may  dictate,  free  from  intervention 
from  without.  But  complete  freedom  of  local 
self-determination  can  rest  only  upon  a  universal 


CONCLUSION  221 

recognition  of  that  right  in  all  othjers,  in  a  spirit 
of  confidence  and  security  engendered  by  the  ab- 
sence of  intrigue  and  secret  ambitions.  In  a  still 
greater  measure  does  the  happiness  of  the  na- 
tional state  depend  on  free  and  full  cooperation 
with  all  others  in  all  pursuits,  activities  and  in- 
terests common  to  humanity  and  in  making  the 
earth  a  place  for  dignified  and  happy  human  life. 
Unless  diplomacy  looks  forward  to  this  and  helps 
to  bring  it  about,  it  will  remain  ensnared  in  the 
old  practices  which  ever  lead  only  to  barren  re- 
sults. 

Lincoln's  simple  faith  in  the  people  has  not  yet 
been  adequately  applied  in  international  affairs. 
International  action  has  shown  the  impersonal 
character  of  calculated  manipulations  coldly  dis- 
posing of  the  rights  and  lives  of  millions  with 
cruel  callousness.  The  last  great  war  has  made 
us  consider  the  relation  of  war  sacrifices  to  the 
daily  welfare  of  the  people.  A  great  deal  of  the 
prevailing  unrest  in  the  world  is  undoubtedly  due 
to  a  lack  of  confidence  that  great  affairs  are  being 
handled  with  wisdom  and  with  regard  to  the  true, 
lasting  welfare  of  the  people  themselves.  It  is 
difficult  to  reduce  to  personal  terms  relations  so 
abstract  and  general  as  those  obtaining  in  inter- 
national affairs.    We  think  of  the  armies  in  ser- 


222  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ried  ranks  and  are  impressed  with  the  impact  of 
their  force  and  the  great  feats  it  may  accomplish. 
But  we  are  too  apt  to  forget  the  individual  des- 
tiny carried  in  every  breast,  the  human  feeling  in 
every  heart,  among  all  the  millions  that  make  up 
this  engine  of  power  and  destruction.  Human 
welfare  rather  than  human  power  has  not  yet 
been  made  the  constant  and  overshadowing  aim 
of  diplomacy.  That  will  be  done  only  when  the 
people  themselves  demand  that  international  af- 
fairs shall  be  dealt  with  in  a  different  spirit  and 
with  other  methods.  Then  we  shall  have  policies 
that  can  be  avowed  and  understood  by  the  people 
who  bear  the  burden  and  who  pay  the  bill. 

The  questions  which  we  have  been  considering 
are  not  distinct  and  isolated  but  are  bound  up 
with  all  that  goes  toward  a  more  adequate  organ- 
ization of  modern  society.  Even  in  the  indus- 
tries, men  are  no  longer  satisfied  with  a  narrowly 
centralized  control.  They  call  for  information 
and  accountability,  they  claim  a  share  in  man- 
agement, at  least  of  an  advisory  or  consultative 
nature.  All  who  contribute  in  bearing  the  risks 
of  industry  demand  to  be  kept  informed  of  the 
policies  and  actions  of  the  management.  In  ever 
extending  circles  men  share  in  the  responsibility 
for  action  taken  in  their  name.    It  is  a  truism 


CONCLUSION  223 

that  risk  is  diminished  and  tends  to  disappear  as 
it  is  distributed  over  greater  and  greater  num- 
bers. Under  our  present  political  system  na- 
tions are  carrying  a  tremendous  risk  in  interna- 
tional affairs — they  are  risking  their  wealth,  the 
lives  of  their  citizens,  their  own  very  existence. 
The  responsibility  for  bearing  these  risks  and 
for  arranging  the  conditions  of  safety  is  now  too 
narrowly  centralized.  It  is  an  elementary  de- 
mand of  safety  that  it  should  be  more  widely  dis- 
tributed, that  a  larger  number  of  competent  and 
representative  minds  should  take  part  in  carrying 
this  burden.  And  they  should  at  all  points  be 
supported  by  a  well-informed  public  opinion 
throughout  the  nation. 

But  there  is  a  condition  that  lies  still  deeper. 
The  popular  psychology  cultivated  under  the  nar- 
row aims  of  nationalism  has  exhausted  itself  in 
international  matters  in  dislike  and  hatred  of 
everything  alien  and  of  all  that  lies  beyond  the 
national  pale.  Such  a  state  of  mind  is  ever  ready 
to  act  the  bull  to  any  red  rag  of  newspaper  sensa- 
tionalism. So,  the  inside  managers  of  diplomatic 
affairs  may  still  say  with  some  justification, 
"Open  discussion  would  too  much  excite  the  pub- 
lic mind."  This  fundamental  condition  cannot 
be  suddenly  purged  of  all  its  potency  for  evil. 


224  SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

Only  by  gradual  degrees  may  an  attitude  be 
brought  about  within  the  national  communities 
which  will  be  more  just  to  the  outside  world  and 
to  everything  that  is  strange  and  unaccustomed. 
What  the  great  imaginative  writers  of  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  accomplished  in 
breaking  down  social  prejudices  and  abuses  will 
have  to  be  done  for  humanity  by  a  new  host  of 
inspired  molders  of  human  sentiment.  We  may 
not  get  rid  of  artificial  hostilities  now  still  nur- 
tured by  nationalism,  until  ideals  of  international 
goodwill  and  fellowship  have  been  expressed  in 
the  form  of  human  experience  and  portrayed  as 
part  of  the  struggles  and  triumphs  of  the  indi- 
vidual human  soul.  Patient,  sound,  upbuilding 
influences  shall  have  to  work  powerfully  on  the 
masses  of  men,  and  on  their  leaders,  before  we 
may  finally  overcome  the  evils  that  express  them- 
selves in  practices  inherent  in  a  system  such  as 
that  we  call  "secret  diplomacy,"  before  the  world 
may  be  made  an  abode  of  mutual  confidence  and 
helpfulness  instead  of  a  house  of  imprisonment, 
suspicion  and  terror. 


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IsvoL.SKY,  Alexander.     Memoirs.     1921. 

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1890. 

Lansing,  Robert.     The  Peace  Negotiations.     1921.     Chapter   17. 

Leutrum,  Countess.     Court  and  Diplomacy  in  Austria.     1920. 

LoFTUS,  Lord  Augustus.     Diplomatic  Reminiscences.     1837-1862. 

LoREBURX,  Earl.     How  the  War  Came.     1919. 

Macknigiit,  Thomas.     Thirty  Years  of  Foreign  Policy.     1855. 

Malmesbury,  Eakl  of.     Diaries  and  Correspondence.     1844. 

Maxwell,  Sib  Herbert.    Life  of  Lord  Clarendon.    1913. 

225 


226  SHORT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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1920. 
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INDEX 


Absolutism,  survival  of,  181  ff., 

208 
Absolutist  politics,  148 
Absolutist    tradition    in    diplo- 
macy, 208 
Adams,  John  Quinoy,  24 
Adriatic  memorandum,  201,  203 
Aelirciithal,  106 
Afghanistan,  157 
Afghan  war,  61) 
Agadir,  81 
Algpt;iraa,  Act  of,  80 
American    government,    16,    18, 

11!),  173.  l!)4ff.,  196 
American  idealism,  207 
Alexander  I,  46 
Alliances,  70,  73 
Alaace-lx>rraine,  64,  121,  123 
Anglo-French    Entente,    79,    89, 

93 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  73,  74 
Antwerp,  91 

Apathy  of  the  public,  172,  173 
Appearances,  32 
Archives,  51 

Armament  interests,  147 
Asquith.  Herbert  H.,  85,  87,  88 
Australia,  210 
Austria-Hungary,  48,  49,  61,  62, 

65,    70,    104,    105,    107,    109, 

110,  120,  121,  123,  124,  132 

Balfour.  Arthur  J.,  140,  141, 
161,  162.  168.  176.  187 

Balkans.  97.  104.  113.  146 

Barnardiston.  Colonel,  91 

Bavaria.  61 

Benconsfield,  Lord.  67.  68,  69 

Belgian  General   Staff.  91 

Belgian  neutralitv,  62,  91 

Benedetti.  53.  62* 

Berchtold,  Count,  104,  105,  106, 
114 

Beresford,  Lord,  87 


Bothmann-Hollweg,     104,     106, 

107 
Beycns,  Baron,  114 
Bismarck,  5,  11,  31,  49,  51,  53, 

61,  63,  64,  70,  140,  184 
Bjorkoe  meeting,  1905,  76 
Blue  Books,  156 
Borgo,  Pozzo  di,  46 
Bosnia,  114 
Bosnia    and    Herzegovina,    65, 

105 
Bribery,  41,  42,  48 
Bright,  John,  55,  67,  157 
British  diplomacy,  20 
Buchanan,  William  J.,  138 
Buelow,  Prince,  76 
Bulgaria,  122 
Byles,  Sir  VV.,  88 

Cabinet,  158 

Cabinet  and  Parliament,  56 

Calli^res,  practice  of  diplomacy, 

27,  29,  32 
Canada,  210 

Canning,  Stratford,  54,  57 
Caste,  diplomatic,  184 
Castlereagh,  47 
Catherine,  Empress,  36,  42,  43, 

44 
Cavour,  60 
Cecil,  Lord  Hugh,  86 
Censure  of  news.   145 
Central   Powers,  120 
Charles,    Emperor    of    Austria, 

121,  123 
Charles  IT.  1.52 
Choradame,  M..  177 
Chili-Argentinian  boundary  dis- 
pute, 138 
China.   117.   126.   127.   143.   190, 

208 
China,    breaking    off    relations 

with  Germany.  127,  128 
Chinese  people,  20 


227 


228 


INDEX 


Chinese  public  opinion,  21 
Chino-Japanese  war,  72 
Christian  ideal,  llJO 
Clarendon,  Earl  of,  55,  57,  155, 

Comite  du  Maroc,  80 
Common  interests,   14,  219 
Communist  Party  and  interna- 
tional atfairs,  179 
"Compensations,"  65,  98,  123 
Conference  diplomacy,  15,  219 
Conferences,  international  tech- 
nical, 219 
Congress,  150 
Constantinople,  54,  201 
Continental  system,  84 
Council  of  Five,  130 
Counter-Insurance  Treaty,  70 
Crimean  war,  54,  55,  56,  59 
Cromer,  Lord,  101,  171,  172 
Cromwell,  34 
Crown,  prerogative  of  the,  153, 

154 
Cyprus  protectorate,  67 
Czecho-Slovakia,  132 
Czernin,   Count,    106,   121,   123, 
124,  169,  189 

Daily  Mail,  London,  205 

De  Bass,  34 

Ue  Tocqueville,  170 

De  Torcy,  81,  41 

Deceit,  28,  20,  39 

Deception,  136 

Declarations,  general,  142,  144, 

186 
Delcassg,  M.,  78 
Dementi,  66,  125 
Democracy,    10,    158,   159,    170, 

172,  214,  221 
Denmark,  37 
Derby,  Lord,  69 
D'Es'tournelles      de      Constant, 

Baron,  82 
Dickinson,  G.  Lowes,  178 
Digest    of    International    Law, 

196 
Dillon,  Dr.   E.  J.,   130 
Dillon,  John,  81,  82,  158 
Diplomacy,  personal,  23,  52,  55, 

184 


Diplomacy  of  authority,  64 
Diplomacy  resembling  war,  49 
Diplomatic  fraternity,  219 
Diplomatic  literature,  51 
Diplomatic    Service,    spirit    of 

the,  218 
Disillusionment,  200,  202 
Disraeli,  50,  67,  68,  69 
d'Orsat,  Cardinal,  30,  33 
Double-dealing,  73 
Drake,  33 
Du  Luc,  Count,  31 
Dual  Alliance,  71 

"Empire,"  68 
Ems  dispatch,  63 
English-speaking    powers,    119, 

204,  210 
Experts,  8,  111 

Falsiloquy,    26 

Far  Eastern  situation,  72,  199, 

201 
Federalist,  150 
Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  113 
Feria,  Duke  of,  33 
Fez,  80 

Forgach,  Count,  105 
France,   48,   60,  61,  62,  70,  75, 

78,  85,  87,  88.  89,  90,  95,  97, 

117,  132,  133 
Francis  Joseph,  Emperor,   105, 

107 
Franco-Hungarian        intrigues, 

132 
Franco-Prussian  war,  64 
Franco-Russian  Alliance,  97 
Franco-Russian     military    con- 
vention  of   August,    1912,   93 
"Frankness,"  32,  40,  64,  143 
Frederick  II,  38,  39,  42,  103 
French  Parliament,  82 
"Friends  of  liberty,"  38 
Foreign  Office  Vote,  186 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 

States,  195 
Fox,  Charles  James,  43 

German  diplomacy.  103 
German-Russian  agreement,  76, 
77 


INDEX 


229 


Germany,  62,  64,  70,  71,  78,  81, 

89,  U5,  102,  103,  106,  176 
Giolliti,  tSiguor,  187 
Gladstone,  67 

Golden  Rule,  47,  195 
Gossip,  137 

Granville,  Lord,  55,  66,  157 
Great   Britain,   48,   65,   67,   72, 
84,  88,  97,  117,  119,  143,  210 
Great  War,  6,  99,  112,  174,  178 
Greindl,  Baron,  94 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  80,  88,  89, 

90,  90,  97,  100,  160,  178 
Gross,  M..  38 

Grotius,  11,  14,  15,  24,  26 
Guillaume,  Baron,  94 

Haldane,  Viscount,  88,  100 

Harris,  Sir  James,  29,  38,  40, 
42 

Harvey,  T.  Edmund,  97 

Havaslii,  Count,  73 

Hoiv  Alliance,  46 

Honor,  110 

House  of  Lords  and  foreign  af- 
fairs, 66,  153 

Hughes,  Secretary,  16 

Humati  equation,  9 

Human  welfare,  222 

Humanitarian   professions,    142 

Hungarian  railways,   133 

Ideals  professed,   117,    142,   186 
India,  20,  210 
India,  frontier  of,  69 
Indifference,  public,   172,   173 
Infallibility  does  not  exist,  176 
Instincts,  215 
Isvolskv,  75,  93,  114 
Italy,  117,  124 
Ito,  Marquis,  73 

Japan,  19,  72,  73,  117,  119,  124, 

126,  127,  142,  143.  199,  202 
Japan,  absolutism,  185 
Janushkevich,  General,  115 
Jay.  John,  150,  194,  195 
Jo'wett,  F.  W.,  85 
Jungbluth,  General,  91 

Kinloch-Cooke,  Sir  C,  87 


Knox,  Secretary,  19,  143 

Korea,  143 

Krupp  Iron  Works,  147 

Labouchere,  50,  51,  55 
Lalaing,  Count  de,  94 
Lamsdorff,  Count,  76,  77 
Lansdowne,  Lord,  73,  79,  96 
Lansiiig-lshii  notes,  199 
Law,  Bonar,  204 
League  of  Nations,  7,  188,  218 
Leutrum,  Countess,  105 
Liberal  theory  of  state,  3 
Lincoln,  221 
Lloyd-George,  122 
London,  Pact  of,  120,  123 
Loreburn,  Lord,  95,  96,  98,  110 
Lords,  House  of,  66,  153 
Louis  XI,  28 
Louis  XV,  52 
Lowell,  J.  R.,  182 
Lytton,  Lord,  172 

Macartney.  Sir  George,  37 
Machiaveili,  11,   14,  24,  28,  40, 

182 
MacNeill,  Swift,  160 
Malmesbury,  Lord,  29,  38,  40 
Manchuria,  143 

Mancliurian  railway  neutraliza- 
tion, 19 
Mandates,   131 
Manipulations.  212,  221 
Mankind,   underlying  unity  of, 

191 
Manteuffel,  50 
Marcy.  Secretary,  50 
MarlboroTigh,  Duke  of,  41 
"Material    for    statesmanship," 

215 
ilatin,  82 

Mazarin,  Cardinal,  33 
Mediterranean  situation,  87,  88 
■Meh(V  de  la  Touche,  33 
Memoirs,    Eighteenth    Century, 

25 
Methods   of   diplomacy   and    of 

private  business,  4,  140,  163, 

169 
Metternich,  35,  46,  47 


230 


INDEX 


Militarists,  German,  105,  185 
Militarists,  Russian,  105,  115 
Military  assistance,  85,  90,  92, 

93 
Minority  interests,  183 
Monarchist  diplomacy,  23 
Monroe  Doctrine,  IS,  215 
Moore,  John  Bassett,   196,   197 
Morny,  Due  de,  53 
Morocco,  GO,  71,  78,  79,  82,  89, 

101,  143 
Murray,  Gilbert,  172 

Napoleon  I,  35,  46,  48 
Napoleon  III,  5,  52,  53,  56,  60, 

62,  63 
Naval  assistance,  87,  90,  92,  93 
Nationalism,  11 
Near  East,  134 
Necessity  of  war,  118 
Newspapers,  171,  223 
Nicholas    11,    56 
Nicholas  III,  75,  77,  115 
North  Pacific  islands,   19,  128, 

202 
Notes,  exchange  of,  November, 

1912,  92 

Objectives,  constancy  of,  212 
Open  covenants,  130 
Open  Door,  18,  144 

Pact  of  London,  120.  123 

Palmerston,  31,  54,  56,   59,   68 

Panin,  37,  42,  43 

Parliament  and  foreign  affairs, 
149  ff. 

Parliament  and  secret  diplo- 
macy, 82,  85,  94,  95,  98,  149  ff. 

Peace  Conference  of  Paris,  129, 
130 

"Peace  of  Asia,"  143 

Pelham,  154 

"People  who  are  not  responsi- 
ble," 168,  216 

Pester  Lloyd,  110 

Pinckney,  44 

Plutocratic  control,  183 

Poincarg,  President,  93,  121 

Poland,  47,  118 

Policy,  diplomatic,  48,  58,  166 


Polish  Question,  118 
Politics,  essence  of,  13,  39 
Polk,   Undersecretary,  203 
Port  Arthur,  surrender,  72 
Portugal,  15,  190 
Potemkin,  Prince,  41,  43 
Press,  control  of,  145,  171 
Pressense,  Francis  de,  80 
Prestige,  176 

Preventive  war,  13,  64,  106,  108 
Private  business  and  diplomatic 

atiairs,  4,  140,  163,  169 
Propaganda,  216 
Prussia,  49,  53,  61,  62 
Public   opinion,  crime   against, 

144 
Public  opinion  and  diplomacy, 

58,   102,   112,  144,  166  ff. 
Publicity,  216,  217 

Rashness,  alleged,  of  the  people, 
177 

"Raw  material  for  brilliant  car 
reers,"  185 

Realpolitik,  103 

Reichstag.  102 

Representative  government,  58 

Ribot,  Alexander,  123 

Roosevelt,  President,  151 

Rosebery,  Lord.  66 

Rosebery,  Lord,  on  Anglo-Jap- 
anese treaty,  74 

Rosebery,  Lord,  on  Entente,  84 

Rosen,  Baron,  74 

Roumania,   118 

Russell,  Lord  John,  52,  57 

Russia,  7,  37,  55.  65.  67,  70, 
75,  78,  97,  104,  105,  108,  109, 
114,  143,  146,  208,  212 

Russian  diplomatic  policy,  112 

Russian  local  agents.  54 

Russo-French  Alliance.  70 

Russo- Turkish  war,  65 

iSalisbury,  Marquis  of,  66,  157 
San  Domingo,  151 
San  Stefano,  treaty  of.  65 
Sandwich,  Earl  of,'  37 
Savoy  and  Nice,  60 
Sazonov,  112,  115,  133 


INDEX 


231 


Schleswig-IlolsU'in,  61 
tSchuvalot  agrt-ement,   156 
iSecrcL  diplomacy,  abolition  of, 

127,  218 
"Siifiet   diplomacy"   used   in   a 

special  sense,  52,  57 
Secret  procedure,  Paris  Confer- 
ence, 7 
Secret   service,   22,   28,   41,   50, 

i;3«,  137 
Secret   treaties,  48,  61,  65,   67, 

71,    76,    78,    79,    113,    11611., 

IIU,  134,  164 
Senate  and  foreign  affairs,  151, 

1<J7 
Servian  question,  104,  108,  113 
Shantung,  117,  125,  128 
Sixtus,  Prince,  of  Bourbon,  120 
South  Pacific  Islands,  lit) 
Soviet  Russia,  133,  179 
Speech  of  August  3,   1914,   89, 

96 
Spheres  of  influence,  79 
St.  Petersburg,  40,  52,  73 
Standing  Committee  of  Foreign 

Affairs,    proposed,    162,    164, 

186 
Standing  committee  on  foreign 

and  colonial  affairs  in  France, 

187 
Stanhope.  Lord,  31 
Stratagem,  138 
Stratford  de   Redcliffe,   54,  55, 

57 
Survival,  13 
Suspicion,    6,    17,    54,    72,    100, 

126,  136.  141 
Sweden,  37 

Talleyrand,  44,  46 
Trmps.  82 
Tibet.  144 

Times.  London.  204.  205 
Traits   de  diplomatie.   Garden, 
48 


Treaties,     publication     of     all, 

188,  205,  206 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  129 
Triple  Alliance,  70 
Trotsky,  179 
Truthfulness  of  diplomacy,  12, 

30 
Tschirsky,  Von,  77,  106,  107 
Turkey,  38,  67 
Turkish  Empire,  60 
Twenty-one   demands,   117,    125 
Two-party  system,  152 

United    Colonies    of    America, 

149 
United    States,    119,    151,    174, 

186,  194  fi.,  201,  209 

Vattel,  26 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  45 

Viviani,  M.,  115 

Walpole,  Sir  Robert,  154 
Walpole,  Horace,  45 
War,  declaration  of,  186,  187 
Washington,      Conference      of, 

1921,  16 
Wells,  H.  G.,  185 
Westminster  Gazette,  204 
Whist,  50 
William  I.  63 
William  II.  75,  76.  78 
William  III  of  England.  153 
Willy-Nicky  correspondence,  75 
Wilson,  President.  21,  129,  169, 

200,  201,  203,  204 
Wotton,  Sir  Henry,  28 
Wyndham,  i53 

Xavier.  Prince  of  Bourbon,  120, 
123 

Yap,  201.  202 
Yerburgh,  Mr..  85 
Yugo-Slavia  and  France,  133 


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